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
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AN EXPERIENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MUSIC

**By
KARL FEININGER**

CONTENTS:
MECHANISM
TEACHING
LUXURY
NECESSITY
MUSICIANS
CRITICISM
PSYCHOLOGY
GENIUS

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INTRODUCTORY

THE conclusions arrived at in this experiential psychology of music are due to an observation of cause, effect, and conduct in the act of music making, covering a period of over forty years.

Music, being a mathematical, a dynamico-experiential, and an executive proposition, offers a field of observation in which all faculties of being are demonstratively engaged. Therefore by taking the creation and recreation of music as a visible manifestation of time, space, place, speed and conduct, an inner and outer rationale of human being has been measurably ascertainable.

In the essay, "Musicians," it was thought to define the nature and extent of the manifold quantities and qualities of outer and inner life, regarding the same subject-matter, as tending to a better comprehension of the relations existing between the Man and his Music.

In the essay, "Psychology," it was attempted to draw a distinguishing line between Reason and Understanding, since these dualisms are being often confounded with each other—a fact leading to rotary and not to direct progression. It seemed necessary, in the interests of gradation, to solve, if possible, this difficult problem by the light of both mathematical and dynamical integers.

The physical touches and modes of attack, illustrated in "Mechanism"—the causal basis on which these essays rest—is designed to dispel supposititious and superstitious notions regarding the mysticism of expression, and for the adoption of a more rational or positive and comprehensive mode of teaching and learning—in an interconnected way—mechanism and expression at the same moment. Besides, the primitive or urgent necessity of teaching and learning how enharmonic or self-same mechanism and expression is, or can be, in the different forms of Cause, Effect, and Mode of conduct, is an indispensable confession or creed for the inner and outer integrality of music. The educational point is: this mechanism suggests to the mind a universal, though minimized, sense of entirety. Its pursuit along these lines necessitates thought, feeling, and action syndetically, or as an indivisible and complementary whole, without which neither a permanently physical nor spiritual basis for conduct can be found and declared. It serves to bring "expression" measurably within the reach of all learners.

To prove "Luxury" of music an educational waste and "Necessity" of music an educational gain, is the purpose of these two essays.

"Criticism" is an effort to show how the proper meaning of the word has degenerated, until the idea of impartial analysis has almost disappeared. We therefore recognize two kinds of criticism: dialectico-schematic (which is not legitimate), and entitative criticism or self-comprehensive analysis. All partial or lesser qualities in man—prejudice, ignorance, credulity as well as incredul-

ity, etc., serve the private quests of dialectico-schematic minds the world over.

In "Genius" the aim was to reduce the ambiguity of the term to a minimum—to something like a categorical brevity—sufficiently so, at least, to prevent the use of the word in a special or private way. A definition of the term may serve to remove, in part at least, the difficulties of recognizing the differences between partial and integral, or between meritorious and meretricious aspirations; and until these differences are plainly seen, let us not flatter ourselves that we possess the standard of common justice or civilization. Many a man has been dubbed "a genius," until the remorseless changes of time proved him an encyclopedic "transient," while on the other hand many "a true genius" has passed by unnoticed by contemporary time, until these same remorseless changes of time lifted, as it were, his true title out of his grave. Our ingrained love of sensation and mystery affords us, after all, but a short and negative enjoyment and compensation as an offset to the trials of life—in no way comparable to what is lost by seeking a merely fashionable or sympathetic and not an entitative standard of appreciation.

The indispensable condition to a work of this kind is the finding of a basis on which, in an unconditional way, the genealogical order of time—as far as it really can concern the psychological status of man—can be demonstratively established—otherwise any product of psychology would eventually determine itself as idly speculative, or of no universal significance or import. In many of the essays on the subject of Psychology the time-standards, respectively of Reason and Understanding—in

the absence of all musical knowledge—have not been observed, or only have been in evidence as transient, or casual of time, or of the time being. This then would declare a dependent, if not self-assumed, premise; and though from such a premise may emanate an irrefutable stream of logic, it would, by the date of its time, necessarily sink into desuetude after having served its day and system. The distinguishing line between Reason and Understanding is, inductively and deductively, observable in the executive moment of music. In this moment are engaged all static and active powers, which, serving basically as the whole number of entitative being, make a genealogical determination of time possible. Cause, Effect and Conduct are an inseparable unity to a creative mind; and hence it is not remarkable, either, that such a constituted mind can never fully agree with a one-sided mentalism or emotionalism, since an apodictically imposed conduct is natively foreign, if not hostile, to all partialized or speculative minds.

The arguments contained herein are neither purely cosmical nor generical ones, but a unity of both, that is: they are simply musical. We may call them mathematico-dynamical arguments and judgments. Music needs not only profundity and acumen but, likewise, sensibility and affection. These latter quantities and qualities constitute a sentiently common basis or the platform of all human endeavor—a platform from which alone particular thought can find a dynamical integer or rationale, by the use of which again the profundity and acumen of musical being can be ascertained. This rationale also conjectures thought and experiential necessity to be enhar-

monic and indivisible. For instance, when Kant declared reason a perfect unity he failed to note that this is not only true from an intellectual or mathematical but equally true from an experiential or dynamical point of view. It is the inner which qualifies the outer viewpoint; consequently, not attuning, he placed the minor before the major proposition, and never observed that the inner not only predates the outer argument but actually includes it antithetically. Now if we attune only within either the mathematical or dynamical category of being and observation, we, naturally, use the thesis and antithesis of the preferred category of argument, but the product—another question—will be merely self-satisfying not all-satisfying, because based on a divided proposition, or a partial comprehension arising from a self-satisfied understanding, or an understanding complete within itself.

It has therefore been held, as a truism in this Psychology, that our intellectual or mathematical abstractions or calculations are not prior but posterior of time and source.

However, be this all as it may: we present this book with the ardent desire that it find an abler pen than the author's, to do justice to the subject-matter herein considered.

The illustrations in "Mechanism" were drawn from life, by Mr. Augusto Bontempi, former Major of Engineers in the Italian Army.

KARL FEININGER.

June 14th, 1909, New York City.

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MECHANISM

MECHANISM

"Take but degree away, untune that string
And hark, what discord follows.

—Shakespeare, in "Troilus and Cressida."

A CLASSIFICATION of music, before coming to the subject proper, would not be an infringement on our time. Since the middle-ages music has been classed as one of the seven liberal sciences, viz.: Grammar, Logic and Rhetoric, constituting the so-called "trivium"; Arithmetic, Music, Geometry and Astronomy, constituting the "quadrivium."

— Classing music with these sciences would, in itself alone, show and prove its place and value as an *exact* science; but the self-evident truth is that the scientific and vital constituents and propositions of music comprise and include, in one sense or another, all the six remaining sciences, since music must have, structurally, its own grammar; intellectually, its own logic; expressively, its own rhetoric; calculatingly, its own arithmetical and geometrical laws and principles, while Pericles and Shakespeare put it into astronomy when they speak of the

"Music of the Spheres." And why not? The physical principle of it is easy of comprehension:—space, hedged by bodies, produces sound, caused by motion.

But according to modern ideas, music partakes of more physio-mental qualities and qualifications than were dreamed of in the middle ages. While externally it remains the same formal science, internally it has since then unfolded and spread into a most universally involved science through the disclosures of virtuosity. Reproductively it is now the most skilled of all the active arts and sciences, with the calculus differential and integral ever needed; educationally its pursuit is so externally and internally inevitable to both body and soul that its executive attainment implicates the learner in ethical or moral science; emotionally it is nothing if not a physio-mental or a practically dynamico-articulative and rhetorical science; physiologically it is a super-eminent and experiential science in one—in fact and principle music seems to include and grasp all kinds of sciences—excepting the lucrative science—a verity well summed up by Carlyle when he said, "See deep enough and you see musically; the heart of nature being everywhere music if you can only reach it."

The pulsations and forces of music are those of all nature. They are in our hearts, brains and language, exalting us to the Infinite. And all personal distinctions are forgotten when we hear and feel the true significance of this God-given language. Nor can we altogether get away from the vital influences of these things, no matter how oblivious or indifferent we are to their existence and presence in us. So trusting to this entitative sense of en-

tirety, we will now more particularly enter into those, to all of us, analogous and vitally interconnected things which music so well reveals, and endeavor to elucidate musical causes and their simultaneously corresponding expressions and conclusions, less from a professional point of view than from that entitative collectivity of thought which is the common attribute of all thinkers the world over, regardless of their occupation.

If preference is given to the Piano, to illustrate what we mean, it is only because the physio-mechanism used in playing it is entirely visible. Yet that does not alter the great fact that the same internal laws and principles govern the playing of all instruments, only externally modified to meet their various structural requirements. Piano-playing is the most visible, singing the most invisible application of them.

Referring then to the physiological motions of piano-playing, we will always find that the employment of certain modes and ways of muscular attack produces certain and strictly related results; therefore all such characteristic attacks or causes and resultant effects or expressions suggest, reasonably, the existence of certain physio-geometrical formations of the hand for producing certain musical effects, the ignoring of which would decidedly show ignorance of the proper external manifestations of internal expressions, or the lack of a well-understood mechanism and its correlated consequences.

We do not claim in case of such a lack of knowledge, that characteristic sentiment or feeling is therefore necessarily lacking in such a rendition, but do claim that the

interpretation then relates more to the intentions of the player than to those literally expressed by the composer—even were the composer the interpreter of his own work; that without a positive knowledge of the relations between cause and effect the reproducer—whoever he may be—cannot design the motion which produces categorical emotions. It seems, therefore, as if physio-geometrical figures, with their principles and laws of motion, should ever be comprehensively ascertained with a view to their categorical expression and fitted to interpret the literal intentions of the composer—which is, undoubtedly, the basis and rule of every first-class and outwardly characterizing rendition. And we go even as far as to say that were such geometrical formations and activities applied on a table instead of a keyboard, they would still characteristically present or convey to the experienced eye what the ear could not then hear, viz., their intended musico-pianistic expression, so proving the positive existence of a physio-pianistic code of signals, which, though devoid of tone, is nevertheless, as comprehensible to the initiated eye as is the language of the deaf and dumb. Such a physio-pianistic code of signals or expression should have, before now, been more definitely ascertained and positively established, so that the reconveyance of music might not altogether be left to the interpretative mercy of temperamental predispositions or idiosyncrasies—usually a mere super or sub-musical tone-sentimentalism, based on a generally inherent sentiency.

But let us explain what are physio-geometrical formations.

Figure 1 shows the uneven length of the fingers in an extended position and resultingly an unsymmetrical curve of the tip-line from thumb to little finger. This flat position, if applied to the key-board, would constitute both the most incomposite and limited way of playing the piano, as shown in figure No. 2.


FIGURE 1.



Now, the reason for the general avoidance of this most unconstrained of all positions is, that technically it cannot be developed into power or shading, due to its flat pose, which also hampers the ready sideways motion of the thumb; but for the lightest or softest modes of

attack it has, within a very limited range, its own native excellence.

FIGURE 2.



We must therefore symmetrize or curve this position if we desire to unfold strength, delicacy, equality, etc.

Figure 3, sketched from above, shows how this curve is symmetrically obtained.

The uncurved or unsymmetrical tip-line of the incomposite pose (because of the much lower station or base of the thumb than of the fingers) has not only been more symmetrized by curving the four fingers and bringing their tips nearer to that of the thumb, but by the aid of this necessary curvature the possibilities of stronger

strokes and sideway motions of the thumb have been relatively secured. (It will be noticed that in securing this position the thumb remains in its primitive attitude. He is the basic stronghold and modifying factor of the hand

FIGURE 3.




though by nature the least movable member of it. This geometrical incurvation enables fingers and thumb to act either separately or connectedly from their own base, the hand.)

Figure 4 illustrates this pose sideways, while at rest. We are now in the first or technical position—the fundamental position from which all others are evolved. Any

comparatively unsymmetrical arrangement or departure from this exact disposition—be it of one or all the fingers or hand—will result in an observable difference of touch or tonal quality and so change the designed cause and effect of this position into another category of musical

FIGURE 4.




expression—to say nothing of the fact, that the mechanical development of the fingers, into strength, evenness, and clarity of tone, becomes almost a physical impossibility. This position must be considered as the proper one for pure finger-training.

Figure 5 shows the raising of the *fingers* to attention or in a striking attitude, without, however, the least

change in the previously assumed position of the *hand*. By the maintenance of this posture of the hand, during the hitting of the fingers, the stronger muscles can be subdued and the weaker ones strengthened—all tending, besides to evenness of touch, to establish the first categorical position of piano-playing.

And now to recognize the figural symmetry and the

FIGURE 5.



resultant expression of this formation by virtue of sight, denotes the possession of a physio-geometrical appreciation. Its recognition and acquirement is positively indispensable as fundamental to all categorically designed changes of expression by means of an altered mechanism, etc.

It is undoubtedly true that correctness of the eye, as

the geometrical sensory, is just as requisite to the accurate exposition of external interpretation as is correctness of hearing, since physio-geometrical figures and their expressive consequences are just as visibly written down in the works of all musical authors, as are time, melody, harmony, temperament, etc., provided the eye has been trained to read expression before hearing it.

Nor do we here imply a merely symmetrical or graceful style of playing or singing, but a positively unconditional observance of and yielding to the causal laws and principles of externally reproducing music.

Style, in spite of its charming aspect and influence, may only be a mere personal interposition between author and listener, in no way inwardly and outwardly related to the original intentions of the composer, simply because his general notation is ably adhered to, for were individual style the thing, lovely or fascinating manners would constitute the true artist. But music-making involves more than an incidental or even inborn style of presentation, for it is a science in itself, be its contents inwardly or outwardly designed. And even though music's reproduction should manifest outwardly a condition of ease and confidence, it is not these qualities alone which constitute the criterion of an able interpretation, since music is not a representation to be measured by style or ease or self-confidence, but by an equimomental adjustment of inner and outer life. And just what this happy assimilation or similitude consists of, or how it is obtained, and to point out the exact difference between a personal and an impersonal style devoid of all affectation, is one of the purposes of this discourse.

Perhaps there is nothing so visibly ingenious, subtle of touch, or so difficult of incarnation and practical exposition, as truly and musically significant mechanism. Now by "mechanism" is understood here more than merely physical skill: it refers to "character" as well; but physical skill is usually the thing termed and understood as "technic." "Technic," seldom including the idea of an expressive mechanism as the better part of skill, therefore stands for an adequate amount of physical fluency to overcome mechanical difficulties, and so conveys but the idea of an outer without, necessarily, an inner sufficiency. "Technic" in this one-sided sense is like Charity—it serves to cover a multitude of musical sins; for finger-volubility is no more an indication of musical than tongue-volubility is an indication of literary intelligence. Volubility is and flexibility may be devoid of concentricity, in which case "technic" is a meaningless success at best, and a musical failure at all times, which no amount of pre-eminent style or confidence of manner can serve to cover up.

The first efforts of learning to master mechanism, and, at the same time, calculated to really unfold the inner life of the learner, must be directed to the outward acquisition of concentric mechanism. This kind of an effort brings the learner at once face to face with self-government, economic reasons and ethical principles, the understanding and embodiment of which are as inestimably valuable to the concentricity to be acquired as to the dispersion of mechanism which, later on, must follow. The principle governing concentric movements is that of economy, the simple rule of which is: *Do not*

make two motions when one suffices. And if this golden rule is not constantly in the mind, ever ready to be studied and applied, even amidst the apparently more causeless actions of scattered movements, the more inner moments of the future artist will turn out in the end to have been but insufficiently understood.

The next step forward is into decentralized motions, or the mechanical position apparently disregarded or dissipated. Now, it is the resort to such motions before economic ones are commanded which obscures distinct musicianship; and aiming to play either inner or outward music in any kind of a way except a designedly causal way, serves to foster musico-phantasticism, or personal display instead of such categorical interpretation as may be needed for all kinds of music.

The causality of the physio-mental executive is ascertainable as long as the body needs a basis, and only in the light of centralized motions can the real meaning of all other or decentralized motions be read aright.

Now, as a matter of common sense, all kinds of positions and their motions—and there are about seven positions which can be deemed categorical—are not only permissible but positively essential to classic expression. All these as well as their respective helping or shading motions—so indispensable to expressive tone-modulation within the confines of categorical declaration—are, *in toto*, rarely instinctively or intuitively resorted to without loss of exact achievement, for they are certainly never ascertainable in a composing nor speculative but only in a decomposing and positive state of mind, since there is no such a thing as any kind of music-making without

methodically classifiable causal means. And again it is only the continuous observance and application of the economic rule, during all kinds of activities, which eliminates the inartistic taint of following prescribed methods or ceremonies, because that observance and application alone can give unmistakable priority to musical intent.


As to methods, there are three kinds: the book method—a progressive arrangement on paper, but for this systematic device by no means progressively suitable to all comers; the eye or physical method—visible on the instrument as a scientific theory of technical matter, or a ceremony due to a personal or preferred conception of mechanism; and the unconditional method—devoid of technical or personal priority, because mechanism and expression are self-same, and the ear, the last—not the first—tribunal of tonal judgment, can thereby be fully satisfied—the result of an imperatively homogeneous understanding for all component parts, which shows an impersonality of attitude alone able to conceive and re-indicate original designs as well as render such conclusions as may further serve to prove the complete though rather obscure inter-connection between mechanism and expression in decentralized music.

The seven measurably categorical positions of the hands in chronological order from the technical or basic position, illustrated by Figure 5, giving as far as was possible, both preparation and consummation, are *visibly* identic with the *hearing* of their resultant musical expressions.

Figure 5, auricularly and ocularly expresses precise or intellectual music and is visibly recognized by the

figurally corresponding performance of all its parts, consequent limitation of action for purposes of scale playing; by simple extension to arpeggio; and by change of the point of support—from hand to forearm—to chord playing.

FIGURE 6.




Its economic attacks are productive of clarity or purity of tone and are primitively conducive to inculcate an accurate sense of time and orderliness, perspicuity of rhythm and conservative use of dynamics. It is productive of what is known as structural or intellectual music and begets, in the learner, an outward appreciation for symmetrical expression.

Figure 6 expresses lyricism or song, and it is easily observed that it is the beginning of decentralization to both eye and ear.

The lyrical or bow position, with its point of support optionally at the knuckles or wrist, or both combined, and certain lowering of the elbow, is expressive of that

FIGURE 7.




roundness and sustentation of tone which so distinguishes the art of song. It is accomplished by refraining from all aggressiveness or height of attack, which, in this case, is confined to pushing or stroking of the keyboard by means of deliberately applied strength or weight of arm or body. The ruling outline of this touch

is curvature, deliberation or the greatest possible closeness of attack with utmost duration of actual contact. And as long as arcuation is in evidence the location of the point of support is qualifiedly articulated to lyrical music. In this picture the ordinary curvature is given.

Figure 7 expresses poetical feeling.

FIGURE 8.



The poetical or suspended position and pendulously applied action is here given in a state of rest or relaxation, with the forearm as the wielder and the upper arm as the supporter of the motion. Tone-sublimation or aeolian lightness of tone is produced by slinging motions and glancing touches whose contact with keys is sensi-

tively instantaneous but whose glancing contact is perpetuated by aid of the tone-holding pedal. The principal consummators of this touch are dissipation of motion and morbidity of contact.

Figure 8 is an impending state for romantic expression, is a composite position of song and poetry, with the point of resistance at the wrist; loose fingers which, how-

FIGURE 9.




ever, remain flexibly resisting upon contact; whole hand and forearm as the wielder and upperarm as the support. The romantic position is expressive of articulative song and incidentally of poetic expression, or when these designs are reversed to articulated poetry and incidentality of song, it then becomes expressive of morbidity and suggestive of souliness or metaphysical presence.

It is produced through a more impulsive pressure—according to called-for preponderance of poetical or lyrical enunciation—than is resorted to in simple lyricism, and less looseness of hand than is given to aeolianism. The attack is made with a semi-yielding tension, which results in rendering poetically or vocally sustained declamatory effects. Its chief mode of production is flexible and elastic resistance with added or deducted weight.

Figure 9 is a reduction or modification of Figure 8,

FIGURE 10 (in preparation).



therewith calculated to confine romantic expression to vocal articulation. The knuckles now crown the position, the upper arm forming its support—otherwise its motions and governing principles are identic with those of the previously given position. Its effect is more that of pathetic voce-poetico utterance—a question but of degree.

Figure 10 implies epic articulation. This attitude completes the dramatic utterance of romanticism—enough so as to eliminate poetry and only oratorially admit lyricalness. The evident combination or gathering of weight, strength and concentration for the touch which

FIGURE 11 (in consummation).




this position manifests—by making the solidity of the shoulder and weight of the body accessories to the attack, with chair alone as basic to elasticity or recoil of the body—serves to make its enunciation energetically heroic, characteristically narrative and peculiarly reflective of self. If Figure 9 showed the minimum of

romantic enunciation this one shows its maximum—which in comparative relation to dramaticalness itself is in return but the qualified minimum of unreserved dramatic utterance.

Fig. 11 shows the consummation of the previously given preparation, enforced by forward inclination of the body to accentuate the attack. The backward incline

FIGURE 12.




of the body would serve to lessen emphasis without however affecting its categorical enunciation. During both forward and backward incline the bodily centre of gravity remains practically unchanged.

With Figure 12 we enter into the sixth or distinct category of articulate sounds or musical elocution.

In this picture the right hand illustrates the manner of dry or humorous, the left hand of sustained or artless elocution or tonal speech. The former is consummated, in this instance, with either inwardly glancing or downwardly given touches, delivered from the hand, or if added wrist, from the forearm; that of the left hand with either forward pushing attacks from the upper arm, or with downward blows from the shoulder. That duration of touch is a notable qualifier of tonal expression is freely admitted; but that manner of attack qualifies categorical expression is no less true. When these two hands were placed side by side in this picture it was done for the purpose of illustrating what variations there can be in a category, as much due to the item of tonal duration as to the general mode of a categorical attack. The design, however, of all staccato, sustained or dry, is to render, more or less, shortness of tone and approximately imitate more the articulated sound of speech—no doubt anomalous to the more melodious project of music, and therefore, a musical simulation of articulation, unless for general purposes of accent or pulsation. Even when vocalized it is but little more native to music, unless we choose to consider such primitive sounds as laughter or the colloquial thraldoms of piano-virtuosity as musical enchantments. Though more or less accentually connected with all categories of utterance, we here desired to treat it as a self-complete order of certain pathetic or humorous expressions, which though somewhat devoid of the singing effects of music, has, nevertheless, its own pertinent qualifications and usages. So while the portamento staccato of this left hand can here express naivety of pathos,

wistfulness, plaintiveness of grief, dignified and mandatory articulation, or render these expressions through the right-hand position less seriously or more light-heartedly, we leave this hyphenated staccato touch and proceed to specialize the daintiness of the un-hyphenated staccato. Its dry or dainty articulation is expressive of ease, lo-

FIGURE 13.




quacity, drollery, whimsicalness, effervescence, order, glitter, gayety, playfulness, happiness, laughter, wit, punctiliousness, technicalness—all qualities more or less derived from a prevailing humor or volatility of accuracy and wittiness. The right hand especially indicates

the manner of mincing crispness and daintiness—should be called the tidbit touch. The motions governing this kind of staccato playing are the glancing, the direct and rebounding, and, sometimes, the stabbing stroke. The thumb in all such cases is an awkward member, and not well fitted for this kind of work, owing to his side-rest and side-way proclivities, is, therefore, best qualified for pivotal work, while the hand is extended or contracted, and lending strength, steadiness and connection to the fingers—otherwise he is, technically, the black sheep of pianism or its very individualistic member.

Figure 14 is the last of the seven characteristically categorical expressions of music. This figure shows the general manner of dramatic or bravura-playing. The purely dramatic or bravura action and touch is seldom, if ever, demanded or warranted for the integral performance of either truly inward or outward music, principally because it in itself smacks so strongly of the pantomimicry of a vividly present and exertive tense. It is best adapted to music whose reason for existence is purely instrumental, or composed and selected for a rendition to be both cause and apology in one for digital display; and is best recognized by personal use of physical force, nervous exaltation energized or concentrated to a reckless display of overcoming real or imaginary difficulties gesticulatively—a ceremony almost invariably devoid of all musical positivism except that of personal virtuosity. So it suits very well to interpret personal perfection in the act of overcoming immense difficulties—internally expressive of personal contempt, defiance and assurance—a mock-heroism, as it were, which neither

good music nor good taste call for, since its expression is less musically than personally effective. The drastic utterance of dramaticism on an instrument is a peculiar absurdity, artistically speaking, because it can positively utter or suggest nothing else than egotistic virtuosity and

FIGURE 14.




everything else but contributive to that. It seems to be delivered from all possible centres of gravity, or a wonderful exhibition of them, the outward success of which is largely due to personality of style and a happening fashion. However, as this mode of expression is rapidly becoming obsolete, though not yet entirely lost, its further

analysis had best be left to such as desire to understand and appreciate it for reasons of their own. The illusion of the dramatic virtuoso is the delusion that performer and instrument are always identic.

These are the seven categories of musical expression,


FIGURE 15.



though some of these are less categorically than measurably musical. But to these positive categories there is a reverse side, the truism of which is that the use of indirect means to an end is ignorance or falsism. If, by way of example, the accurate touch, given again in Figure 15, were essential to the intellectual demands in the nature of

a composition, this particular expression could not possibly be conveyed by either the poetical and lyrical positions offered in Figure 16 or *vice versa*. Such an unhappy application of the right thing in the wrong place is bad judgment, not infrequently brought about by trust-

FIGURE 16.



ingly following a preferred mode of playing, as advocated by particularly inclined schools or teachers. But should the irrelevant motion be consciously applied—*i. e.*, with knowledge of its irrelevance—it would naturally mean either waggery, mimicry, clownishness or parody of expression. However, when ways and means are

spontaneously apt with an original design, the expression is, conditionally or unconditionally, a happy one:—conditionally when this happy aptness is a temperamental coincidence: unconditionally when it is a temperamental appointment. In the former case, though the interpretation is individually correct, it will show the absence of that entitative power whose presence is the indispensable condition of musical and not musico-local genius. The impress derived from a conditional aptness of rendition is amateurish or dilettantic, since it is but featural or manifestly without such ramifications as indicate the presence of a general reserve power; and the rendition, though apt, evidences temperamental particularity and, sequentially, personal assurance of style.

Exaggeration of style or sentiment is expressive of affectation without necessarily coming under the head of virtuosity or dramaticalness; it can occur in any category of expression.


Figure 17 will serve, for instance, to illustrate the exaggeration of poeticalness, so let us analyze the inner attitude of this figure.

In intent it is unmistakably poetical; but in view of the economic rule it is just as unmistakably overacted, for one would first think "Ye gods, what grace!" before being able to think "Ye gods, what music!" provided it could consummate that conclusion. This misdating is brought about by the underlying and too strongly individualized thought about "grace of appearance"; and by this prevailing thought, the musical design of the player is veiled by priority of manner or style. Physio-mechanism should still economically correspond with the

musico-psychological expression or effect noted down by the composer, regardless of category.

And to produce or originate, as well as to reproduce or re-originate, needs, internally, not over or under thought and feeling between cause and effect, but enharmonious thought and feeling between these and the con-

FIGURE 17.



ceptive mind; for whether causes may have to prevail expressively over effects or effects over causes: that rests unconditionally with the dictates of the subject matter in hand. Enharmony always exists between cause and effect—that much is absolutely certain; but whether the

agential mind constitutes enharmoniously a third factor in the duality of cause and effect—that is the eternal question as well as the indispensable condition at the same time. What is usually so misleading to the agential mind, are the vast differences between the appearances of quantitative substance and its qualitative power; yet it must always seek to enharmonize these appearances with itself, otherwise it may only be a conditionally harmonious and not an unconditionally enharmonious factor in the triune entirety indispensable to the entitative utterance of music. Now if the mind will look to causes as first of time in music, it can rest assured that effects must take care of themselves, and so rid itself of unnecessary anxiety on that score—the enharmonious relation of the two warranting this assurance unconditionally. All the more is this assurance necessary, for singleness of purpose, because a great error in effect is produced by the slightest oversight in cause. How easy, for instance, this may come about when causes are not strictly attended to, or the sense of effectuality prevails over the sense of causality may be deduced by the following: the same position can strike three different ways—glancing, punctuating and driving touches (to say nothing of the influence of assistant motions and states of rest during actual contact); and these strokes convey just as much of a difference emotionally to the ear as they do motionally to the eye.

If the visual cause—symbols, time, etc., and a corresponding mechanism—is not correctly adduced, the effect, to the ear, may nevertheless be quite satisfactory; but it will not be in keeping with the notation given, or

the effect prescribed and desired—all of which proves what has been maintained before, viz.: that the ear, or organ on which effect is produced, is *not* the first seat of musical intelligence, and but the last sense to be consulted. Now, if effects dominate, the eye will not be likely to ascertain the cause; but if causes prevail, the whole number, mathematically and dynamically, can be ascertained, and the enharmony of sight, touch and hearing then constitute the absolute certainty of the mind, or the indispensable condition of entitative music-making, or the enharmony of cause with mind establishes all else. It all means that unconditional understanding alone constitutes a prevailing reason, which begets unquestionable or masterful results, because the mind then creates both cosmically and generically, or in the light of universal entirety. Nor can then the necessity of substance be absent from generic thoughts and affections, since the three in one mind constitute entitativity of observation and conduct, or a mind not likely to mistake its own desires or meaning.

Motion is always indicative of power and interpretable as life; life as organic motion and emotion; these both as being and identity; and these again as an agency. And it follows that the constituents of human agency are, (1) motion, emotion, and individualism, naturally; (2) thought, meditation, and judgment, mentally; (3) affections, character, and enactment, generically. So it can reasonably be declared that a creative sense is inherent in all men, and can be intuitively unfolded to universal dimensions and triumphs in all men, provided man

accepts the native conditions of his genius as arousing quantities and qualities.

In analyzing physiological motion (unconsciousness) and psychological emotion (consciousness): potential energy is the determining factor of quality; energy, that of quantity; and such enharmoniousness of the mediative mind only is able to absolutely fix and declare the mathematico-dynamical rationale of any musical subject-matter either to be produced or reproduced.


The motional expressions of energy are: laxity, rigidity; rest, and speed. The emotional expressions of power or potential energy are: indifference, desire; balance and passion; and co-action is polarity or enharmonious mentality. Accordingly, with an enharmoniously constituted rationale, a certain estimate and scheme can be cosmogenerically devised, unfolded, and commanded in music; and from that, deductively or inductively, can be foreknown and appointed the artistic character or conduct of all factors concerned, divisible into permanent categories, each of which contains universal potentialities of physiological expression, or constitute, collectively, entitative utterance.

We come now more particularly to the analyzation of emotive meaning or expression.

Figure 18 is a categorical delineation of the zonal expression of temperament and speed, time and gradation, and color or vibratory intensity. (Unfortunately for this chart, the color gradation had to be omitted on account of the great difficulty of gradually changing in minutest degrees one color into another. So a gradual gradation of color or tone is not much in evidence.)

Light oscillation, distributively or dissipatingly, inclines from perpendicularity to horizontality of motion, producing the primary colors in its gradual transition

FIGURE 18.



from the perpendicular clarity of white into the totally horizontally inclined opacity of black. Colors are, therefore, degrees of reflection and deflection from clarity into

density (or *vice versa*), just as passions are degrees of modulation from intensity into laxity of expression (or *vice versa*), or from verticality into horizontality of intensity.

Now, light oscillations are to the eye what air vibrations are to the ear. Both are the perceptible change of extreme centrality or decentrality during the transition of density into rarity or of black into white (or the reverse); therefore white and black co-exist in sound as well as in light, are governed by the same law, and in both cases are not deemed colors. The principles ruling both are those of absorption and reflection: white and black, to the eye, is either the complete reflection or absorption of light oscillations without being deflected into colors so-called; and to the ear is the complete reflection or absorption of sound vibrations without being deflected into sound colors properly so called, consequently the colorless white and black to the eye is the colorless white and black to the ear. Both of these sound timbres indicate extreme absorption or reflection to the ear, and only when transition begins from one extreme to the other do colors or emotions come into evidence. So motion is the producer of light oscillations into color and achromatism; of sound vibration into passion and apathy; and its dissipation or gravity is vital or dynamical rise and fall. Motion is ever the prime cause; its transitions from verticality to horizontality ever the production of seeable, hearable and feelable color; and music ever the mimetic sphere and demonstration of the cosmo-generical import of motions themselves with their time, space, and place, in the economy of entitative universality. Through motion

comes the same effect to the same brain, only differentiated by the characteristic channel through which it reaches the brain. And only that brain should be called truly educated which can so differentiate, otherwise it will never claim its God-given prerogative, viz.: that it can be and should be enharmonious with all things.

The motion of a definite sentiment has its definite speed, time and color; and the mechanico-figural and temperamental manner of attack transforms or psychologizes the cause into effect and, at the same time, defines the motional, emotional and intellectual status of the player, as being characteristically particular, indifferent or universal.

Now, the seven positions and their resultant categories of expression correspond with the seven primary colors; and in the course of light transition from complete reflection into complete absorption or dissipation, we obtain the following gradually evolved and interconnected results:

Red is the first or basic color to those which surround it, because it is the primeval effect of transition from complete white into color, and therefore the supereminent effect of deflection or ideal archetype of all colors, which, translated into auricular or musical color, implies maximum intensity or pre-eminence of thought or mental emotions and a thereto proportionate minimum of physical activity. So it comes about that red corresponds with Mind and temperamentally with *Largo* (slow), the physical condition of centralized thought, contemplation and self-recognition and the nearest approach of motion to silence—that is, solemnity of action

as basic to the beginning of rotary or revolutionary into evolutionary motion.

Orange.—Through increasing momentum of evolutionary activity, or advancing horizontality of deflection, synonymizes with ejaculation, articulation, speech and song or Lyricism, and coincides temperamentally with Grave.

Yellow.—The further liveliness or volatility or Lyricism accords with Poetry, or the recognized essence of sensation, agrees with Lento.

These first three constitute the trivium of physiological latency, but intensity of contemplation or thought and ideal or soulish perception; the following four the quadrivium of accumulating motion and emotion into gradual enactment, with a correspondingly increasing dissipation of conscious thought.

Green.—The beginning of vitality into more or less reflective enactment—accords with Romanticism, the optimistic worship, recognition and intelligent or mental enactment of exterior with interior nature comparatively, and with the temperamental time of *Adagio*.

Blue.—Dramatico-Idealism, ideal enactment or sublime concept, identicalness and reincarnation of a central idea and unity, harmonizes temperamentally with *Andante*.

Indigo.—Declamation or positive tonal enactment, highest attainment of physical and spiritual life or completeness, generic autonomy and kinship, conforms to *Allegro*.

Violet.—Dramaticalness or passional enactment, creative exaltation above rationalism, or destructive mental

depression below normality, all actions and reactions from uniformity and equity motionally and emotionally, pure individuality, corresponds with *Presto*.

FIGURE 19.



(Of course it should not be forgotten that we are thinking of purely tonal enactments with their respectively self-suggestive moods and musico-physiological expressions.)

So red is the pivotal color and violet its outer boundary; and if red tallies with *Largo* and *Mentalism*, and violet with *Presto* and *Dramaticallness*, it is because the former stands for greatest concentricity or intensity of reflection, and the latter for the least concentricity or intensity of reflection, but the greatest distribution of velocity or vivified activity in regard to both eye and ear, implying, musically, the longest and the shortest centralization of intensity or emotional color, and psychologically the smallest or largest amount of purely physical activity.

But there are unsteady speeds as well, such as the acceleration, robbing or slackening of time. (See Figure 19.)

(Gradation is even more necessary to this than to the previous chart, and its omission deprives it very much of such subtlety as it should evince. The artist tried it—spoiled several copies in the trying—and finally declared he could do no better at present and that it was the most difficult task he had ever undertaken—trying to graduate such a curious thing as this design.)

This confusing chromo represents eccentricity at first glance. But trace it carefully and you will find method in its apparent confusion.

The temperamental zones, given in Chart 18 are herein also given, but a spiral running outward or inward—from or to the centre—threads its way through them and, more or less, destroys the categorical recognition of zonal confines or distinctions. The spiral is a geometrical figure whose principle is the avoidance of interconnection. Its radius, from a fixed point, is never quite normal to

the curve of a completed circle, consequently a proportion is lacking which is, in principle, comparable to irregularity of design and color and also to temperamental eccentricity.

Now, a mentality which expresses itself in such a spirally decentralizing or converging manner, lacks all conception and understanding of categories or their necessities and limitations; and its progression or regression can only imply untrained mental forces with an ungoverned or restless temperament as their driver. Contracting or expanding with but unrestricted thought and force simply constitutes the spiral act of folding or unfolding one's common nature. Is this spiral process the positive or merely the fortuitous right of the individual?

There is such a thing as a cosmo-surpassing identity in all men, and a fully responsible conception of this state is not only possible to every man but intelligently demanded of him for self-preservative reasons, because that identity is the unconditional basis of his native excellence and all-essential for his common unfolding. It is only his eccentric sense of particularity that urges him on to fold or unfold spirally, and so negates or corrupts the positive qualities of his genius. As the senses are the only possible corrupters of his native excellence, it seems positive that upon the correct unfolding of these senses depends to a great extent the truthfulness of his understanding. Musically this spiral procedure is rhapsody, or the expression of erratic or aimless speed-rates. However, it must be admitted that the eccentricity of an irrelevant or mongrel physio-mechanism in music is, by far, more readily exposed by its general results than by its particu-

lar application. All erraticism or aimlessness is sorely in need of native mother-wit.

The subject of expression here entered into would hardly be complete were we not, in a condensed way, to draw attention to the characteristic qualities of classic expression, or music whose cosmo-genericalness of thought has delighted the many, but whose expressive import is realized but by the few.

The following entitative masters of permanent expression, with its various texts of classical inherence (given in the order of respective or successive pre-eminence), date only from the accomplished era of intrinsic music to the epoch of Wagner.

BACH,

both closing and opening an epoch in music, is the first representative master of purely outward phonation in a formal, seriously oratorical and lyrico-technical sense. His structural or musico-architectonic genius has never been equalled for pure entireness of thought, perfection of reasoning, pregnancy of thought and clearness of formal expression.

HAENDEL

is the exponent of outward music in a lyrico-oratorical, dramatico-ideal and vocally technical and declamatory sense. For the distinct utterance of a cosmic sublimity he has not yet been approached.

HAYDN

is the exponent of outward music lyrico-oratorially considered, in a naive, humorous, plaintive, pathetic and descriptive sense. For simplicity and directness of humor and pathos Haydn also remains unexcelled.

MOZART

is the spontaneous creator of outward music in a technico-natural, lyrico-dramatic and oratorial sense. His facetiousness or creative happiness is unrivalled.

BEETHOVEN,

the universal master of ethico-outward and inward music, in a dramatico-romantic, pragmatico-tonal, oratorial, technical and lyrical sense. For grasp of ethical entirety and instrumental depiction his identity is only rivalled by that of Shakespeare—implementally without the latter's possibility of coarser realism.

SCHUBERT

is the exponent of outward and inward music in a lyrico-vocal, lyrico-poetic, lyrico-oratorial, lyrico-depictive, exuberantly formal and technical sense. Schubert is termed the feminine Beethoven, but excels the latter in lyricism and poetry.

MENDELSSOHN,

the exponent of virtuoso outward and inward music in

a poetically aesthetical, ideally reflective, musically suggestive, technically specific and dramatico-lyrical sense. He depicts the dainty as well as the larger expression of musico-poetic aestheticism, in sentiment as well as in perfection of form.

SCHUMANN,

the master of inward and outward music, in a romantic, poetical, emotionally speculative, musically informal but highly impelled technically virtuoso and lyrico-portraying sense. Schumann excels in soulishly morbid contemplation or immediate inwardness.

Grieg also comes under this head, but only in a nationally characteristic way.

CHOPIN,

the exponent of inward music in a technically virtuoso, characteristically temperamental, poetical, lyrical, pathetically declamatory and epico-instrumental sense, limited to the technicality of one instrument. No one has expressed so much generally or more epico-poetically with such limited means. His auto-suggestion is unique.

WAGNER,

the great exponent of psychico-universal music, in a purely dramatical, dramatico-lyrical, romantic, oratorical, lyrical, sublimely passionate, introspectively contemplative, descriptive and freely formal sense. He is the musico-supersensual creator of the modern Music Drama. In

extent of dramatico-psychical expression or soulful vivification of action, not lacking in precise expression when needed, he has not even been approached in either universality or categoricalness of mind.

The masterful expositions of entitative texts, as manifested throughout the works of these great natures, assures us that music is the forceful, colorful and accentual indicator of congenital pathetism which, in combination with cosmo-causative observances, has become a scheme to practically sublimate our worshipful, passionate and supereminent attributes. This pathetism addresses itself to our notice in the three tenses of time, in reminiscent, immanent and divinatory time, determining universally intelligent existences. Of these tenses only the immanent or present tense can be turned from internal or abstracted into external or assertive presence, in which case, however, entitative qualities cease all-reaching announcements and become individual ones, which means, in art, that they are more local than universal of quality and quantity.

There yet remains for estimation the general position of the people and the professional one of the musician, who usually considers himself better informed than are the people, because he has devoted himself to the pursuit of music. Now, whether his claim is justified depends entirely upon with what kind of a concept he has devoted himself to its pursuit—that is, whether he is representative of the instrument, or of music by aid of the instrument. Certain it is that any man becomes only totally professional or conjectural of attitude the moment he but

conditionally lays his hand on either music or instrument, because, on the other hand, it is unconditionally certain that music is a common inheritance and experience, and that by such a limited procedure he is, most likely, to lose touch with the generical power in the masses. The purely professional procedure seems therefore to present to the people but local or uncertain quantities and qualities; it is a state of being which generical nature may repudiate or be indifferent to, unless some unforeseen condition—like fashion, for instance—steps in to save or claim it as its own.

Now the psychological difference between the generical and the specific is this: generalicalness imperatively posits emulation as the inference of universal being; specificicalness imperatively posits imitation as the inference of particular being; so the purely professional attitude seems not as trustworthy as does the common sense one of generalicalness in regard to the attainment of a fixed or settled discernment; and this psychological difference pertains to all subject matters under consideration, and most importantly to that of music. Therein it is the acumen of native versus the acumen of professional sense; and the intelligent or ethical difference between these two is, that emulation dissects and compounds—that is, it seeks internal as well as external understanding, whereas imitation only generalizes appearances, meaning that it perceives and accepts internality and externality at face value or without any further understanding than that governing aspect—lacks, consequently, all reason for existence. In music-making it means that professional psychology is imitative and general psychology emulative—

the latter the kind calculated for all. Considered conclusively—that is in its broadest or moral sense—emulation involves the genuine appreciation and homage which an open and fair-minded character renders gratefully unto the talents or genius of representative men. It is morally courageous to acknowledge the exemplary, true grit and merit to equal it, and a glorious or divine blessing to surpass it. In particular, emulation seeks causes, reasons, and shirks no labor nor impediments to find them, therefore accepting unconditional cognition and responsibility, and repudiating all superficiality, renders account of the generic attributes of man.

Imitation, never analyzing but always criticizing, shirks all direct issues, resorting to exertion or trouble only to put together the appearance of what it self-selectingly believes to be exemplary—a palpable assumption of impressions as causes by reason of merely internal comparableness. How imitation—a spurious process—ever came to be considered as a correct or harmless process, especially in music or educational matters, cannot intelligently be explained except as a thoughtless deviation from sound sense, *i. e.*, to gain time by shirking self-unfoldment. The fact, however, will obstinately remain that imitation is counterfeit, and as such but an ethically dishonest simulation of human thoughts, actions and emotions in particular, sure in the end, or in the midst of a crucial moment, to result in the discomfiture of the counterfeiter, and prove a waste of time. In no wise can the imitative attitude be morally conciliated with the independence or truthfulness which either our nature or art unconditionally stands for. An ethically insincere or tricky

mind can never reach the utterances of real art or generic expression, to say nothing of the fact that its process betrays the entireness of being into the bargain, again meaning a dead loss to human identity, progress, learning and example. Emerson says truly, "Imitation is suicide," and might equally truthfully have added "and emulation is life." The motive of imitative operations is eternally egotistic even though its appliances are as manifold as are the appearances it so furtively and vainly endeavors to simulate; it lacks the elemental reason which first created and offered those appearances to others. Therefore it seems as if purely professional notions or experience, or even a preponderating talent for an instrument, had less to do with the generic side of the subject than the apparently crude or commonplace wholesomeness which has not been subjected to an incidental or sympathetic course of music-training, and more to be trusted to render a common sense judgment than the conditional virtuoso or composer.

On the other hand, it must be freely admitted that the particular understanding of the people is, as yet, too partial or confused to even imagine or anticipate the close relations existing between themselves and music, or what the cosmo-generic nature of music-making holds in store for us all. They seem thoroughly satisfied with the enjoyable or propitiatory side of it, which, at least, has the great merit of sincerity, even if it leads to no particularly generic unfolding nor to an exact grounding of its immense instructive possibilities. Perhaps not a few of them have experienced the discouraging results or tests of critico-

sympathetic instructions, which depend for success largely on the possession of an internal or imaginary or imitative faculty, or what in common parlance is called "an ear for music"; and finding, after trial, that they have not the "requisite ear" have quietly gone back, with some advantages, to the sensuous enjoyment of music as the easier proposition. So, as regards the people, we have on the one side the love of the auricular sensualist, and on the other side the distrustful or skeptical conservatism of not auricularly or partially inclined natures—all of which, unfortunately, accounts for the predominating belief in the personal and not integral nature of music, a mistake which totally denies the all-reaching acquisition of music and leaves the field to specialists and imitators or to the incidental instead of to the unconditional unfoldment of music.

However, be that as it may, common as well as uncommon thought, experience and nature always present unconditional propositions, which, more than anything else, proves that the imitational inceptive attains only an isolated presentation, while the emulative one always attains organic completeness—the imitative initiative being, fortunately for organic completeness or certainty, the inimitable exception to the universal rule, but otherwise a senseless and graceless state of existence.

And, in conclusion, if man's cosmo-generic constitution imposes not on him as long as he exists, an internal and external seeking for adjustment with a Central Cause and Power—for the blessed privilege of knowing and uttering The Word—pray tell what else can human existence intelligently stand for or mean?

TEACHING

TEACHING

"A little learning is a dangerous thing;
Drink deep, or taste not, the Pierian spring;
For shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
And drinking deeply sobers us again."
—Pope, in *Essay on Criticism*.

IN ORDER that we may fully accredit declarations of ability and good will, it is necessary that these declarations should come to us silently re-enforced by an unmistakable presence of genericalness of character.

Now, the teacher is the accredited promoter of moral and disciplinary civilization, and his success depends even more on the unspoken wholesomeness which re-enforces his presentations than upon how much he knows and how correctly he teaches; and if this is true of all teaching, how much more so is it necessary in the instructor of a physio-mentally expressive art, wherein genericalness of utterance is of highest value?

Surely there is no position which involves so much nor carries with it such varied charges as that of the teacher of reproductive music. Consider for a moment that he is intrusted with an education in which many characteristic thoughts, emotions and their manual utterance are working factors of co-ordinate value, and it

seems unlikely that any other one position can exceed or even rival it in its demands for generic presence and largeness of thought and enactment, for purposes of generic character unfoldment in those to be instructed. That by some wise dispensation of Providence the general result is not worse than a waste of time or money, is but the private side of our proposition, therefore only inferentially in evidence on our way to the point of the musico-educational question.

The first obligation we seem to be under, before proceeding to define what may be necessary to the music teacher, is for us to state what we mean by "music."

Music is a sensuous tonal arrangement in which are united supereminent and experiential conceptions. By this unity music is constitutive and regulative of a homogeneous fundamental power or an aggregation of cosmic and generic utterance, presenting a systematic inner and outer totality to the understanding. Music, therefore, plainly shows that pregnant and forceful conditions of thought must prevail not only in tones, but that these tones are actually to be commanded to meaningfully appear by the hand of man, and offer themselves as common revelations from a higher plane of thought and feeling; and, inferentially, what it may all involve to ably communicate such a unique but evidently all comprising and exacting art.

However, the first responsibility for the future success or failure of the neophyte rests upon those who are entrusted with the selection of a teacher. But, unfortunately, selectors usually have curiously inadequate tests

by which to gauge the fitness of the teacher whose services they desire to secure.

Such as have knowledge of playing themselves usually talk "method"—a very relative theme, easily met by the teacher, be it his or somebody else's method, if he is shrewd, in a worldly sense, and a good talker. The "method talk" is weak all around—shortsighted in the selector if he thinks that a preferred method is necessarily a guarantee that transforms the neophyte into a capable performer; evasive in the solicitor if he fully enters into that, or, for private reasons, shields himself behind that view, instead of fearlessly pointing out that "methods"—no matter how good, because they seem to prohibit discretionary measures—are merely theoretically contrived ceremonies of progression, based on a particular experience, which for that very reason come and go constantly. Analytically considered, the "method" agreement is based upon the curious assumption that the relative past and future are both a guarantee of vital presence. But methods are nothing more than promissory notes which on their faces or promises discredit the urgency of the inherent moment.

Those who know nothing of playing or methods try to arrive at a selection by judging from reputation and personal manner; and are approximately near the truth could they but tell, with all their shrewdness, the exact difference between popularity and merit, or what amount of wholesomeness of character was behind a good and personally agreeable exterior and demeanor, or even back of a first-class ability.

Others—and we think the majority—endeavor to determine a teacher by his good or bad playing. This is the least good test of all, as an executory process alone does not constitute the widely differing one of imparting, even if playing is exemplary and accepted as belonging to the proper mode of teaching, since that may widely open the door to imitation under the garb of emulation. Illustrative playing means more the loan than the encouragement of initiative, since it presents effects the causes of which should be first studied and independently ascertained by the pupil, as otherwise it is a process of imparting which emboldens him to evade all causal learning and, instead, but strongly appeals to his experiential sense and recollections of effects without their accurate causes or reasons for existence. The constant search for causes alone tends to particularly able discernment and interpretation; and if after that further, or even particular interpretation is needed—and it always is—it is certainly better sought for and found in the standards of a concert hall than anywhere else.

Now, if there were a test of causal and effectual understanding during its application to the learner's internal and external abilities, with their particular situations and emergencies in relation to the subject matter, that might, at least, measurably indicate the ability of the teacher to deal with a situation as it may present itself. At all events the test then occurs when it can and should be observed: in the act of imparting. Perhaps after that there would exist less guessing, and certainly a more proper basis to conclude from, or for arriving at a cor-

rect estimation of his distinct merits as a teacher than ever can be gathered from his practical executive. Yet even admitting that this final test has been satisfactorily responded to, there nevertheless remains the obvious necessity of granting him, gratuitously, an unswerving and persevering devotion to the necessities of his charge.

There is no quick nor direct test for this devotion, for he may assume this as a mask by controlling his temper; consequently no immediate assurance is possible. It may, perhaps, take years of experiencing his work to gauge his character by conditional or unconditional results ere it is safe to either confirm or deny the wisdom of having selected him.

So what remains finally as the best general—the only possible—solution?

Simply, that teaching will always be solely a position of trust, since capability, honesty, devotion, address and fine playing—all put together—do not necessarily constitute a generical conception of one's work or profession.

If we, on these very broad grounds, now consider that a teacher of executive music has not only to be constantly selective, alert, firm as well as yielding, but that he can easily escape detection as a careless or peculiar teacher, in consequence of the prevailing general ignorance of the nature of music and of the necessity of generical or unconditional relations back of what he outwardly professes to think, be or do, it is not saying too much to claim the position of music-teaching as one of almost unlimited freedom—a freedom only then deserving of trust and confidence when it has been found to be accordant with an unconditional intelligence and character. But the obstacle

with selectors is usually the lack of such an intelligence and character on their part, whereby they could render an able judgment. And the particular cause of this lack is this: While we all possess a prescient sense of reason, most of us do not permit this sense to impress us to the extent of coming to a conscious understanding with it, probably for fear of committing ourselves to certain responsibilities and consequences which we intuitively apprehend but do not care to consciously assume. And the evasion is easily enough adjusted and reconciled in our minds by accepting, without further thought, this prescient sense of reason as protection enough, and that, therefore, we possess a sufficient amount of intelligence to meet all requirements. So usually, on the one hand, withholding from the teacher the necessary interest and confidence is due to that apprehensive ignorance—destined never to be illuminated by experience—which distrusts all men because it suspectingly imagines that self-seeking is the first and only sincere motive power on earth; and giving it indiscriminately to him, on the other hand, is due to that expectant private judgment—experience could never change if it tried—which so hopefully trusts, because it is so easily satisfied and believes that good address is well on the road to professional ability, and that honesty is a delightful security for the thing itself.

Now for the selectors to simply take time and enter with the teacher into the pertinent laws and principles of his art and vocation—which a fair sense and general education sufficiently permit—and observe his selective ability and application of them, is not only the surest way of obtaining such information as warrants a measurably

correct opinion, but also manifests an interest which is decidedly helping and encouraging to the right man in the right place.

However, that all may better understand the different categories or limitations of teachers, we will fall back on a fundamental definition of human nature.

There are but three general types of man who, in an approaching manner, constitutionally represent normal humanity.

The first type of man is predisposed to instinctively and intuitively view external things, which indicates a strong or naturally self-preservative individuality that in feeling and mentality reckons principally with the ego and incidentally with its externality, but endeavors to make it contributive.

This type readily seeks and selectively accepts information, utilizes it shrewdly, often wisely, for its own purposes, but does not like to submit to a formally educational discipline or anything that it chooses to consider as an invasion of the personal right of selection. Its emotional disposition is usually social or even genially tender, witty or good-natured, and, while not deep, can be termed smartly intelligent or facetious. In a personally involved way only can the type rise from individualistic into generic intuitions and comprehensions. As a character the type has usually the courage of its own convictions. It possesses a marked talent or a strong predilection for the more independent spheres of action, and widely or liberally interpretative vocations or professions recruit themselves from this class. Its ideal tendency is proto-plastic or to the first of a kind, for it loves the

unusual or original, and has no scruples about raising itself up to the dignity of uniqueness, even at some cost to itself.

The second type of man is more external than internal, which is indicative of a preponderating mentality over animality, and has, therefore, a lesser instinct for preservation of self. His individuality is qualified by tuition, and often even fettered by taking matters too literally and subjecting ideas to analysis as of first importance, which, consequently, makes him executively *slow* but fair-minded and conservative, with good principles and morality to back him up in life.

An invasion of this type's personal rights is less resented than one of its external or pet ideas, for the impersonal rights are too much pondered over before personal resentment becomes active, while in case of an attack on its pet ideas resentment becomes active at once and the intellectual challenge is instantly accepted and vigorously entered into. The type is devoted to education and a thorough believer in its disciplinary wholesomeness. The acquisition of contributory or confirmatory ideas or knowledge in subjects it favors is warmly welcomed, but it is otherwise averse to what it may consider an uncommon innovation. Sometimes it is conjecturally given to idealism, arrived at by a process of logic from an either generally authoritative or a self-constructed premise. Its memory is often wonderful, but the vital assimilation of all it does remember is usually poor or merely automatic, while its disposition is almost invariably modest, gentle and retiring but opens up among

its class. Its executive side is co-ordinate with the occupation of thinking, writing, teaching or speaking, but averse to the more practical and executive sides of life—so much so at times that, in face of them, it can become very helpless or confused. The learned or literary professions, as well as the exact sciences, recruit from this class. Its ideas are philosophical of nature, while its ideals are only strictly intelligible existences.

The third type of man is a more or less pronounced combination of the first and second types, or an instinctively internal and external man, indicative of genius or as possessing both an identic and generic, or an entitative disposition. Being so strongly two-fold of nature, he is either a sub-normal or a super-normal being, or, in other words, is either above or below the average. Everything about the type centres and depends on the attitude of its will. If weak of will it is vitiated, and sin and virtue, diction and contradiction will alternate with impulsive or inconceivable rapidity, manifesting amazing incongruities of intelligence and feeling and a general want of equilibrium or common sense—the consequence of a strong nature being governed by an infirm will—a weakness brought about by strength of inherent dualism or actionary and reactionary predisposition. On the other hand, when an unquestionable but wisely kind and systematically disciplinary education—by means of physiological or executive demonstration, as best calculated to involve and exercise the discriminative power of its will—has succeeded in balancing or giving this inborn duality an outlet or an engaging occupation, nothing is likely to excel its splendid representation of any vocation it has

chosen or taken to. Then it has understanding forceful enough to prevent the worse than useless attrition of all its more or less antagonistic endowments, and fully value the difference between contradictions and contradistinctions—which means that it can fully realize the psychological moments of relevant and irrelevant limitation, because memory and vital assimilation have then become one and the same thing in form of practical enactment. It is no use to deny that this is really the type of man that God placed unto the world, with the unmistakable proviso that he must unfold should he desire to recreate himself and enjoy or exercise the blessings of a God-given freedom in its only sense.

From this type of man, or representative natures, great characters are obtained, be they affirmatively or negatively what they will: Shakespeares or Napoleons, Prophets or scheming Reactionaries, Saints or Rascals—all from the highest to the lowest, from the best to the worst. Its ideas are paramount and experiential conceptions, both internally and externally adjusted, but depending as to their application on the intelligent freedom of the will.

The world in general, however, trusts either too much or too little to this type of man, preferring the more measurable quantities and qualities of head and heart in the first two classes, because they constitute the customary majority, are, therefore, better understood, consequently more easily guarded against. It is either a lover or a hater of this type, but never quite indifferent as to its presence.

Now the first type, in the capacity of a teacher, would

be more or less partial to the instinctive, emotional and phenomenally showy side of music; the second type would prefer literality and formality, and remain more considerate of the principles and responsibilities of a man and teacher; and the third type may or may not be self-containedly impartial to literary emotionality and spirituality alike—depends on his will. Were he a willing and unconditional teacher his ability and usefulness would surpass that of the previous two types of instructors, but were he, for private reasons, an unwilling or a conditional teacher he could simply become unscrupulous and harmful. In any event, he, however, can recognize ways and means and their respective values best, and, above all, *knows* the right moment for their selection and application, yet can deliberately miss the moment, or, worse still, pervert or exploit it completely through egotism or hatefulness of design.

The partiality of the first two, though not equal to all the demands of an entitatively distinguished art like reproductive music, finds, nevertheless, ample scope therein for the exercising of their respective natures and endowments; and were this not so music could not be the generically characteristic art she is. Therefore their mutual shortcoming consists not in that what they teach or offer is wrong, or, in itself, not taught well, but in the shown fact that whatever they teach cannot be done so in full view and realization of the whole truth or entirety of the subject, and is, for this reason, lacking in cosmogeneric comprehensiveness. We have in these two types an ascending or dynamical internality on the first and a

descending or mathematical externality on the second side, so both are, individually, only approximately near the central or main truth of the whole subject, and, in comparison with each other, contradistinctive enough to hold opposing views. This opposition implies, when fair-minded at all, a categorical preference for one truth at the expense of another equally important, as, for instance—to use the basic comparison—the internality of one type is not causally concise enough and prefers dissipation of thought and fingers, while the externality of the other is causally so painfully precise that it leaves nothing to instinct and self-perception and so eliminates all originality of thought and spontaneity of time. The former prefers unlimited freedom, detests dogmatism, and loves temperamental enactments best; the latter prefers dogmatism, hates unlimited freedom, and loves scientific enactments best—so securing for the moment, it is true, a more thoughtful technic, but at some cost to generic utterance. It is quite safe to say that neither undue dissipation nor centralization will right or adjust itself, artistically, without entitative direction. And the exact inwardness of both extremes is, that on one side there is too much aggregation and on the other too much segregation, consequently the former type coincides with volatility of mind and exuberance of motions and emotions, and the second type with stiffness of mind and parvitude of motions and emotions. It is hardly necessary to draw attention to the fact that their respective disciples or pupils will savour of source and even quarrel with one another if they are obedient to their masters.

The comprehensively promising duality which can so

distinguish the third type of teacher is in the other two only minor and very often only casual. It is true as gospel that the man of parts will always find himself confronted and threatened by the collective interests of the many. Finished details or isolated qualities are certainly not international totalities in art, but only some of its factors or accessories, which, even when ably presented as major propositions, are, nevertheless, no more representative of completeness than would a head or a heart without the rest of the body be representative of man. Such a presentation is merely artful or crafty without the possibility of being masterful. The sufficiency of mind in music consists not of a specifically professional acumen of thought and feeling in any one of its manifold branches, or even in a stinging smartness and comprehension of all its categorical details, but consists of an entire and simultaneously homogeneous attitude of intelligibility, emotions and coinciding conduct, in which an unconditional mentality is the impending or arbitral master of situations and ceremonies.

Now the unconditional knowledge of entirety alone can consummate an artistic appreciation and presentation of any one of its features, as without that kind of knowledge no special feature of art can be ably understood nor fully presented. Neither can the law of proportion be equitably or conclusively applied to one-sidedness or to a principal feature whose general support and form is unconceived, but only to that generically entire composition in man which does make music a universal art. Music, to be an art and not an artifice, must contain the force and thought of unconditional contrast—that is, the principles of affir-

mation and negation; and to be complete even in its parts these principles should be sustained without denial. Both the merely internally or externally predisposed preceptor must, by reason of comparison—if through nothing else—instinctively or intuitionally become aware that what force and thought is within, is being only partially exercised. But being confronted by the unconditional demands of art, without any preparation to impersonally surrender their personal opinions to such impersonal demands, they instigate or excite purely self-devised and self-subsistent propositions, to meet the essential requirements of both art and existence, or as necessary to entitative self-adjustment all around—in such a manner evading the full demands of generic art. So in the course of time or experiential necessity it naturally comes about that the internal or subjective teacher boldly asserts a method or ceremony of his own construction, while the external or objective pedant confidently advocates and shields himself with the authoritative procedure of somebody else's "method" or experience—especially if it just happens to be the vogue. One can, somehow, be at least measurably sympathetic with the internal or instinctive conceptivity of a system, limited as it may be, for this initiative boldness records cravings that indicate the presence of force, strife and character in him, whereas the scientific and self-confessed shielder of himself behind some one else's procedure or success, deserves but the suspicion of one-sidedness or prevailing desuetude, from such as can grasp the differences between galvanizing and vitalizing a method in the course of application. And the results also, which even the most able teaching of merely

emotional or motional music usually inculcate and establish as art, are, for the learner, educationally, not always unquestionably wholesome, either to his particular or general nature and development. For instance: Instinctive or immediately perceptive motions, which derive their outward momentum from only a forceful internality of sentiency, result, if steadily adhered to, in a morbid development of the sensorium—meaning, in the course of time, the constitutional acquisition of mental and temperamental peculiarities—often up to the verge of self-delusion—which in themselves constitute eccentricity of conduct or a peculiar attitude of mind, which as far as it concerns art, remains generically negative or mediocre, but which *may* end in purely emotional notions, and *will* end in not attaining the goal sought and worked for. On the opposite side mechanical motions, deriving their momentum only from a forceful externality of mind, when unremittingly persisted in, result, equally logically, in the constitutional callousness of sentiency, loss of native ideas, expressions and energies—even unto lack of identity—again meaning, in time, constitutional inflexibility or dryness of thoughts and feelings, and are in themselves a musically retrogressive—even though an inherently declarative procedure—likely to end in pedantry, intolerance of mind and littleness of feeling. Both cases are alike devious wanderings in the light of wholesome entirety. And all such progressions, or retrogressions usually end in deterioration. All evolution or change is not always for the better!

It is a most common error to suppose that all desire, and effort to consummate that desire, must imply or mean

the presence of aptitude or the unfolding of skill, and all skill straight advancement towards the artistic goal. But unmistakable unfolding is based upon the unconditional observance and management of physiological quantities in unity with internal qualities—that is, a uniform recognition of their dual characteristics, and, thereafter, the well-grounded belief and faith that, in art, the inviolable or fixed integrality—both regardful and regardless of self—is mysteriously yet clearly found in the enharmonious unity of mental identity with all essential things. With this generico-intelligent idea of one's task the learner has, at least, become comprehensive enough to understand that he must first conquer—not merely control—himself ere he can command the utterances of art—after which both may truly be considered artistically self-same.

However, dualism, contrast or antagonism, is not only the normal condition of the third or generic type of man, but of all men; so reasonably it cannot be that, in a native sense, the two former were born less estimable or gifted than the third type, but that those were originally left too much or too little to themselves, and but for a provided adjustment would have exercised equally well the generic prerogatives of man in any station or occupation. And if any difference thereafter exists in their respective work it is of degree and not of wholesomeness, because every degree and every item in it was perceived and conceived by the light of integrality. We presume altogether too much on special capacity and too little on general aptitude; and it is seldom the capacity, but the personal presumption accompanying the capacity which is

wrong, since it but serves to partialize, if not paralyze, the genericalness in the capacity. Selection is optional, but genericalness is a necessity.

Now as education is considered a self-protecting necessity, its contents and measures are formulated and taken with a view of unfolding outwardly as unconditionally as possible; but the present scheme demands only very fortuitously internal conditions and seems satisfied chiefly with a good memory and an outwardly exact behaviour, hence so often no harmony between inner and outer life. It seems therefore that while education should continue to serve outer accuracy as heretofore, its scheme should necessarily be broadened so as to equally well serve an inner sense of accuracy, which can be easily brought about by subjecting internal life to the outward conditions of time, space and place. Though these are the principal factors of externality, they are nevertheless only casually or professionally thought of in a general education. Utilization of these factors would secure to education all the qualities and quantities of an internal and external arrangement, which, in cause and effect, would virtually constitute what we, with our usual aloofness or helplessness, understand as "special aptitude" or "inspiration." However, be that as it may, only enharmonically constituted educational devices can unite the three types of teachers into one universal representation and each in able accordance with his vocation, regardless of private aspirations or characteristics. And the enharmonic device would soon prove that to be normal and rational, which we now conceive and look upon as "special aptitude" or "inspiration."

The inspirational process, for instance, of external to internal unfolding can be figured out, in music, by grouping fractions into units and subjecting these units to the same speed degree to which previously each of their fractions was held, which seems to prove that, after all, "inspiration" is an exact process of attained composition by means of time and speed. Hence centering motion, the way of external tuition, can be led, aided by the native faculties of instinct and intuition, into internal tuition, by the gathering and increasing momentum of thought, emotion and enactment of a qualified decentralizing speed. It is composite speed which denotes inspiration, because it compels the concealment of self in favor of a spontaneous display of generic nature.

When the nature, forces and limitations of dualistic and antagonistic things are qualifiedly or combinedly exercised, a most practical and wisely wholesome counterbalance or pendency or state of capable arbitration prevails, calculated to make a master of the one who, while contrastingly pitting action and reaction against each other, can, at the same time, also successfully harmonize them without denying to each the rights of existence. Exactly in the equitably rigorous exercising of diversity lies the secret of pedagogic success, and in virtue of this purely entitative measure the educational advantage which the domain of music so easily offers and its comprehensive pursuit so unconditionally demands.

On the incomplete or phasial side music, as an acquisition, cannot fail to disorganize, even when phenomenally successful, or even should it escape the expressive stigma of triviality or egotism. Consequently all true or good

music-making accords with that which is generically wholesome, and all poor music-making just as thoroughly expresses that which is generically unwholesome.

Perhaps the most dangerous feature of purely professional competency to teach music is illtimedness of application. When this happens—even with the best technology and truest understanding of its laws and principles—the application may be worse than useless, because pre-datingly applied it may be deadly discouraging to the more vital needs of the psychological moment. Many a talent has thus come to naught without any fault of its own, just as on the “inspired” side many a one has been dissipated through too much “psychological moment.” Music is an executive, therefore a most vital and practical art; and as such a one all accurate, fruitful teaching of it is not only timely external but also timely internal—so allowing the greatest scope for exercising both an external and internal judgment in a timely sense. Merely stuffing the mind with information may or may not be a stimulus to an executive on part of the learner, but certain it is that information in itself does not necessarily constitute an executive capability in music. The rule which, therefore, must govern all successful, or, rather, competent teaching is, that laws and principles must be introduced in the order of time raised by the characteristic condition of the learner. A misapplication of rules and principles can be worse than having none in particular to apply, because to trust to the willingness and generical naturalness of the learner is, under all circumstances, an essential item and part of good teaching, because it is a native

force in the learner which should never be suppressed but ever rightly understood, ably guided, encouraged and sustained. The universality of art includes all generic forces; and willingness and intuitional nativity are, by no means, the least important ones, because they are the original causes of incarnation. After all, the real incarnation of art shows itself later on to have been but the reincarnation of generic life—naturally on a higher plane—and life is better with common naturalness than ever art can be without it. So it not seldom happens that the successful result obtained by ostensibly partial or even incompetent instructors is due just to their nondescript dependence on the instinctive or perceptive forces present in the pupil; but that mode of teaching, unfortunately, constitutes no specific guidance or the direct unfolding of such native forces to the consummation of a high or valuable educational attainment, for it is, internally speaking, merely the very shrewd or artful but fallaciously crafty nursing of self-education and possible self-deception. Such teachers and learners are never confronted with their shortcomings until a decisive test arises in which their success is just as partial or undecided as their attainment. That is very hard to bear, yet it is only the equitable law of self-adjustment brought home to both teacher and pupil. In view of this danger it seems almost essential to insist on the pledge of some certain method as a safeguard against too much internalism; only that demand certainly intimates that progress is to be confined to a dogmatical text, and able selection or impersonal interpretation is not to be drawn from first sources.

And what is method? In its literal sense a method is the progressive arrangement of technological matter on paper; in its active sense it is a physio-mechanical arrangement of technical motions on its instrument. Now while all this may be thoroughly good and correct as far as it goes, it cannot possibly go far enough to practically meet the size or timeal necessity of everybody alike. So there are two objections to be urged against the acceptance of all pre-timeal orders of succession: first, that whatever a method is it can be nothing in itself, because it depends entirely for its practical usefulness or success on interpretation, communication and vital assimilation or acceptance; and what may be lost thereby on the long road from origin to goal, is not to be estimated by the professor of a preferred order of progression, regardless of contingent circumstances; second, that the acceptance of dogmatico-progressive goodness and certainty is an adherence to the omniscient conceit which gave rise to its inception and construction in the first place—a fact not calculated to recommend its adherer for great discrimination.

Different, however, is the case with an order of progression which only indirectly commits the teacher and learner—that is, when technical material points logically to its inherent self-succession as a method, and is for this reason open to selection at any time, if exact and plentiful enough in itself to meet the requirements of the moment. However, all matter depending on selection is never a method, even though continually mistaken for one, but only a presentation of technical matter acceptable on the strength of its own necessity.

There is a logically inherent succession or unfoldment in the elementality of technic—like that of Plaidy—determined by the categorical requirements of the instrument; but though this elemental technic has, instrumentally, a timeal succession, it need not be so related to the individual requirements of either teacher or learner, and for this very reason cannot very well be termed “a method,” but only an arrangement of elemental technic or matter conditioned by the musico-idiomatic requirements of the instrument, the selection of which must and can theoretically correspond with the contingent needs of the learner.

So no one has yet or ever will be able to offer a progressive or methodical completeness on paper, able to fulfill the continuous requirements of flesh and blood, without the necessity of a still abler selection for some point of time not covered by the method. How, then, with due comprehension, can anybody enjoin or be honestly enjoined to abide by the features of predestination enforcing dogmatic advancement in face of ever arising uncertainties, which certainly have their rise and meaning always in the vitally mental, emotional, ethical and physical composition of both learner and teacher?

With what degrees of completeness professional knowledge and methods can representatively exist, we have endeavored to explain, by indicating the three types of man; so there remains for us to show in which way and to what extent their ethics are likely to be involved musically and pedagogically.

The conscientiousness of the first type or internal man is limited by characteristic self-sufficiency. It is this pe-

culiarity which militates steadily against the expansion of his sphere of usefulness, or, rather, against the symmetry of it. Push self-sufficiency to the limits of its comprehension or knowledge and it will turn and, more or less, successfully twist facts or things to suit its unavoidably self-created theories and propositions. That constitutes and evidences ethical weakness, ruled, presented and upheld by dependence of judgment entirely upon self. And self-sufficiency kills more souls and plagues more charity and kindness than all the apparently worse ills which were fabled to have flown, once upon a time, out of the box of Pandora.

The conscientiousness of the second type or external man is circumscribed by the ideal completeness of his scientific knowledge and impersonal respect for authoritative sources, which, in the mere abstract, constitutes a self-confessed poverty of identic and initiative virility. He is, therefore, likely to be alternately distinguished by two extremes, viz.: either by initial modesty and timidity or, as a reaction, by intolerance of inception and application; and neither proposition is conducive to promote vigorously the extent of his own or the learner's executive side. He, when cornered, must twist theories and propositions to suit facts to sustain himself, and his is usually a dry belief without entitative power of faith.

In both of these cases it is not what has been done but what has been omitted which entangles and perplexes the unfolding of the learner's executive mastery and rationality of expression, or, in other words, the want of an impersonal theory and the sufficiency of a personal

theory prove either too much or too little for all concerned. So it seems left to type three to solve the educational problem as far as it is solvable.

It is the characteristically well-born and ingrained arbitral power of the third type—so indispensable amidst the natural contrasts of physical and hyper-physical dualisms and antagonisms—that is best suited to meet and overcome the perplexities of selection, interpretation, adaptation and presentation. Yet fit as this type is to do the correct thing, successful teaching is thereby not fully secured without due knowledge and help from the unknown quantities and qualities of the learner. Heaven has allowed no man to isolate himself with perfections unchallenged, or the privilege of unconditional completeness without a test to prove them useful, or teach without the moral consent of another, or to be a born teacher by virtue of his professional and characteristic perfections alone. Therefore, viewing teacher and pupil as co-equal in the scale of human endowment and value, there is this difference of state obvious: the teacher is reactionary and retrospective, while the learner is actionary and prospective. Nothing at the outset can, naturally, be further apart or more opposite than these timeal or seasonable attitudes, but to meet they have agreed, which necessitates a mutual abnegation of self. The only ground they can meet on is the moral one of mutual forbearance and enduring patience; and only from thence fairly begins the process of externality enlightening internality, or maturity, immaturity. This one has assimilated analytically, collectively and conclusively the truths of his vocation with its experiential and ethical lessons; the other is to

assimilate these truths as they come, wisely and at the time of his necessity to have them. The concerned but impersonal attitude of the teacher is all-important, and should, first of all, be designed to tranquilize the learner into confidence and receptivity, so that it warrants his belief that truth, capability, honesty and sympathy are his for the taking of them. This belief is the father of faith. Certain it is that the more personality intrudes itself the harder it is to establish this faith, and by so much is the quality or force of unaffected or simple directness lost. The difficulty of demonstration on part of the learner permits only an unfinished application of unconditional accuracy, as theory and practice must go uniformly together, that is hand with mind testing one another as self-same things. Able selection alone can meet the exigencies of the moment; and its dangers are small when resorted to in view and comprehension of art-entirety, but great when exercised in view of mere art-phaseology, or catering to individualism; and in this respect a pre-conceived procedure may be fairly considered to be almost Procrustean, while a self-conceived procedure may be Sisyphæan.

Were pupils all of one calibre, fixedness of procedure could safely be advised and uniformly applied, since principle, law and order could then be adjusted to meet the requirements of all alike; but as no two learners possess a like assimilation, able selection becomes, in itself, an interpretative necessity. All contrasting or contradictory art factors may be considered to be of unconditional worth and necessity, but only in their proper time and place; and only by such a discriminating and discretionary

course can all art factors be made known, as a cohesive yet contrasting art entirety, to the mind of the learner.

Music-making, like religion, is, or at least strongly suggests the mental and physiological need of expression at the same time, and requires the whole presence of man—that is, both particularly and entirely—to consummate completeness of expression.

But, as has been shown, this entirety is not found in the bold externalism nor in the retiring externalism of the human make-up, but in both together, as the arbitral power to adjust—that means a power of identity which tends, through its masterful agency, to self-regeneration as well as to the dimensions of a musico-pedagogic significance.

The only remaining question about the efficacy of such masterful arbitration is: Can it retain the power to endure?

If it cannot endure it never was fully penetrated by the great grace of its power, and consequently had unfolded no perfect will.

The will—which Schopenhauer calls “the fundamental essence of all that occurs, even where there is no choice”—is only then free or complete when it has become identic with the unconditional mind.

Freedom is an idea adapted from nature to which grace adds the enharmonic will.

Considering then that the answer to this question hinges upon the possession of an almost Christlike love, fearlessness and self-effacement, the reply pertains to morality and religion more than to music, therefore these,

and not musical or pedagogical ability, alone must furnish the answer.

Without religious virility the best of all teachers can be no wholly active part of his profession but chiefly reflective of it. This means that the ability to entitatively teach is unfolded from a generically dualistic and impersonal character, unconditionally governed by an ethico-religious strength of the will, though that will is entirely apart from the incidentality of professional knowledge.

Now the serious study of executive music involves the entirety of man fully to this ethico-religious external and internal extent, and is the incentive power which offers him the unfolding of higher thought, rarified emotions and their unmistakable utterance. Therefore a confession to this ethico-religious power is one of the first requisites for entitative—not merely mathematically capable—teaching.

To bring about in others a similar unfolding is the highest and most difficult task of the teacher, for, on his part, the task means the impersonal recognition and adaptation of that part of the whole truth all essential to the urgency of the vital and not theoretical moment, very often, too, without the learner's comprehension of what is being done for him. Supporting this highest task is tactfulness without cunning or subterfuge—the general principle of teaching. This juncture of genericness and worldliness covers the explicatory conduct, with all its possible contingencies, far the best, because it affirms and offers a universality of attitude calculated to convey, to almost every mind, not only the impartial conception and

conviction of truth, justice and learning, but also an encouraging sense of toleration, patience and love of labor, tending to establish and confirm the idea that all learning is impersonal, co-equal, therefore mutual property; that the teacher is as modestly obedient to its calls as should be the pupil. If nothing else could prove that imparting is one thing and knowledge another, these universal demands upon the distinct ability to impart, prove that much at least.

Halved or quartered brains only think within halved or quartered dimensions, therefore possess not that scope of thought which admits the essentialities of a universal unity; and music—like religion—demands a universal number as its magnitude. Incomplete dimensions are strictly individual ones, and individual capacities are always grounded on temporal premises, which, when taking hold of music or religion, are very likely to beget methodical fictions or philosophical sophistries. It is these latter which declare such dogmas as the entitatively disposed brain is likely to differ from, though all brains of integral worth are anxious to acknowledge any dogma based on universal observation, and joyfully admit it as a form of the best knowledge and wisdom attainable. God, for instance, is, or should be, the same truth to all the differing senses and faculties, under any name, since to overlook this undeniable ground and superstructure of being and thought is, virtually, to deny the entitative properties of the mind. This virilly ethico-religious power of the mind is a gracious gift which isolates man from all else on earth. It is an incentive and initiative power the like of which is not outside of man; and though without con-

fessing its inner and outer nativity and presence a man may be an honestly conscientious and able teacher, yet without it he could never rise to the height of a creative artist (nor very well to a significantly recreative one), nor to the pedagogic height of entitative teaching—perhaps not even to the dignity of possessing a character for lasting good and usefulness—and, certainly, can never rise to the height of meriting or apprehending “the riches of God’s forbearance.”

The genius to teach music is of that duality which is able to promote character entitatively, because it does not confound reason with understanding. The generic power is that of reason; the rational power is that of understanding.

It may not be amiss, before we conclude, to draw attention to the ideal abstraction of music from her causal basis or agency. Doing this is followed by the acquisition of a merely contemplative attitude of the mind—a private condition of no earthly use to anybody outside of the self-indulgent possessor of that quality of mind. Now as regards the validity of its discernment, it can only display such extraordinary tastes and opinions concerning the subject matter as are sure to come from a purely internal condition of mind. That these so often pass without controversion is because no being of sense can take them seriously. Nothing is easier or less responsible than such an abstracted or contemplative frame of mind, for all it has done consisted of simply separating cause from effect and constituting effect a cause; and what may follow in the way of understanding is almost too much for any mortal intelligence to encompass and hold fast.

Man and Music are causally inseparable, therefore there can be nothing in music which is not in man or in the flesh; so there exists only one point of view able to conclusively test the whole subject—a unitedly internal and external one.

Unfortunately most people are predisposed to love the non-incarnable or speculative idea best, for private reasons of their own, which, though exceedingly gratifying to themselves, is nevertheless one of the most useless fascinations of leading a merely internal life in music—from which indulgence they could easily cure themselves if they ever would take their ideas seriously and endeavor to realize them practically, by making themselves the humble and prosaic agent of their ideas so that they may become their incarnation. This, of course, would necessitate, first of all, their external and not internal domination, to the extent, at least, of allowing their abstraction to become, in due time, a sublimation of their work-enobled life instead of remaining a weak-minded though strongly sensuous superstition or fascination, or a state of isolation, which is both ways—internally and externally—a needless failure.

To harness those internal ideas—there is, for instance, the instrument designed to be their tongue; its tone with inflections ever ready to be their language; the manner of its utterance the never-failing causes and effects of those ideas. If they have thus been proven as sensibly or intelligently communicable, then let those sensorial and surpassing faculties, as concurrent powers, and which *can* transform practically these implemental means of uttering into tangible ideas, viz.: the enlightened mind, the

disciplined emotions, the freed will, the commanding character of the executive—then go forth as evidence of the fact that the internal existence of man is no less real life because it is ideal. And so one creates in art what without knowledge of art can easily be considered impractical propositions.

In view of this it becomes necessary that the teacher reckon first with the human element of the learner, even before he considers the first proposition of his art, so that the former may be truly unfolded by the well-timed propositions of the latter. And so can always be wisely avoided that art absorb the man or man his art; for if either one or the other happens it is sure to lead to unqualified or unbalanced music-making, or showing, elementally, an undeveloped or misdeveloped sense of religion.

The result of this analysis is, that entitative character is ever the power behind the throne, or that the moral and impersonal character of the teacher is eminently more vital to the interests of all things concerned than the specially existing amount of artistic feeling, understanding and professional aptitude in the teacher. On this basis, too, is able selection assured and the freedom thus granted is sure to be justified.

It is the character, not the ability of the man, that resents corruption—adheres to the truth, morality, responsibility and the impersonal wisdom and management of his trust—and would consider mere personal gain as rank heresy and treason to those who have secured his services, did it conflict with the integrity of his charge.

Such a man is, at least, capable of realizing that every thought, sensibility and act in life is but an identic reflex of the constituent quantities, qualities and energies of that generic power with which we are originally gifted; that the exercising of this power, in an entitative way, alone brings about an aggregation and segregation of its reflex constituents into that characteristically Christian conscientiousness, which further unfolds and strengthens human entity into impersonal endurance and toleration unto the end.

And, on the other hand, nothing permits a profounder insight and is so instructive of man's elemental and mental parts—their quantities, qualities, proportions, forces, sincerities, etc., etc.—than music-making, because that act lends itself so unreservedly to the reflexion and definition of the outer and inner life, baring it to him who can read that manifestation of force and matter, even unto its most particular details and subtleties, for the whole process of serious music-making involves a complete physio-mental unfoldment of man's inner and outer worth at the same time.

The super-imposed principles and laws which should govern and guide all deserving emanations and enactments of human effort and which, in this particular instance, are so evidently needed for able selection and conclusion, cannot, therefore, be reasonably slighted or ignored without indicating the presence of negative, if not inimical, working forces. Generically they are and remain to the inherent sense, all essential and sacred, because genericalness is of the people, and ever intuitively

recognized and wanted by the people in all music utterances.

And had we, in conclusion, to name the greatest as well as most exemplary of all generic teachers, we would call him Christ.

His worship of generic truth; his love of his kind; his hatred of evil; his accountability to his divine affirmative, the Father; his fruitfully blessed knowledge of the relationship of man to the Father, and, above all, his impersonal wisdom of application of the living law of truth, so simple and direct that even children would, unerringly, love and confidently regard his true and loving will, if they could understand nothing else, make him the greatest teacher of us all.

But there is also the particular side of his life, not to be omitted while enumerating his impersonal qualities, viz.: that he gave his life for the unconditional nature of human existence, divinely certain of the presence of that super-imposed or unconditional freedom so graciously entrusted to the body of man by his divine Creator.

And, finally, the motto of the teacher and learner—for one is unthinkable without the other—should be:

With love for all, and but God's mercy for myself.

LUXURY

LUXURY

"Self-robbed victim, of will and purpose rid,
Slave of the beckoning phantom, oblivious
Of the talent lying hid;
Knowing a store of varied fact,
But not the art that transmutes aspiration into act;
Dreamer, thy vague and hopeless quest
Makes thee, of friends, the secret mock; of men of deed,
The tragic jest."

—The Dreamer, by Leon C. Prince.

BY "LUXURY" we mean that dissipation of generical power which is the logical consequence of mere intuitional music-making, especially by those who mean to pursue it either seriously or professionally without offering a requisite openness of mind to analyse and receive tuition unconditionally. Nor do we here refer to those who enjoy music merely generically or as listeners. That is a privileged class. We refer especially to such aspirants as imagine that strong inner forces or convictions can appoint, by virtue of their own inherent power, intelligent outward declarations. Declarations of expression in music are certainly always apparent; but that for this reason they are necessarily also intelligent—is another proposition altogether.

How such a forceful declaration is inoperative, as far

as concerns the very purposes for which it is made, we will endeavor to illustrate, in passing. Of course the illustration, to accord with the nature of the proposition itself, can only be treated in a negative way—a way that shines on the truth by the glaringly self-evident insufficiency of its reasons. While we do not claim that this negative illumination is always to be recommended as wise or necessary, we, nevertheless, enter into its spirit in the profound belief that “a little of it goes a long way.”

Particularly can music-making be regarded as a luxury—*i. e.*, a waste of time—when it serves merely the emotional side of our nature, and that side not in enharmonious accord with external or physiological causation. By this we mean that it is necessary to take into heed both inward and outward factors alike, since the student assumes an ostensible responsibility, or attempts an intelligible interpretation for others; and that this cannot be accomplished on idiosyncratic or local lines, when artistic ones are intended, goes without saying.

Now if one is only after emotional self-confirmation or unmixed self-enjoyment—and that exactly is what it means—all that is required is to eliminate all paramount ideas as to the existence of a categorical responsibility, and easy-row is being harrowed. In this case one centres with visionary might and main upon the virtues of one's own natural forces and—behold! music-making becomes a joyous pleasure—an unfettered language of the soul.

The great advantage of this romantic attitude is quite obvious; it offers the opportunity of being both a whole-souled player and an entranced listener at the same time;

and in spite of the cold fact that tasteful necessities have been preferred to vital ones, it fondly nurses the belief that its attitude is most serious and exact.

Physiologically this beatific condition is always rendered by the sensuous conglomeration of touch and hearing, which are then so perfectly united as to constitute that state of being which the vulgar call "it," but which we prefer to call hereafter "the neuter reciprocal pronoun,"—or "pronoun," for short, with an occasional adjective—since it is a distinguishing identity which can operate on both sexes and come out in a most positive manner.

Now this state or gender adhered to in music is, oftener than not, considered to be a condition conjecturing the presence of a first-class inspiration. Yet should this pronounced state of forceful existence be occasionally weak enough to long for or admit more critical faculties during its enouncements—for example, such an irrelevant sense as an eye that persists in seeing; or a brain that insists upon being intrusively present just then—it would be wise to call upon the state of being which we have, on several previous opportunities, termed "the State of arbitral identity," or the tribunal of last resort. Perhaps it is judicious to draw attention to the fact that there exists quite a number of these "tribunals of last resort," and among them also that of the pronoun; however, we refer only to that tribunal which adjusts universal and not private claims. So if this particular tribunal adjudicates favorably, all will be well—but if not, there either needs to be a new trial if the contrary decision is heeded, or to courageously go on in the course

chosen, depending on particular strength of will and endurance to carry the inspiring assertions of the neuter reciprocal pronoun to a worthy finish. We assume that the self-dependent course has been determined upon, so we will continue to follow what, in the course of time, may possibly happen to the pronoun on its tortuous way to a finish.

Let us say it has just finished its debut before a little audience of friends, called in for the purpose of hearing the wonder. As a consequence of the pronoun's inspirational work the debutant feels uncertain about the solidity of his success. He cannot exactly remember how the whole performance was gotten through with. He remembers incidents but no details nor totalities, consequently tries to remember the amount of applause received and by the amount judge his success. Whatever conclusion he comes to on this point is strictly private. We only know him to be strongly impressed with the necessity of going to a more reputable teacher than the one he has. Of course he consults the pronoun—for pronouns know best—and the pronoun declares that he needs a teacher who profoundly understands and approves of his particular endowments and who would treat them with reverent enthusiasm.

The newly chosen teacher promises much—"just the man," the pronoun declares. He being a man of parts, with a good knowledge of things in general, matters go on lovingly for a while—and in the course of time actually succeeds in placing a laurel wreath—of home growth—upon the talented brow of his genial pupil. On this

occasion success seemed quite decided—and the road to a glorious world-triumph looms up in the distance.

That great friend and mentor, the noble pronoun being, at all times, a suspicious and jealous master, now begins to inspire a noble discontent in the bosom of his protégé—principally at the expense of the newer teacher, who now suddenly—in the glare of the recent success—pales into littleness and desuetude—seems, in fact, to be too insignificant of talent to nurse genius.

And now ardently sighing to conquer continents, pronoun and protégé seek the office of a teacher of a world-wide reputation—and, finally, take the man of the pedagogic hour.

He being a serious man, takes the protégé seriously also, and shows himself as interestedly critical and straight. He remarked, after the protégé's first lesson, that "technic was insufficient, but that practice made perfect,"—which vastly encouraged the protégé—it seemed such simple and direct advice.

In the course of experience he diagnoses the new pupil as "uncertain of quantity, but very promising as to impending qualities, if only—," etc., etc. Nevertheless he remains dutifully determined to do his best, even though his temper is beginning to suffer from certain misgivings that there was something wrong somewhere—hard to deal with without resort to personalities. A blissful unconsciousness fortified by a "matter of course" self-sufficiency is a hard proposition—most difficult to reduce to a proper sense of receptivity—therefore no wonder that the teacher rose, by degrees, from plain directness to impatience; from impatience to brusqueness;

from brusqueness to studied impoliteness; from that to anger, rage and fury—until acute personalities were the order of the day. But the pronoun has not been idle throughout these temperamental changes, on part of the man of the pedagogic hour, and counsels potent resistance to such personal corrections; and the protégé succeeds in proving the courage of his convictions, even if he succeeded in nothing else, until, one day, in ungovernable disgust he notifies the teacher “that he had enough of his insults, and never intended to become ‘a professional’ anyway.” To make a longer story short, especially as from the very first no protégé of the neuter reciprocal pronoun is ever in the slightest danger of becoming “a professional” except in name, we leave them both to pursue their ways as they see fit.

Now this story is intended to convey actual happenings in a serial way. The point of the story is, that the “artistic pronoun,” without the finitude of quantity, is not a force ever intended to wisely conduct its own mode of external pronunciation, but is to be distrusted as a restless, feverish force of predominating sensuality and self-importance, energetically declaring self-sufficiency to constitute real independence or genius. Of course all predetermined conclusions based but on the presence of conditionless or self-seeking forces are emotional chimeras, bound to come to grief; and the stronger such a force searches to find itself, the weaker the success which accompanies it, simply because quantity and quality are forever inseparable things. The very burden of life is to reckon with both, but its greatest triumph is the consummated fusion of the two into one.

It may be mortifying to our pride that the human mind cannot fly freely but has to seek and reckon with the clods for self-preservative reasons; yet so it must be, desire we an unfoldment calculated to make sure of the practical interests we have in view. Simple independence means disciplinary restriction in accord with the facts of a subject-matter, the subject-matter always imposing obedience to the regulations which govern its own external and internal quantities and qualities. But what man may privately design or desire is quite another matter, as has been illustrated. And the moral of this story is, that un-qualified love and self-disciplining ambition lead, unerringly, to disappointed expectations.

Now it is a blunder if any of us imagine that such peculiar beings are brought into the world in a finished state of selfishness, even if selfishness is their predisposition, for it is unreasonable to suppose that they will not yield preconceived notions on points acceptable to their ego. Egotists are not born but reared by early surroundings characteristically less strong or capable than they are. Common nature, in such cases, has been taught, by the inverted method of reasoning, to seek weaknesses in its environments that it may be beholden unto its own strength; and self-sufficiency, having once been posited as an elemental proposition, becomes contemptuous of simple sense and pursues a course of its own, in the firm belief that its manifestations are universal of genus, therefore testimonies of a prevailing genius. A little reflection would show it to be pure self-importance, insisting on going the length of its own tether; so it usually

in the end turns out to be only a strong form of characteristic ignorance totally devoid of the homely features of genius, such as patience and enduring self-effacement. It makes inward haste without outward speed. Instead of submitting to the slow and laborious acquisition of perfect time, and the still more difficult command of music's various temperaments and tenses, without loss of timeal proportions, energies, colors, shades, etc., etc.,—as certainly needed by impersonal interpretation—it overrules all that, in the mistaken belief that a fluent ease or a confident appearance is compensating and sure to make a favorably determining impression. That this is really the first requirement *to* and the last evidence *of* complete mastery is undoubtedly true; but in this case both requirement and evidence, though unconditionally true in themselves, are arbitrary misdates, without any substance or quality than an affected taste or a hollow pathos, urged on by acute self-importance, to ascertain a reasoning or confirmatory success. This mode may serve as a social but not as a musical accomplishment. Ease of language and manner is a personally or impersonally reflective argument; music is not only all of that, but a generico-impersonal demonstration as well. Most plain is the fact that conditional liberties with time, mechanism and temperament show the insincerity, the pretense and the incommunicableness of the player, and at best leave only the impression that a naturally talented being has been, or is being, changed into a merely colloquial character. And this purely internal process, continued in, distorts and dissipates, logically, every serious truth that goes to form generic identity, leaving nothing, in the

end but the singular emotionalist and the capricious thinker supported and encouraged by the generosity of his occupation. Forecast, supplanted by prejudice, has become impossible; patience, consumed by ambition, seems deadly slow, so slow that to get rid of this last guardian of wholesomeness appears a great gain in time, money and growth and the best evidence of prescient genius—all of which, if entirely successful, reaches only a freakishly wonderful competency, bound to live on hope and enterprise, and mental dyspepsia for life. And if the status of a master can be unfolded by possession of peculiar proclivities in one direction we, at least, after forty years of observation, have never seen it conclusively proven nor permanently established. Parnassus was never scaled by following a selfish or a broadly self-devised road; besides one's own way can be only then significant of text *after* Parnassus has been scaled by way of the narrow path.

Colloquially speaking, we all know well that no other art can be as fascinatingly and egregiously illiterate, yet at the same time so sardonically and spontaneously responsive as the purely ideological art of sounds; but formally speaking, we do not know so well that her integral propositions are too cosmo-generical to be lightly disposed of, nor that it is these very propositions which demand a self-effacing adherence on our part to such an unconditionally premised totality. Now only in a colloquial sense does music-making permit one to yield to unqualified or personal fancies and emotions, because to these she conditionally offers the alluring and fascinating possibility of indulging in sensuous composition—not that

of actual music-making, but that of imaginary self or being; and, therefore, to contend in this manner within the circle of self's own preferred energies, is an incipient self-gratification without the opportunity of a formal unfolding. To think, for a moment, that such uncontradictable confessions are the quantities and qualities of talent or genius is a silly conceit of emotional egotism; to conceive, in plain view of the cosmo-generic identicalness of music, that losing touch with the common nature of our genus is really artistic, is nothing better than a foolish aspiration to establish a first-found originality; and to succeed in carrying out such a troublesome program is to be nothing higher than a first-formed freak of the musical persuasion.

However there are other internal motive-powers besides "whole-souled love" for music which can make the pursuit of music principally negative, for instance: the selection of music for purposes of glory, or money-getting, or killing time agreeably, etc., etc. All these usually fraternize with this love, and can be unfolded to a point which makes that "love" a serious ethico-educational failure. Anything short of one's own intrinsic worth will, in time, turn out to be fallible or limited, and can only serve, in the end, to prove that irrelevant incentives directly repulse all such regulative rules and principles as the formal integrality of man and art require, an integrality which so many well-meaning men mistakenly suppose to exist and seek in art alone and not in themselves. Certain it is that selfishly strong and ethically weak motive-powers can never attain the well-classified value of tonal expressions, which arising from

native sources irresistibly appeals to them again. And the belief that certain internal forces are, without further ado than fluent technic converted into correspondingly external effects, is certainly a state of mind which delights in the speculative.

However, of all the irrelevant motive-powers on earth, unqualified and self-seeking ambition—that internal fever and torment of selfish sensuality—is the worst, because in this case it looks not as closely to the command of its subject-matter as to the command of its supposed rewards. Such an unwholesome motive power never impelled any of the great masters, who, after all, were only great because they were, first of all, great commoners—our Bach, Beethoven, Wagner, Shakespeare, etc., etc., or all planets of first magnitude. With such men the weaknesses of the flesh were persuasions but never certainties. The persuasions only indicate the qualities of their private opinions, while the certainties indicate the qualities of their native intelligence. Nor need the two propositions ever be deemed as conflicting, for certainty is a pre-eminently stronger proposition than is persuasion—at least to every fairly thinking mind. So while every one of them surely had all the individual failings of flesh, blood and brains, their integral natures were not thereby touched or mortally corrupted and thus did perfect an everlastingly greater amount of good than bad, during the few years of their stay on earth. We all have, more or less, a strong persuasion to find the negative side of others, from which, when found, we usually manage to draw a considerable amount of certainty in favor of ourselves—a procedure which, in this instance, tends only to

more weaken what good the proposition practically offers : a modicum of self-affirmed truth.

Now, if we think that music-making is really an ideological individualism, depending on emotional preponderance, we think what is, in its general sense, only half true. If this individualism is not characteristically integral it is too half-witted to seek the aid of science except in a casual way ; and again we have the artistic pronoun in the role of a self-established analogon in ardent search for what suits it best. Therefore when one notices the multitude of diverse talents for music, the majority of which come practically to nought, it is not extraordinary at all that there exist prejudices in the minds of sensibly and wholesomely disposed people about the pursuit of music being not only a waste of time and money for a questionable necessity, but evidently an enervating and effeminating pursuit as well. Besides this class there are some people whose observation is unerringly certain but whose intelligent inferences are exceedingly slow, who, therefore, seeing and judging quicker than they can think, have made up their minds that any emotionalist is fit for and can succeed in music-making, if he only makes up his mind ; but there being no mind and only a will, it can never be made up. To be able, however, to understand precisely the dissimilarity between an ego-mania and a self-abnegating mania needs, apparently, more than a quick observation and a private discernment.

But what is the usual corrupter of entirety of character? Nothing else than instilling, as a protective measure, a comprehensive and careful idea about self-same interests, without exact requirements. Character-

istic stagnation can easily overtake that being which at its earliest was not firmly, patiently and lovingly taught to believe and enact at least *one* unselfish virtue for its own sake. And the precise difference between a singular and a plural character is this: the one exacts priority of self; the other priority of kind.

“Character” is strictly a relative term and means nothing more nor less than the aggregation and segregation of experience and understanding, according to one’s own lights or nature. If character unfolds merely by the lights and intelligence of its own nature and not by the lights of an external super-eminence, it implies clearly that its owner has, wittingly or unwittingly, severed himself from the integral interests of his genus, even if that character remains mundanely in accord with its kind—in which case the word “character” designates related and not independent purposes. Dependent individualism is bred, born, nursed, reared and matured by either egoistic or altruistic proclivities; independent individualism by the uncommanded heroism of self-denial, or that state of being from which both egotism and altruism are arbitrarily commanded.

But though the fact is, that an occupation may not need such a quality or state of being as arbitrament implies, it is, nevertheless, certain that its outcome—as to success or failure—is conclusively determined by either the dependently or independently characteristic quantities and qualities of the man who pursues that occupation. In music—no more nor less than in any other occupation—the dependent individual reckons with his employment for its particular worth to himself, and the independent

individual for what it demands of his entire efforts. There can be no doubt as to which one of the two must excel, because there is no doubt that wholesomeness of character, directly or indirectly, contributes to the success of any kind of work—let alone that of music-making which depends entirely for its success upon the equipment of a well-disciplined arbitral presence. And if it should happen, as it often does, that temporal necessity exacts concessions from this presence, so much the worse for the character of the world, the man and the occupation, without greater harm to the principles and necessities of immutable freedom than to hold them in impertinent and fruitless abeyance and momentary suspension.

All art presents immutable conditions and therewith offers only an unconditional command of itself, or no conditions whatsoever.

What we have tried to show is: that the dependent mind speculatively evades the total conditions of musical causation in favor of its choice effects, and that, therefore, it is just as dependently compelled to accept these effects without classification and as masterful. What follows, logically, this state is: that its unskilled and artistically undefinable utterances do not and cannot express exactly what the inward messenger may so deeply and sincerely feel when he utters, and—without necessarily being aware of it—only succeeds in calling attention to the vehicle of his thoughts—the instrument—or merely to his own personality.

Now it is simply the absence of qualified recognition, for the unconditional nature of mechanism, which directly causes the emerge of technic, person or instrumentality;

for were the absolute nature of mechanism both scientifically and ethically considered, it would be, ultimately, submerged by the emerge of its ideology and character. To realize, technically and ethically, the grounds of first causes, is to ensure their effects and results, our discernment and the possibilities of coming to unconditional determinations; for understanding and practicalness—not the forces of sensation alone—are indispensable to the whole truth of a subject. This care is the only way to avoid partial or decided failures, since then the possibilities of self-deception are reduced to a minimum; and the messenger of an inward mission will not believe himself to have been called for a certain purpose, and in the supreme hour of trial become painfully aware that he is saying or doing something entirely different from the certain purpose he has in mind. To put it still more plainly: nothing else than misunderstood—consequently misapplied—perception is or can be at the bottom of every failure, otherwise there could exist no reason why any and every effort should not be made entirely successful.

We have, so far, only followed the pursuit of music-making by a musical or, rather, a sensuously or ambitiously tuneful egotist, therefore we will now assume that the inefficient study of music is carried on by an unselfish and open-minded individual, perfectly willing to subserve, and what other factors are largely contributive to the usual failures in music-making?

No other factors—outside of poor teaching—than an unwarranted super-ideal conception of the nature and purpose of music itself, usually engendered by lack of

educational and ethical standards, to offset or counterbalance the musical deficiencies or limitations of the instrument to which ideas are entrusted for utterance.

Purely tonally speaking all expressive sounds are calculated to insidiously fascinate and absorb sensuality, and thus influence the mind to forfeit its conscious prerogatives, permitting the glowing effect to predate the no less sentient but darker and, to the majority, therefore less attractive cause.

Purely instrumentally speaking—as an instance—the facile and only vocally suggestive piano is well calculated to establish the delusion of phenomenal over substantial priority.

And why is the piano, particularly, such a danger to the pursuit of an external music-culture?

For three quite weighty reasons: by its inherent breathlessness; all too ready response to any kind of an attack; and by its want of equal tone-sustainment.

Though these defects by no means impair its immense usefulness, they should, nevertheless, be seriously taken into consideration, yet no more or less so than the defects of any other instrument, for, indeed, every instrument can breed certain idiosyncrasies in its devotee, if he is not always careful of its natural restrictions and places himself not intelligently above these. All instruments independent of breathing or bowing are constitutionally ungrammatical. The piano is the favorite implement for tonal misuse the world over, because it invites everybody to play it; and as everybody has, naturally, an elemental sensuality—grammar or no grammar—and a desire to listen to its expression, even in the form of noise,

the piano, even with its nobler qualities, but too well also serves tasteless ones. But among the defects enumerated its greatest one is—from a vocal view-point—its want of tone-sustainment or immediate decrease of tone-power, which makes the art of song only suggestive—an incident instead of a destiny. The influence of this is likely to encourage extravagant speed-rates, to keep up a constantly vanishing tone-power, and therewith invites to idiomatic interpretations. What is essential to off-set the limitations or imperfections of all instruments is simply to accept them as vehicularly designed, for the far more important purpose of uttering integral propositions. If we look to ourselves for the correct interpretation of propositions, instead of to the accidentalities and incident-alties of instruments and compositions, we are less likely to be mistaken, for then we are, at least, in the path which leads to the unfolding of independence, or the ability to utter others as they would be uttered. And that unfoldment once attained we no longer easily mistake instruments and authors, because we have really learned not to mistake ourselves. The belief that the instrument or the composer reflects music better for our great love of them and not exactly what we are, is a childish belief.

The regulative rule for us should be, that the calibre of the man is the measure of himself and not the measure of other things, and that, consequently, the condition of the man is the condition of his utterance.

And as to the super-ideal notion or worship of music—that is but the product of sensibility and self-gratification; and the consequence of the combination is as little understood as is its unity. It adds nothing vital to the

comprehension of music nor to the more significant appreciation of its producers or reproducers. All such believe in the wonders of particular music and genius but not in their common sense or mother-wit—a perfect absurdity, since music is indissolubly dependent on mechanism, from which again spontaneity can be deduced if its speed requirements and modalities are comprehended instead of merely imitated or counterfeited. And ignorance of causality *will* produce notional conjectures and bigotry as to the nature and value of effects, just as self-gratification is a form of prejudice which jumps at all conclusions apparently in its favor. Both of these are the very bane of music, having created that state of amorous but desultory music-making which we know as dilettanteism, whose spirit and preachment is so pronouncedly private and narrow.

Generally speaking, the ordinary fault of the relative man is his uncertain belief that unusual appearances are the result of incidental or inexplicable happenings instead of the intelligently predetermined unions of quantity and quality; and it is the prevalence of superiority of this happy-go-lucky spirit in dilettanteism which discourages—if not altogether destroys—the sensible sobriety of professional dicta. And what is left for the affections to dictate, if they do not, first of all, counsel patience and self-effacement, is beyond computation and reckoning with.

Now hitherto we have been speaking only of the young would-be artist whose mind is carried by sensuous effect or is otherwise hampered; but now, to further unfold the subject, it becomes necessary to draw the

full-fledged professional and his consequential listener into the argument, since, accurately speaking, there are three class of devotees to music, each of which, according to its particular coign of vantage, claims separate observation and judgments.

The three representative classes consist of : the physio-active professional ; the physio-active dilettante or avowed non-professional ; and the physio-inactive listener. That each of these devoted classes hears the same thing differently is implied by their classification—barring partial or incidentally interconnected touches of truth with each other.

With the professional, music is likely to be an out-and-out designed composition by itself. To his faculties—supposed to be in timely order—music is, under all circumstances, an intentional or self-possessed proposition, whether thought-coherence or thought incoherence is documented. Thought-coherence is, to his mind, attained by the employment of positive factors ; thought incoherence by the employment of relative factors. Every manifestation to him is unconditionally simple, that is : unconditional causation—conditional as it may appear externally—never ceases. With him it is all a determined or successive change of time, made possible only through his adherence to one or permanent time governing fundamentally ; consequently he considers music as a totality made up of infinite parts with each part indispensable to totality. To him music is an elemental certainty.

With the dilettante—immune from strictly professional obligations—music is likely to be an out-and-out designed composition by himself, brought about by the

employment of preferential or arbitrarily dated senses—a luxury he can all the more readily indulge in as his necessities can be liberally chosen and catered to by himself. To him origination is the sole necessity of his position, consequently he is likely to be superior to all expressions that do not accord with his tasteful internality. How he has gone about attaining this unique state of musical existence we have attempted to describe already. To him music is an elemental conviction.

With the listener—exempt as he is from all practical obligations—music is externally a state and internally a being, or the truth of one, summed up, by his philosophical mind, as manifold sensations more or less agreeable—according to his experiential judgment. Now, as a conglomerate thing of sensuality—a congregation of soulish emanations as it were—music may certainly be considered as one general rhapsody of expression; hence it can be easily inferred from an “all ear” position, or a slight extension of faith, that rhapsody is really the generic expression of music, and that if this virile thriller is not present in all compositions interpretation is not indwelling. Effects, according to his mind, are supposed to furnish their own causes, by the combustious power engendered and stored up in ebullient moments. That even that much must be perfectly self-possessed does not strike him at all, for his uncommon sense, in regard to music, will not tell him that combustious power could only then be void of studied design or responsibility were it impossible of premeditated notation, or, later on, of drastic execution.

Now, as a matter of fact, rhapsody is only one particular expression standing clearly out from the many

others which music essays; and probably the true cause of this unqualified desire for rhapsody at all times is, that spontaneity and rhapsody are being persistently confused with one another. But rhapsody is the particular and spontaneity the general necessity of rendering musical utterances. However on the sameness of rhapsody and spontaneity all hands seem unanimously agreed; and the synonymizing of these two declarations is the cause—forty out of forty-one times—that rhapsody will be unqualifiedly applied to every composition, regardless of its purpose. Nevertheless, to the mere listener, all kinds of music are essentially mysterious persuasions.

Now, on intrinsic grounds music devotees need not be separated into three general classes—should, in fact, really constitute one inseparable community by the very nature and reasons of their affections. However private interests always assail general propositions, as a matter of course. But what germinates private interests or opinions in an art, where none need exist, is the lack of development to read the same truth in all our senses. Nothing dissipates common understanding so thoroughly as the various evidences of the senses in conflict with each other; were the mind more on the alert it would soon perceive how furtively this facultative struggle for supremacy goes on among the senses and how in spite of its own ordained purpose it is constantly being cajoled by all of them, only to be, finally, dictated to by the sense which has come out of the contest as the strongest or most persistent organ. But the strongest organ may not be the first organ in the order of time—which simply determines a particular coign of vantage and its logically

corresponding judgment. And exactly this happens in music-making if the ear will appear as the first and strongest sense, though it is only the judge of the two senses—touch and seeing—which predate it. The consequence is—and we have told its story in “Teaching”—that with this self-sufficient factor in the wrong place the thinking brain is, logically, liable to such further mistakes as must follow reasoning from erroneously conceived premises. That the brain, by necessity of its proper functions, continues its thinking is only natural; but that it has been forced to accept erroneous premises is very unfortunate. And if in the end the brain, by its own experience and logic, does not ascertain the sources of its mistakes, or take, from the beginning, regulative measures against undue encroachment upon it through its senses, the useless contest goes on—until it does consider its inherent rights as first in the order of time. It is peremptory that the brain read the integrality and not only the particularity of all messages it receives through the various and unlike channels of its senses, otherwise it remains the sport and not the discriminator or arbiter of them.

And auricularly speaking there are only two classes of hearers: the executive and the non-executive. Only in case of the non-executive class is the ear truly both initiative and conclusive, while in case of the executive class it remains only a conclusive sense. The timeal differences in the two cases are: The players' external priority over internal, and the listeners' internal priority over external propositions, are radically opposing attitudes, since attention to causes characterizes the

player, and attention to effects the listener ; therefore any attempt of the player to be both executory and auditory at once, results in an unavoidable strife between the two positions, regarding priority, in which one or the other must come off second best, to the undeniable timeal detriment of both of them. The ear only then becomes a subconscious sense when predated by sight and touch, and never otherwise ; and therefore it is, that the executory will always be destiny, and the auditory only eventuality. And subconsciousness, *in toto*, is a state of more or less decentralized realization wherein all faculties work on an equal level of conception, brought about by the demands made upon acute consciousness, through ordained degrees of time and motion. The subconscious state can also be summoned by the momenta of conception alone—which accounts entirely for the impulsive power of the neuter reciprocal pronoun, who does the calling, however, before it is warranted by the proper regulation and cultivation of all its factors—is therefore limited to the best it can do under such conditions.

No doubt but that all the insincerities accompanying music-making result, involuntarily, from the uninstructed intermixture of these two positions, and of which unqualified blend the dilettante is the distinct outcome. The constant effort to regardlessly commingle them is detrimental to singleness of aim or purpose, and, ultimately, is calculated to give auricular effect precedence over ocular causes, even if it does not, at last, establish the delusion that effects are really causes in themselves.

It can only be, rationally speaking, the all-ear listener who is distinctly allowed to judge by hearing alone, to

the exclusion of external thought, or of all formally and informally predesigned effects, if he so pleases—a state of auricular delight the executant is excluded from by the very nature of his business. But it needs the dilettante to fondle the delusion that indistinct appearances musically were also indistinctly premeditated by a master, because they sound unpremeditated, or that cause and effect were not characteristically, in conception and conveyance, indited or thought of at the same time, since, rationally, there exists no such an exuberance—even in rhapsody—as an “unpremeditated premeditation”—but the premeditation of an unpremeditated appearance—it is needless to say—is quite possible, as it is an evidence of legitimate skill. The difference between the two propositions—playing and hearing—seems so simple of comprehension, that it is distressing to note the fierce and vain struggles of the neuter reciprocal pronoun to solely simulate the appearances of skill instead of its assimilation; but that mysterious effort, probably, constitutes the chief ecstasy of luxuriant music-making.

It is unnecessary to account for such a preposterous state of musical intelligence, but the direct corrective of it is found in an exact education, regardless from what sources it is obtained; and the next best corrective of it is possibly found in the pursuit and eventual understanding of complete or cosmo-generic music-making. But these correctives stipulate self-denying work—precisely the kind which seems constitutionally repugnant to the gushily predisposed nature of most dilettanti, and for this excellent reason afflicts them greatly—so they prefer the generic composers, who, they imagine, demand not

such self-effacement as do the cosmo-generic ones, and manage to get some credit for possessing a sentient talent, and, along the lines of these affectionate notions, a great deal of ideological comfort and self-satisfaction. Nothing seems further from their mind—as players—than the fact that there exists only one independent condition for every executant, and, instead of simply facing this condition, they prefer to pester and rack their brains to find royal roads to what they desire to be. Unfortunately for their success there is only one royal road open to them—the very dependent one upon which sympathetic listeners travel.

They externally see but do not evidently realize the very different destinies of these two roads, but just fuse them into one, regardless of the indisputable fact that this fusion is merely ideological and resultingly monogrammatic. This being, however, happily accomplished, they thereafter are fullfledged members of that self-constituted tribunal of ardent connoisseurship, whose basis is hearing and who still lay the flattering unction to their souls that their opinion is determining, and believe that the neuter reciprocal pronoun is God's own particular mark of Pierian favor.

This musico-affectionate state of affairs leads to theories and practices based, at best, on but partial assumptions, which are of particular danger to inexperienced students, especially to such as may not have learned enough—outside of their music—to understand entitative propositions, or are not even aware that such propositions are the elements of their art. Let the perplexed ones, however, recall the guiding truth of their task—of every

task, viz., that the qualities of cosmo-generic intelligence are the prerogatives of all men, and must, for this very reason, be deeply interconnected with all aspirations; that, therefore, this kind of intelligence is of paramount value, and its unconditional application the first criterion of conduct. Nor can anyone escape its demands, for on the alternative side stands the cutting irony of musical eventuality, viz.; that it takes precisely as much self-effacement to give a standard interpretation of one master as it does of any other.

Now, when a musical education is wanted, begin by seeking it in every direction and for what it basically implies, since everything, however remote it seems, is influentially connected with it. Oppose to difficulties the canons of understanding, but, remember, when understanding aspires to be its own pupil, then, lacking the universal canons of reason, it unfolds but speculatively, and will be betrayed, in the issue, not by its particular understanding, but by its particular want of reason. The absolute is not to be ascertained without the necessity of contradiction; and understanding's own final test is its ability to resolve contradictions into contradistinctions, because by such resolutions alone does reason prevail and enable understanding to prove the truth of its own assumptions by a better light. The observances of conduct are: personal self-effacement; earnest and persistent pursuit of characteristic wholesomeness by aid of all available educational means in and outside of music—principally those of the sciences; avoiding no difficulty nor test of patience and endurance in favor of momentary ex-

pediency or immediate success; and, finally, an undivided adherence to both letter and spirit as essentially indivisible.

Then even the minimum result is the possession of an enlightenment distinguished by control of thought, feeling and enactment. And whether great music-making is attained or not, makes no integral difference, for whatever is then done will be well-done, therefore exemplary and of gratifying pleasure to all such as can see more in music than mere skill and sensuousness, viz.: its inexhaustible cosmo-genericalness.

The luxury of music-making begins when both independence and dependence of time, speed, accent and mechanism are not equally considered and available, or mere impulse rules perception and drifts the Will; and all this comes about when an internally sensuous dictum has put the things of sensation in place of the things that are super-eminent.

And, finally, we must, logically, conclude that the so-called "illimitable" in music is merely a phantom created by the sultriness and distentions arising from the strained or feverish or foolish or ignorant perversions of the laws of our entire nature with its governing rules of order, timeliness and economy; by forgetting the truism, 'as ye sow so shall ye reap;' by not bearing in mind that sound or tone is a causal "effect-result" whose exact value is the value of its producer; that the absence of physio-mental supremacy merely makes the player the opportunistic victim of his instrument instead of its opportune master, and that for this reason the more independently man stands in point of entitative character the

more supreme and beautiful, from and to him, will be the musical messages.

And were we called upon to enharmonize truth and falsehood, we would state that they are the same thing, only in and out of place in the economy of the universe.

NECESSITY

NECESSITY

"Understanding and sensibility, with us, can determine objects only in conjunction. If we separate them, we have intuitions without conceptions, or conceptions without intuitions; in both cases, representations, which we cannot apply to any determinate object."

Immanuel Kant, in *Critique of Pure Reason*.

NECESSITY is ever the unconditional mediation and conjunction in art between the faculties of sensibility and understanding, and may be said to constitute the ethico-virile reason of artistic conduct. It consists, consequently, of an enharmonious comprehension of sensibility and understanding, as well as of a harmonious mediation which—conditionally and unconditionally—adjusts their quantities and qualities according to the requirements of any selected subject-matter or text to be consummated. So here "Necessity," especially in its broadest sense, refers to the acquisition of internal exactness, or such an understanding of generic reason, as only the practice of music can add to the particular results of a facultative or mathematical education.

It rests, therefore, with this essay to consider the birth of music; her presence in man; and why she is able to serve him better than anything else, as the systematic yet aggregate cultivator of his native quantities and qualities.

The uttered sound of sensual or emotional feeling, in organic life, constitutes a dynamico-ideological language, or sound-effects arising from physiological causes; and this tonal expression is more primitive and natural to man, as an utterance, than is even the language of his native land, because it is his generically spontaneous language and precedes any spoken language in the order of time.

As organic life rises in the scale of nature or intelligence these sound-effects grow more definite or pronounced in subtlety, meaning and form.

Sound is the physio-sensible and dynamical language of universal pathetism or magnetism. Laughter (staccato or shortness of sound) indicates mirth or pleasure; the Cry (tenuto or length of sound) the ecstasy of joy or pain—so Pain and Pleasure were its Adam and Eve. These sounds were issued spontaneously by the primitive ebullitions of our animal feeling and are ideo-sensible expressions of it.

With the recognized meaning of sound came the formulation of word and language; with language came melody; with melody came harmony or music proper, and with these two came a tonal scheme and the evergrowing subjection of physiological, mental and instrumental means to meet its external and internal behests.

Music, as the language of humanity, needs the employment of man's aggregate faculties to meet its educational extent.

By "aggregate faculties" we mean those of dissection and composition or the sciences of exactness and forces, in conjunction. And here it may not be amiss

to point out that there is a precise as well as a forceful composition; that the first is *formal* and governed by time, and the second is only a *form* of perception governed by space and place. In exact composition Time is supreme with Space as dependent; and in forceful composition Space is supreme and Time dependent. In ordinary use there is usually a question of priority between them; in music, however, it is integrally indispensable that both appear conjointly or as equalities—hence our expression “aggregate faculties.”

The pursuit of music involves the usage and development of the three most important senses out of five, viz.: Seeing, Touch and Hearing. These are the three metaphorical graces of music—the greatest number of sensories applicable or necessary to the pursuit of any single occupation; from which can be inferred that this singular conjunction of senses naturally involves a more aggregate form of education than is called for under simpler conditions. Nor is this inference too vague when we consider, intrinsically speaking, that we aspire in music to control a precise as well as an energetic activity and certainty, in the extensive sense of a deliberate and simultaneous psychical and physio-executive rendering of sounds, conveying, by cause and effect, the import of a dynamico-sensible language whose slightest utterance is pregnant with causal as well as ideological significance:—and if this whole statement should appear to be so vulnerable to some of us as to challenge criticism, the certainty that every education is proportionately and relatively hampered or stunted, in which the development of any one of our senses or faculties is inconsiderately

omitted or neglected, is, necessarily, beyond all comprehensive doubts.

We are aware that there have been blind musicians who have obtained an approximate eminence; but their loss of sight was manifested by sameness of color or temperament, therein showing more or less inability to comprehend or diversify color-schemes. Their uncontrollable instinct, amounting, musically, almost to frenzied enunciation, was for light or intensity usually, and lacked psychologically the intuitive command of categorical expressions. The loss of sight—that is space—is less apparent on the organ, because thereon color is auto-suggestive; but is most apparent in the composing of music. The color-scheme being artificially established on the organ, nothing else remains to be consummated thereon but the possible combinations and not the intuitive productions of color.

Seeing, as well as touch, comes before hearing in music. Hearing is only to a small extent the corrective or confirmatory tribunal of precedent sight and touch—and touch may be, optionally, the precursor of sight.

We say “to a small extent” advisedly. The ear is, natively, a consonant and not a dissonant sense; but as music is both concordant and discordant, the ear must be trained ere it can discover the purity or legitimacy of discordant harmonies—which accounts, especially while hearing new music, for its ready disapproval of what strikes it very often as wanton innovations. And especially trying to young and inexperienced ears is the time which may elapse before discords are resolved into concords. However, the ear can be trained to any extent,

and should for this very important reason never revolt sensibly against harmonious innovations. It needs constant unfoldment to be any kind of a judge, since concords alone do not constitute music, however simple it may be.

Sight is the speediest of all the senses, consequently the quickest and most direct sense to receive musical ideas, by agency of notation; and has this great advantage over hearing, that it can make almost instantaneous digest of extendedly noted ideas—a thing hearing does not at all admit of.

The ear cannot afford the loss of rhythmic presence, as can the eye which sees music, without losing all intelligible ideas of notation. If it is to hear in conjunction with seeing, it will need its own good time to do so; so hearing without seeing absolutely and practically demands rhythmical and timeal presence—all of which is perfectly superfluous to a sight, trained to apprehend music out of silence, by the aid of notation, or musico-symbolical ideography.

That the sense of seeing is often under-trained or over-trained and but very seldom exactly trained in music, without manifesting temperamental awkwardness, is due to the lack of self-control or patience to adjust the speedier sight to the slower hearing—the result of which is that this sense is frequently either almost totally neglected or, in some cases, over-educated—in either event not conducive to objectivity of interpretation. And, no doubt, its neglect is largely encouraged by the fundamentally misunderstood example and certainty of playing

better from memory than from notes; but how is memory to be correct if seeing is cursory or inaccurate while in the act of memorizing? The whole misunderstanding on this point is one of those many errors in time or misdates which so constantly militate against the whole system of positively successful music-teaching and objectively accomplished utterance.

It takes often years to train the eye to acquire only the commonly necessary accuracy and quickness to read at sight even the ordinary notation of music, but more than common self-control to make it instantly take in the manifold accuracies of notation. As an evidence of extended reading, or the possibility of its development, we point to orchestral score-reading. Here twenty systems, five lines each, occupy a page, which must be read at a glance. However, when the eye is so far advanced as to do so much, that is, commonly fluent reading, it already possesses an unusual training, if one understands what the task involves, viz.: that the eye is always subject to the recognition of time-values; to the cyphering and placing of comparative fractions as they pass by; to the ever-changing concentration and distribution, over space, of music's characteristic orthography; to the particularities and generalities of horizontal, diagonal and vertically written rythmical schemes and tonal pitches; to the transposition of the self-same degrees of elevation, by virtue of clefs, etc., etc.—and the whole undertaking to be governed by either externally or internally appointed degrees of speed, which must accord, physiologically and psychologically, with the prescribed notation.

Of touch and consequent hearing we have spoken at

sufficient length in the Essay on "Mechanism," and have no further need to follow them here in particular, but will pursue the three senses virtually, integrally, and resultingly.

Sight is a compounding and dissecting; hearing only a conditionally compounding and dissecting, and touch a discriminating sense.

The senses of sight, touch and hearing are, essentially, co-equal and reciprocal factors in music, provided the aim in mind is the integral unfolding of man and music in like degrees.

It is the reciprocal unfolding of these senses upon which depends the present and future significance or success of executive utterance. The continuous effort to interchangeably recognize and reconcile them with each other, as contradistinctions, is productive of that instantaneous observation and conduct which are so essential to the recognition and command of psychological moments, and so advantageous to its possessor.

This unfolding and regulated activity, whose chief aim and principle is the solving of contradictions into contradistinctions, is the entitative prerogative of man; and its characteristic application, to the questions or things of life, the only commensurate mode of living, or aspiring up to our native endowments, for such a characteristic individualism leads to ever-growing thoughts, accretive skill and instantaneity of enactment.

Sensuous and immediate affinity with music, however, is not the same thing; it argues only the native presence of our generically vital and dynamico-ideological tendency to musical perception, implying, in its

primitive state, the natural and unspoiled nearness of that emotional sense so inherent in us all.

To select music for purposes of education is first to consider instrumental means or her physical agency, and our physiological factors, and, relatedly and geometrico-mechanically, apply the latter to the instrument—whatever it is. Physiological agency, fundamentally thought out, presents the idea of space, place, time, mechanism and motion, which all are, upon application, instantaneously transferred, by instrumental means, from cause into effect, that is, from motion into emotion, and from emotion into the correlated ideas which, in form of effect, follow designedly constructed causes. It is motion which converts space into time and sound and therewith physiology into dynamical ideology. It remains with us as to whether our applied physiology and its resulting ideology is expressive of particular or of universal import. The point is this: the constructive power, back of the physiological cause, is exactly the constructed power of the ideological effect; therefore if accurate thoughts underlie the construction of causes, their ideological effect is cosmological; if only emotional energies underlie the construction of causes, the ideological effect is generical; but if both accurate and emotional ideas underlie the construction of causes, then the ideological effect is universal, or cosmo-generical. Thence to attempt the production or reproduction of these ideological sound-forces with any other idea than that of giving our unconditional attention to their acquisition or mastery, with our whole nature to back our attention, is either to vitiate ourselves and them with particularized designs, or—

still more—lower their possible design or entitative significance in the scale of musical expression, if not make them totally lacking in any extent but that of chaotic utterance.

Now let us see what constitutes even the first commensurate lesson in music; what it involves, and what may be deduced from its adequate acquisition.

It begins with the designed accuracy of mechanism calculated to express only positive or mental and not sensual emotions, the principle of which is that of economy of motion, meaning: entire abeyance of physiological profusion or measurable effort in motion or time. (See Figures 3, 4, 5 and 15 in Essay on "Mechanism.")

To obtain non-sensual expression or time or action, it is not only necessary for the learner to pulsate measured time with added or lessened degrees of speed, but also to subject the mechanical procedure to three conditions or moments: to an immovable state of respective pendency; to a relaxed or restful state of abeyance; and to an active state of motion or time or pulsation. So we have, at the outset, the impending, the consummating and the passed mechanism at the same time.

Now this apparently little lesson is not only quite difficult and demands much thought, repetition and self-control for its correct as well as facile attainment, but has, in addition to its inconspicuous difficulty, also the misfortune to be distinctly devoid of all show, so in the eyes of the uninformed or misinformed it is of little value or consequence, even though its accomplishment does guarantee the unconditional presence of entitative

character. Hence it is safe to predict that its non-attainment is the beginning of mental decentralization and implies, positively and consequently, also the non-attainment of all future development to musically characterize motional and emotional expression, and can but result in the peculiar or idiosyncratic interpretation of every kind of music, simply because the regulative principle of economics—so essential to all expressions—is not physio-mentally consulted. And it goes without saying, that even profusion or dissipation must hiddenly convey some sense of limitation, otherwise it will express downright waste or profligacy, instead of proficient simplicity—the eccentricities or imaginary vagaries of which will then be characteristically observable in all utterances, not excepting even those intended to be prodigal or irregular. The leading question put forth by the regulative principle of economy is exceedingly simple—do you command or are you commanded?

This diminutive but fecund opening lesson, furthermore, observes three unconditionally uniform factors, viz.: Mechanism, Time or Motion, and Agency. And higher up in the scale of intelligence it is Mechanism aspiring to power to translate the principle of economy into enactments of applied economy; sense of space, time and understanding seek the absolute control of simple and compound emphasis; and the proposition of agency exacts the presence and continuous development of moral or ethical sense to command as well as obey. And the only proof extant that all this is really or ably comprehended, is its veritable enactment or impersonation.

Now he who cannot master this first lesson in all its

bearings cannot be unfolded to find for himself the whole number which governs and alone makes clear the psychological exposition of all kinds of music; for depiction or enactment has but one number, and that number is accent—the sole indicator or variant of both space and time. In the absence of this number all agency will be but a casual representation of sounds, strikingly devoid of self-perception. Nor do we believe in the theory that the musical germ is a new or need be ever deemed an artificial creation, because music is a generic composition simply depending, in every case, upon capable tuition for its development. But, generally speaking, the cause of a practically useless effort is less due to weakness of effort, and still less so to want of native qualities in the learner, than to the deplorable circumstance that very seldom is the unit of unconditional motion and emotion presented simply, comprehensively and impressively enough to be remembered as an axiomatic proposition; or if well presented in the beginning is suggested as merely a temporary expedient and therefore, later on, lost sight of, or deliberately discarded as too primitive, or thrust aside in favor of less dry and more lush manners and expressions; or—as still oftener happens—is too unphilosophically or over-conscientiously administered, until the letter of it kills both sentiency and further inclination to work. But, nevertheless, it remains a fact that during the usage of decentralized mechanism, the positivism or centralization of mind is more needed than ever, as without its directing presence all related bearings are lost sight of, and we

are left, like speculation or guesswork, to temperamental fancy or happy chance.

The absence of necessity and understanding for economic laws, under all circumstances, is a direct invitation to resort to constant dispersion of thought, which is no doubt encouraged by the erroneous idea that spontaneity of presentation or utterance is in this manner consummated and applied; and that any further decentralization of the mind implies only a greater presence of genius and constitutes the inspired and revealing road to musical greatness. But why unqualified dispersion should be deemed desirable in art and desirable in nothing else outside of it, is due to an utter misconception of categorical spontaneity.

Now, artistic spontaneity can only be consummated by the clearly designed and commanded unity of all factors, it having been previously stipulated that all factors should be so far developed as to really permit the simplification of their multiplicity into any one presentation of categorical unity. This categoricalness is certainly not one state of only naturalistic or organic synthesis or general desire, but many states, for to be really categorical, and not merely generally tasteful—if not artificially so—needs also categorical conceptions as well as genericalness; and these are only declarable by a correspondingly categorical mechanism. It is thus that conception becomes artistically qualified—not by a general hunting for musical ideas and soulful expressions. We see, therefore, that in a musico-educated state putting together is predetermined by science, while in a natural state it predates science, its great fault then being no

categorical premises to reason from, which results in peculiar or idiosyncratic presentations. So though it is perfectly true that any combination is numerical identity, it is no less true also that to qualify and characterize combination is categoricalness, and that fact alone constitutes the artist. The absence of a musico-cultivated categoricalness is the infliction of general as well as of individual music-making. However, this general or organic state of mental decentralization is solely a criterion of possibility determined by the avoidance of contradiction or the absence of self-analyzation. It is only a self-satisfying importunity to apply the undisciplined and unregulated force of our elemental nature in an idiomatic way; and though that may be honest, it is not whole of nature. And what a waste of effort to try to unfold generic endowments by applying their native forces in a notional or in a simply plausible manner! The difference between scientific and native perception is this: the scientific is the external and the native the internal perception of things.

However, a few words, ere we pass on, about the genius supposed, usually, to be that for music in particular.

The responsibilities for failure are not always to be traced to the learner's door, since it may have been that his work has not been rationally kept in contact with the entitative nature of all his possibilities, for only in the conjunction of accuracy with sensibility can all his possibilities come into play. On the other hand: in the absence of a character disposed to the recognition of an

entitative rationale—the unconditional principle of economy or frugality, the regulator which always rules fundamental causes in strict harmony with both our self-preserved reason and nature—the desire to learn music is but experimentally sensuous—a condition which, though exceedingly sympathetic but, unfortunately, only peculiarly fond of music, is, nevertheless, such an unfettered and unlettered, or merely sensual argument in its favor, as to invite and even fanatically dare a failure, the content and extent of which is not educationally measurable or realizable, until it has completely run its experimental course.

Now, the possession of a sensuous or affectionate nature is constitutional, but, fortunately, not constitutive with all men; and it is alone through one-sided reasoning or egotism—or, in truth, by more egotism than reasoning or understanding—that those whose sensuality runs preponderatingly to music, though totally impervious to economic penetration, do consider themselves, or are usually considered by others, to be naturally constituted specimens of musical genius. But the dry fact is, that this so-called “musical tendency” is in itself no guaranty of genius but only a guaranty of the presence of an as yet unqualified predisposition to sensual composition or passionate expression, which, unless corrected, remains only a temperamental egotism whose unharnessed strength tries, frantically, to crowd out, for private reasons or characteristic purposes, the all-essential presence of both contra-distinction and contra-diction, so defeating its own ends.

Under such egotistic conditions music, by an almost

general opinion and consent, seems, after all, only the sensual vehicle to give human emotions a refined but latitudinarian or an unrestricted outlet—which, summed up from an academical point of view, defines music to be only relatively educational or only of individual value. But this judgment does not take into consideration that, even in musical naturalism or free-feeling, there is no effect without a cause, and no cause without an effect—the axiom of all educational propositions; that therefore such music-making—being effectual—is also generical, though devoid of categorical intentions. The whole trouble is that without categorical design it cannot be an entitative manifestation of music. So from the categorical viewpoint the only object of uncategorical music-making, or music in which the sense of causality has been too much displaced by the affections, seems to be—and is—that of self-gratification, or the giving of unqualified pleasure—if possible—to equally uncategorically inclined listeners. However, from all one-sided conclusions the dimensions of music are only related and not vital to the needs of education, since partiality can only establish the use of music either mathematically or dynamically, but never cosmo-generically. And hence we need not wonder that the many seek identicalness and self-recognition in that partial or particular side of music which best happens to accord with either their dynamical or mathematical predilections at once, and so, regardless of a more universal possibility, suits and entertains them best, entertainment constituting the criterion which gives validity to their choice.

Now, all educational questions should clearly present

themselves as the idea of not only informing but also conforming man with the broadest sense of responsibility to his native endowments and so transform him into a mediative agency between the true, the insufficient and the false. This agency is, undoubtedly, best tested, as to its correctness or incorrectness, by the resort to physio-mental demonstration, because this hyphenated mode needs an inner as well as outer rationale to be complete or self-corrective; and the possibility of self-test and self-correction should accompany education as its best factor and criterion, because, again, demonstrative good sense is the end-aim of all education and determines able selection and capable enactment just as it determines inefficient selection and incapable enactment.

There can be but little doubt of music-making's educational pre-eminence under the stipulated and provided condition of studying its externally causal and internally sensual propositions unconditionally, as this directs the mind to the conception of a legal causality as a first necessity towards self-help—a viewpoint certain to assure an absolute knowledge of, at least, its operative side, which inclines to an equally certain control of its sensual or effective expression; and these, jointly, lead, in the end, to pragmatistical conclusions based upon an unconditional understanding concerning its categorical and total or universal value. But when causal or constructive conditions do not predate or, at least, even-date effective or sensual ones, or—in other words—are not physiologically as well as psychologically perceived, then music, less than any other art, possesses an educational proposition or degree. But even in any case is music possessed of a

character of some kind corresponding to some purpose, though in such music-making as merely represents the senses, or affections, or passions, there is really no claim to discernment other than the propitiation or exaltation of the senses—an elimination of the understanding in favor of emotional synthesis. Academically speaking, in this case music is intellectually doubtful even though generically influential to the listeners, because it then ostensibly pretends to deny a causal construction which is self-evidently present to the eye if not to the ear. Music, like medicine, has its sedatives and stimulants. And an irrational or merely motional recreation of this kind of music is a resort and address to nervous or sensuous excitations—a course of acquisition and enjoyment which, in time, destroys the will or control and judgment that characterizes all appointed music-utterances—a process anything but conducive to either an inner or outer education. There can exist but one cause which reasonably accounts for this, viz: that appointed seeing is almost totally displaced by hearing—so leaving the interpretation of notation, should notation be required, to the intoxicated mercy of emotionalism or entirely to the unqualifiable imagination. And so peculiarly resultant are the consequences of misdating our senses, that often our conclusions are in direct contradiction to what we meant to express or what we expected our initiative to consummate. Misdating always points to a preferential form of perception and, consequently, to an incomplete or disconnected usage of our senses.

There exists always, whether we perceive it or not, an unalterable point of observation by the fixidity of

which we can adjust or regulate our ideas and enactments, and around which these—as well as systems or worlds—must revolve, and which, in music, may be termed the regulator of causal mechanism; and this regulator and interpreter of music is Accent in all its varied or concentric and eccentric bearings—Accent in speed and delay or activity and repose; in selection and application; in order or disorder; in parcimony or profusion—ever Accent, not incidental but unconditional accent. And this means, in particular, that even timelessness is only understood correctly by the light which accentual capability sheds upon all irregularities, though to a musically uninformed mind the idea seems paradoxical.

Now, if music is not more generally acquired in its most comprehensive sense it is mainly because its very simple and common-sense beginnings are so seldom—mechanically and philosophically—properly applied and adhered to throughout—in which event a forecast of coming results is quite impossible. This is all the more to be regretted because it is really no more difficult to be right than wrong in the beginning, since every beginning is in itself correct if its content and meaning is clearly in keeping with what may positively be aimed at. But this understanding is very exceptional in music, where nothing in the beginning is clearly outlined and classified about the expressive nature of music itself, except the never-wanting but vague necessity and desire for “technic” and quick results, backed up by that detestably equivocal and sardonic truism that “practice makes perfect, or the master.” The question, however,

as to "difficulty" applies almost infinitely less to the object of music *per se*, than sincerely to *what* and *who* we are, and especially to what we will or will not do for ourselves—a question which applied to the condition of an all-desiring and nothing understanding egotism sounds about like this: are you inclined to self-denial or self-gratification? And the result will tally exactly with the answer, made less in words than in works.

But music is so natural to us that there is very little difficulty in teaching or learning it phaseologically or uttering some one favored sentiment quite respectably—a sentiment especially sure of a limited success if it happens also to be the preferred idiom of both teacher and learner—so instinctively or intuitively self-gratification usually carries the day and the pursuit. Now the ease with which an individual hobby or sentimentality or ambition can be musically nursed, plausibly verified, and gratefully recognized, is so easy to the human make-up that thousands of learners and teachers never even dream of going beyond the little circle of their idiosyncratic proclivities. And though this very fact has vastly helped to popularize music, it is, nevertheless, the identical fact which has also, more or less, disqualified or discredited its study as an educational factor and, scientifically, assigned its pursuit to the degree or level of an agreeable social accomplishment, accepted or tolerated considerably by society, as a more or less charming bit of contributive egotism.

It is certainly very natural, when young, to feel the "promethean spark" and by its incitations become pre-disposed to its utterance; but it is quite another thing

to have this ebullient feeling categorized and made utterably and universally intelligent in various different ways, for the purpose or extent of entitative significance. And though any one of the previously mentioned and defined categories of expression (see Lecture on "Mechanism") is sentient with being, it is, in isolation necessarily a being without the interconnected extent of entirety. The presence of a degree of merely organic temperament, ever synthetically predisposed, is, in no higher sense, musically constitutive, therefore goes not far enough to be of educational value, unless categorically unfolded, even though it must be admitted to contain all the possibilities or features of a generic force. Considered in its mathematically undeveloped or raw state, it contributes about as much to art or education as a drop of water would to the content or extent of the ocean or a grain of sand to its beach.

And as to music as music.

Music is divided into two great classes which are legitimately external, viz.: into cosmo-generic or absolute and into generic or related music. There is, however, a mistaken tendency to utilize generic works for the depiction of positive events, which is known by the name of "program music." That this is no class of itself but only an arbitrary interpretation of related music and a complete misunderstanding of the purely motional in it, is almost self-evident; therefore we need not analyze the peculiarity of its inconsistent heterodoxy—and not claiming even such attributes of necessity and universality which it cannot help containing as music, it may be safely left to the appreciation of such as are either will-

ing to submit to its unrestrained definition and follow its arbitrary direction, or can find a better interpretation of it than its authors apparently claim for themselves and their own work.

Their educational contents as music.

Cosmo-generic music offers to perception metrical thoughts and mental emotions. It is its own object and subject and presents to conception its reasons for self-existence: as to its formality and content; as to its logic and motional force of argument, in regard to its tonal thesis and antithesis within the bounds of syllogistic dynamics; as to the unconditional or economic manifestation of ways and means, resulting in clarity of tone, comparatively expressed, more with conservatively climactic and anti-climactic dynamics than color-schemes; as to its mathematical and structural or archetectonic up-building and contraction or expansion of subject, both progressively and regressively uttered; as to its cogency of resumé; and the whole sectionally, contingently and homogeneously to be considered as a tonal argument from incomposite to composite consummation or understanding. It is, essentially, a cosmic argument—and either the player or listener who is not predisposed to metrical thought and observation will never fully understand this kind of music without being educationally prepared to receive it.

Generic or related music presents to perception native ideas and reasons. It is, in itself, not the object but the vehicle of dynamico-spontaneous reflexion in the service of poetico-ideal portrayal. Where in cosmo-generic music understanding seeks a mathematical synthesis, in

generic music it seeks a dynamical one, colorfully contingent upon the event it desires to consummate. It offers to view: the incidental formality and ideal deification of its subject; the immanent internality of time and the contrasting color-scheme of its tonal proposition, consequently the presence of instinctive or intuitive dynamics; the conditional manifestation of ways and means, subject, however, to the unconditional utilization of a centralizing and decentralizing, therefore unsettled, mechanism; the sympathetic or free contraction or expansion of fancy or imagination; the complete submergence of causality into ideal depictions; the happy disquisition of subject by resort to the reminiscently figurative ideas of its resumé towards completeness, or incompleteness, etc., etc.—and the whole homogeneously considered as the consummation of an internal into a possibly external composition. Its form of sensibility points more to space than time; and its proposition is presumably positive, while its consummation remains always contingent or dependent. It is, essentially, a human and never a cosmic argument.

However, both classes of music are alike unconditional as regards their acquisition, consequently equally positive as regards their causation, with this difference in the nature of causation itself, that in cosmo-generic music it is centralized or open, while in generic music it is, more or less, decentralized or furtive, though the principle of causation is, fundamentally, positive in both classes.

The acquisition and control of causes is ever a matter of conscious accountability to the law—economy—needed

to govern them, whether centralized or decentralized. This is the very point so little understood in generic music—and were the statement not true no distinction could ever be possible between mechanism and effect; nor would the idea be so prevalent that there is no positively causal mechanism in what seems purely sensuous or ideal music, since the absolute necessity for mechanism, of some kind, is in reason completely accountable. However, to the purist or scientist, in music as well as in mind, the idea is that centralized causation only is legitimate, while to the sensualist or idealist all centralized causation seems dry and merely pedagogically intrusive—if not obsolete—and he is therefore apt to argue, from first sight evidence, that there is no mechanism to inspiration or ideality—but there is, if it is to be communicated to either the senses or the understanding, only in this case mechanism is always submerged or is the substratum of effect. Both parties are right, only neither party goes far enough to ascertain an indisputable entirety.

The causation of experiential music is certainly too recklessly lost sight of—even by musicians themselves—in view of the ebullient effects she offers, at spontaneous hand, to sensuous appreciation or ideal abstraction therefrom. And though synthesis of being or mind is ever the joyful moment whose touch makes all the world akin, that is no valid or masterful reason for forgetting or ignoring its constitutive side. On the other hand, to deem this composition as unscientific because its causality seems remote and apparently not precisely traceable is just as one-sided. One need only reckon with the

composite after having capably solved the single number—and vice versa—when the whole matter grows clear. The fact is, that any education is in danger of failure which has not been held to the unconditional requirements and considerations of time, place, and space, or does not, in the absence of musical training, hold identity, at least, instinctively and intuitively to these three pre-eminent features of existence. But the argument—if it ever got to a final judgment—between pedagogical scientism and philosophical experientialism seems this: why do the people affirm generic music without caring to ascertain its causality, and why does the scientist admit no musically sensuous intuitions as possessing a mathematical element of certainty? It is only the non-admission, on both sides, of factors and facts as indispensable to the features of music, which causes a contradictory instead of a contra-distinctive division, where, intelligently and pragmatically, no break or leap can exist.

The admission of space, place, motion and time, as factors to be consciously consulted, gives even to the meaning of dynamics a measurable certainty or rationale to which there is more than merely acoustical and chromatico-acoustical results, viz.: an inner comprehension as sure of itself and what it intends to say as is any numerical or outward certainty—a certainty of such vast educational importance as to point to music as the only vital art which can furnish us dynamically with an inner rationale, or, at least, with an intuitive or instinctive comprehension that such a rationale is in existence. With stated dimensions of space and formations of the hand we can plainly see

that while there may be a hundred different ways of constituting mechanism it still remains a psychio-causal mechanism throughout. The whole trouble is this, that we leave mechanism almost entirely to the incidents of manual formation and impulsive perception; and the result of an undefined mechanism is an uncategorical or vague character of expression, while that of preferred mechanism, or its opposite point of view, is specialization of expression without collateral resources—an æsthetical if not ethical omission sure to be in evidence even in the expression so exclusively preferred and uttered.

The art of producing music is unconditionally positive. All kinds of music are in effect what they are in cause. And quantitatively and qualitatively considered, cause and effect are equally unconditional, therefore in that respect inseparably present and equally certain.

To those who confuse effects with causes.

Effects are but natively sensible or affectionate determinations, with which we then begin instead of ending. No ethically certain or intellectual state is discoverable from an effectual premise, unless we begin to reason back to physical causes, and from this basis go forward once more. Entitative states in music must first be physical and not phenomenal states, for to these we must turn as the authors of effect—after which effective or psychio-dynamic results can be made physiologically foreknown and ably selected. The understanding therefore is, that cause and effect, as an entirety to the mind, are identically subject to the rules and principles governing all phenomena, though as appearance

and phenomenon they are differinglly evident to our senses.

So, after all, both classes of music are equally available for educational purposes, because music, as an all-comprising composition, constitutes, in itself, the simplest and most self-evident totality extant, containing the predicaments of all nature—cosmic and human—in the form of a strikingly immanent presentation to the mind. Only in case of their division in the mind does accurate or analytical music appeal merely to the understanding, and inaccurate or energetical music merely to the senses and their instinctive knowledge; but taken as a unity appeals only to minds seeking entitative propositions, in which event there will be no useless contests as to a preference, nor endless squabbles about “schools” and “methods,” or—philosophically speaking—between scientism and experientialism.

Is it further necessary to argue that such an educational and disciplinary process leads to a knowledge capable of vitally handling and clearly establishing—actually and ideally—causes, effects and judgments constantly and under multifarious conditions? Is not sound and color, in a collective sense, the ideological expression of all physiological and hyper-physiological life at the same moment?

Where there is motion there is sound; where sound there is expression; where expression there are ideas; where ideas there is reason; and where reason there is intelligence; and where intelligence there must or should be understanding. Summed up, music is the mimetic and diminutive replica of militant but ennobled or hu-

manized universality wherein all causes, effects and results can be analogically gathered into observation, demonstration and determination. And in this sense, too, music is original with all. We claim music when we claim speech or sound, in pitch, rhythm, accent, modulation, etc., etc. To control or understand the inner and outer containment of this cosmo-generical universe is a first-class educational proposition, one fully worthy to be accepted as including all propositions in one, and from this viewpoint fully worthy of our undivided attention and endeavors, provided—of course—that the task is undertaken with the impersonal declaration that all factors concerned are of equimomental import in the economy of the entitatively constituted and constituting mind. This declaration adhered to is the indispensable state of all educational propositions. Let us itemize.

Educationally we can develop, through the physically external and internal study of musical causation, a vital quickness and keenness of apprehension, perception, feeling, thought, memory and executive control of ways and means, almost incomparably above those of any other mode of educational procedure in content and extent, because the process is an experiential super-eminence or an all-round completeness of inter-connected physiological and psychological activity, on a scale of entitative entirety. And this activity is so eminently practical, too, that nothing short of its executive manifestation is absolutely conclusive. The necessity of practically proving the truth and ethical value of one's understanding, through the physically executive government of self,

would alone place the device of music in the list of highest available means for the unfolding of the mind in a systematically disciplinary and moral way. Furthermore, it evidently combines the sciences of nature with those of the affections, to the united extents of affirmation, agency and negation, thus offering the best opportunity for the founding of an aggregate yet systematic scheme for training purposes in no way conflicting with the tenets of all men but unceasingly confirming and enlarging their entitative truest and best. And the dividing line between its educational and non-educational promise is contained in the simple answer to the simple question: are tonal emanations to be consciously or unconsciously designed? If to be unconsciously or instinctively, or even intuitionally designed, sounds will contain only the more or less happy or unhappy accidents of sentient or insentient music-making; if to be consciously designed, time, space, place and agency confront the mind as of first necessity. Why, the very initiative attempt to consciously carry out the proposition involves thought, patience and endurance by the light of universal laws and principles—and patience involves morality, and morality, in any form, augurs and posits system, and system evidences the presence of an unconditional will-power. And if this apparently so simple beginning keeps up until it has been converted into flesh and spirit, the characteristically educational foundation has been well laid, and ever cumulating results are sure to far outweigh the trials and tribulations of its practical acquisition, since these are of no comparative moment in view of its accretive and distinctive benefits. And whether

the beginner liked or disliked music is, indeed, very seldom a question of musical talent, but almost invariably a question of inclination or disinclination to serious work.

From first to last music offers the best field to impress, learn and value practical, philosophical and conscientious accountability unto a vitally physical and psychical thing, instinctively, intuitively and tuitively to be considered, and demonstrated both internally and externally. Not even can the question of music-training be a mere matter of taste or fashion, but a question of vital importance, because its neglect, or merely sensuous or auricular study, leaves an otherwise irreparable and unmistakable void or vagary in both our nature and culture. It is not only the enjoyment of music either, but the entitative cultivation of it which fills the void. While its enjoyment is a persuasion or a conviction, its cultivation only can mount up to the dignity of a certainty.

We have endeavored to show why a mere personal opinion or sensual discernment is likely to be very unscientific in its conclusions, and also why a merely scientific one can be equally insufficient. We have tried to prove all this when we proved music to be both super-eminent and experiential in extent and content; and our argument has been that these two modes of music cannot be causally and effectually separated in reason and understanding, as the causation of both is equally unconditional. So with time there will surely come a scientific musico-educational department whose curriculum teaches the dynamical as well as the mathematical

rationale of the mind; wherein heart and head is equally well provided for, and music is considered as a dynamical language of cosmo-generic dimensions, with a dynamical grammar as clear and precise as that of any verbal language. Then there will be no sensible effect without a well-understood cause; musico-sensual illiteracy will then have had its day, and automatic specimens of music-making can no longer pose and serve as technically and expressively exemplary of conception and rendition, which rendition is not colorably alterable, even by a well-contrived simulation of temperamental speed, and for which color-monotony even a perfect consummation of shading cannot compensate. Motions and emotions can then be raised to the rank of a well-understood cult; we will, therewith, possess educational ways, means and tests which go to the root of man's phenomenally aggregate but, as yet, unsystematized mental and emotional possibilities.

In conclusion let us survey, for a moment, music's affirmatively ethical qualifications.

As to the sincerity of music—being a spontaneously dynamico-ideological language she has no time to lie, or hide thought and its true quality, or make believe she has intelligence and sensibility when her manipulator or devotee has none. She mirrors, with unmistakable fidelity, the hypocrite as well as the Christian; the partial as well as the integral mind; the empty as well as the full heart. She rewards subterfuge and apology with loss of executive command—so, unerringly, carrying out the infallible argument from cause to effect—that is: self-adjustment.

And as to our emotional life—is not the causative pursuit of music the wisest and most practical as well as purest developer of our emotional being?

And though music yields herself utterly to our caresses, does she not continually suggest and stipulate the unconditional control of causes? Does not the infinite versatility of music clearly put the responsibility of timelessness, restriction and measurement upon our own shoulders? Therefore wherein exists a better opportunity for the inceptive exercising and vindication of Affirmation, Agency and Self-denial, tending at last to the acquisition of a discernment corroborated by best examples and real practice? Categoricalness is only derived from the conjunction of understanding with sensibility, no more nor less in music than in all else which we desire to ascertain. And if an understanding of entitative categories, degrees, phases, etc., etc., in their enharmoniously constituted aspects, is not the highest kind of education—what is?

Truly that sensibility and understanding which is not versed in the formal conditions of time, space, place and agency, is but partial—if not altogether devoid—of discrimination, because these are the sole conveyors of external representation of and to the mind. And music, when pre-eminently based on the observations of these things, ascends in an unbroken chain of thought from a common experience to a super-eminent unity, or to a super-eminent internality and externality.

And so the wond'rous Unit of super-eminent and experiential truth will be found, at last, to exist in the bosom of art alone.

MUSICIANS

MUSICIANS.

"Of all the liberal arts, music has the greatest influence over the passions, and it is that to which the legislator ought to give the greatest encouragement."

—Napoleon I.

PART I.

IF THE great musicians had only undefinable sensations, or indefinite ideas, or did not bother themselves particularly about the psychio-causal powers they worked with—or which worked them—it was simply because all self-reflecting consciousness is quite inimical to that degree of consciousness which permits musical or synthetical creation. It is almost an anomalous proposition to declare a semi-conscious absorption and an analytical or self-conscious reflection at the same time, since the quality of one state of mentality demands spontaneous or successive completion before or after it begins notation, while the quality of the analytical state of mind demands the disintegration of these dual modes of creation before or after synthetico-spontaneity or construction has begun notation. The first state is so much ahead of the second one in the order of time and speed, that the results of their respective judgments and conclusions are quite opposite declarations. Nevertheless

it is within the power of an unconditionally or impersonally trained mind and will to select or alternate these contradictory states of consciousness at discretion. Of course such a potentiality of mind anticipates the existence of a free will—a will which can subject its memory alternatively to an abeyant as well as to an activated condition—according to the time of its subject-matter. And music demands, more than any other art, a synthetico-spontaneous as well as a succinctly creative ability—especially if its declarations are to remain permanent ones—with analysis as a separate feature or factor in its sphere of activity, to be held in abeyance until wanted, as an after reflection. Separately each state of the two is, however, complete enough in itself to constitute the success of vastly differing schemes of thought, which, though apparently in no connection with each other, really complement each other when they are utilized in accord with their inherent order of time and speed ;and this is not hard to consummate if we follow the universal principle of observation, viz., that all dimensions contain, at least, a sympathetic or tolerant compliance in each other—a principle of thought and conduct which will always succeed in upholding the undeniable existence of a universal unity.

If the foregoing propositions seem somewhat paradoxical it will be due to the fact that a synthetically predisposed mind is always a composition-seeking mind, while an analytically predisposed mind is always a dissection-seeking one—which, too, accounts for the not unusual inability on part of creative or re-creative musicians to easily express themselves otherwise than

through musico-tonal schemes or instrumental means, or assume any attitude of mind other than the one intimately relevant to the urgency of musical creation. And, generally speaking, it is more than likely—in spite of ourselves—that all predispositions and their distinct tendencies are really governed, as the end usually shows, by such inherently temperamental forces as we happen to possess rather than by either the essentialities or incidentalities of any occupation we profess to follow.

There are, broadly speaking, three in themselves divisible classes of musicians, viz., Implementalists or Virtuosi; Cosmo-generics or Moralists; and Homo-generics or Virilists. From the first to the third class we may consider the unfoldment to be historically, but hardly rationally, an advancement.

This triune multiplicity shadows forth a fourth or hybrid, and a fifth or solecistic class. Whether the fourth or hybrid class is evolutionary is much to be doubted, because it is both parasitic and reactive; and whether the fifth or solecistic class is an advancement remains to be seen. The subject of both, however, will be considered later on. For the present the three cardinal classes of musicians should be first broadly considered as tending to give a better view of all exceptions to the rule.

The affections and agencies of these three fixed classes of creators and re-creators are, musico-characteristically, based on mechanism, dynamicism, and humanism—signifying that their respective creations, whether productive or reproductive, contain and declare any one or two or all three of these qualities as basic of conduct.

Of course this triunity is practically indestructible—even if only particular or peculiar of utterance, because music cannot be uttered without system; but the prejudice necessarily back of all particular or peculiar utterances is, in such cases, the first psychological cause in evidence—a cause which cannot be hidden (as time constantly proves), by the importance of personal accomplishment. Now, a negatively psychical cause is, in the nature of things, just as fundamental as an affirmative one, but with this great difference, that the affirmative one is in harmony with time, and the negative one is only a temporary request for time—a request which time never grants, no matter what man may think to the contrary. The fundamental nature of agency can never be hidden—no matter how subtly veiled by objective pretense—but will always, in the end, come to the fore and constitute the measure of merit. It is this parasitic egoism on the one side and a peculiar or universal egoism on the other, which commonly constitutes the basic attributes of the fourth and fifth classes of musicians we have already alluded to.

Having now premised the two psychico-basic causes of musical conduct—shortly known as affirmation and negation, but which we beg to qualify as either a direct or inner, or as an indirect or outer affirmation of conduct—we proceed also to declare that it is essential to the nature of our subject to drop all historical evolutions or data for rational ones, since in the order of completion the cosmo-generic element in music is unquestionably an ability and type of the highest order of intellect and impersonality of the affections; so our new or rationalistic

order of musicians will be Implementalists, or Virtuosi; Homo-generics, or Virilists; and Cosmo-generics, or Moralists.

The convertible or homogeneous terms in the Virtuosi condition of character are of quality:

Personal,

Self-important, and idiosyncratically temperamental;

in the Virilistic condition of character are of quality:

Communal, Nationalistic or Racial,

Important, and sentiently temperamental;

in the Moralistic condition of character are of quality:

Impersonal,

All-important, and commandingly temperamental.

To convert these again into musico-harmonious nomenclature we would have:

Individualism, symbolized as the keynote (Tonica) of conduct.

Virilism, symbolized as the mediant (Major or Minor) of conduct; and

Moralism, symbolized as the dominant (Fifth), or determinative principle of conduct—constituting together in philosophical nomenclature, the indivisible unity of Substance, Quality, and Quantity.

As regards the characteristic objectivity of will in these three states we would define the individual state to be externally unconditional—a status of license wherein means justify the measure; the virilistic objectivity to be internally unconditional—a status of freedom wherein the affections justify the measure; the moralistic objectivity of the will to be both internally and externally

unconditional—a status of liberty wherein able selection justifies the measure. Here we would have it understood that Mastery rules all three classes, as it implies the able reduction of multiplicity into a characteristic simplicity by physio-mental discipline. In this respect this quality is similar of power throughout the three states, even though they are differentially categorical from a common nucleus, for physio-mental discipline is the cardinal proposition of all sciences and arts. And also, broadly speaking, there are but three incentives or causes to musical expression, two of which are native or inner—temperament and genericalness—and one which is acquired or outer, viz., culture, the importance of which cannot be overrated as it involves the discipline of the mind and will. However, it is solely the degree of genericalness, or the inner quality or degree of power of the affections, or temperament, which divides these degrees of power and differentiates them as implementalism, or virilism, or cosmo-genericalism, and furnishes the extent of the whole number of each declaration. And though the affections have their common centre, it is cosmo-genericalism alone which embraces the power of all three declarations in one.

Having as much as possible endeavored to anticipate any unclearness as to the constituent and regulative characteristics of composers and reproducers, we now proceed to apply the various categories of conduct to musicians themselves, as gathered from their work. And let it be remembered that we have nothing to do with the private character of such as we have reason to

mention, since that side is quite another proposition—unless it may serve to illustrate psychologically a common purpose—but only with the musico-psychical character which their works manifest, and by which they themselves desired to be known.

The most successful self-unfoldment and consequent mastership of instrumentalism, by means of an exquisitely attuned sensibility of temperament and implemental affection, is that consummated by

CHOPIN.

The unfoldment of Chopin's singular genius was brought about by an intensely inner and self-consuming feeling and strength, desirous and satisfied to proclaim itself through the medium of one instrument only, which, consequently, served as the basal cause of his inspiration. The sympathy of his affections could not rise, inherently, above the particular construction, quality and premises of the piano; indeed, it conditioned and moulded the whole content and scheme of his mind, and caused him to predominate as a musico-esoteric and exoteric unity of sensibility and conduct or utterance. Aural judgment, to his mind, not only served but constituted music. And were it not historically well-known that every work he penned was originated and tested by his aural sense alone—regardless of harmonic theory—one could rationally gather that much, at least, from the private inwardness of his creations themselves, since they, undeniably, indicate the auricular sense as immanently controlling. Nor could he have originated from

any other consciousness than a purely private one, even had he desired to—so picture his searching hands indefatigably seeking such dictates from his instrument as could be approved of and accepted by his aural judgment! However, the inner consciousness in music needs not always the approval of the ear in creating; it can, in fact, apprehend and understand musical meaning much quicker and better by sight and touch than by ear. So we cannot omit to remark in this place, that in this aural judgment or auricular scheme of origination he is the illustrious archetype of countless amateurs, who, corrupted by the ear (which, fortunately, Chopin was not), manage hopefully to waste their time imitating his method of creation without his reason, so wasting what originality they may possess in the hopeless task of imitating the inimitable. Only a vain sensation-craving intelligence, whose aural judgment is almost invariably favorable to what its private self desires and approves of, would attempt to follow Chopin's method of composition.

Chopin must have, at times, suffered intensely—as all artists do who work without a positively assured outer sense of forms and proportions, because all inner life is illimitable without external measures and standards. His mode of creation—fastidious or hesitating as it was—was much less a source of unhappiness to his mind than the mode of his recreation, for what was deliberate in construction could not be deliberate of time in the moment of reproduction, because certain it is that ultimate or virile manifestation of music lies more directly or sensibly within the province of reproduction than in the province

of production. Consequently the time-question—always the first criterion or premise of all premises—proved fatal to him in this respect, or to whatever claims Chopin may have made as a virtuoso; and so the very mode which made him excel in one domain (production) foiled him in another (reproduction). It was in this last field that he experienced some of his bitterest disappointments—the agonies of hesitation when almost any quality of determination would have been better. We see in this instance how little able selection, as a psychological end, has to do with able selection as a psychological moment. The collection of thought in one case is timeful or voluntary; in the other case timeless or involuntary. Reproduction exacts many moments in one—that is spontaneity; to construct succinctly many moments in one—that is able deliberation. Chopin composed music from and for his own necessities, and incidentally so for the pianistic world. The particularly uncompromising power of his internal ego was so overwhelming that it induced him to express a contempt for all system, thereby clearly indicating, in a negative way, his studied unconsciousness of any particular system or method—a foolish vanity, since internality, to be intelligible at all must be possessed of a system, erratic as it may be, or at no time would its conclusive utterance be comprehensible to others. The contents of a work furnish the nature and system of its creation. The fact is that his system or scheme was conditioned entirely by the requirements of his piano; and the moment of his need selectively construed its output, to which his inner sense furnished an eventual succession, acceptance, and

consequence, without admitting a self-conscious idea of a system of procedure. The abiding seat of his judgment was, as we have indicated, in the searching criticality of his touch and ear, for if he could not touch and hear a thing, he was totally at a loss as to its harmonic correctness or value as an idea. For this reason, too, his orchestration was insignificant, simply because he could not try it over long enough to make it self-suggestive—and, anyway, orchestrating by aid of the piano only, gives but a superficial indication as to how it will sound in the orchestra. Orchestration is certainly one of the things which belong to that inner consciousness that understands musical meaning without touch and by thought and sight only. The aesthetical value of Chopin is in a class by itself. He deified music as poetry, for all of his declarations are the musico-lingual poetisations of his subjects.

The other great specialist, however along almost opposite lines of conduct to Chopin's procedure, was

PAGANINI.

While an internal personality compelled virtuosity in Chopin, an external personality compelled it in Paganini—which means, that Chopin was characteristically esoteric, and Paganini only characteristically cabalistic or occult. We freely confess that we are unable to find in Paganini, more than an incidentally ruling musicality, while an outer system prevails dominantly—and go as far as to think, that had he not learned the mysterious Violin, he would have obfuscated or prestidigitated with other means. He was mechanico-pre-

eminently ingenious, and in this direction, innovatingly consummate. He—like Chopin—was self-existent and self-taught. His unfoldment, instrumentally exterior of purpose, and in able accordance with that aim, uttered mechanical diabolery with unique self-completeness and extraordinary immanence, which the public, including musicians—excepting Spohr, who had travelled and observed—found perfectly miraculous, being under the strong impression that it always meant music. Of the two men, Paganini was the greater virtuoso, Chopin the greater composer. The former's external sense limited itself to the construction of technical wonders; the latter's internal sense to the construction of musical wonders. Both men not only savoured of source, but became sources, for both had practically exhausted the native possibilities of their respective instruments, with this difference in their schemes, that Paganini was self-consciously actuated, and Chopin consciously so towards instrumental completeness. The timeal pre-eminence of Paganini showed the man of wit and ready action; the selective pre-eminence of Chopin showed the man of fastidious humor and hesitating action.

For once, out of billions, pure individualism, in the case of these two men, patently carried the artistic day, and really achieved a phenomenal self-development—a process only warranted again in the event of a still to be determined or unexploited instrumentality. Either of these two men would have been of less importance generically, without the opportunistic promptings and assertions of a particular and to them auto-suggesting instrumentality, which they chose to designate as first of

source ; therefore uniqueness, or the desire to be first of a kind was the actuating or motive power which logically carried them towards the goal, as it is of all such as consider means to be first of source.

Along this line of thought and creation, yet remains for consideration, the unfoldment of the

ORCHESTRA VIRTUOSO.

Now virtuosity is, at its best, in itself, as first of source but genetical of system and generical of selection—consequently is, by the light of universal thought, but a second source of inspiration and confession—that is: it furnishes to an already expressed subject the rhythmico-articulative color schemes of orchestration—a tonal sublimation or deification of that subject, which though dynamico-lingually suggestive and assertive of it, is, nevertheless, not all-essential even if illuminative of it.

The orchestral principle of virtuosity is ably manifested by such composers as Berlioz, Liszt, Strauss, and others. By these masters thought and emotion are, integrally enough, declared in the orchestra ; and though this instrumental unity admits of the highest powers of tonal expression, their declarations, nevertheless, do not determine a broader utterance than that of geneticalness. However, the creative process of their declarations demands a first source endeavor, since orchestration, in itself, exacts that particular quality of thought which is one of the first essentials to a categorically declared integrality—even when only used as an end and not as a

means. And this confusion of end for means is due to a generico-temperamental, instead of a cosmo-generical selection, which is all-including. It is practically a self-selection; and all self-selection is a characteristic acknowledgement of limitation, transient of power, because only provisionally necessary, emphatic and expedient. A cosmo-generical selection, on the other hand, implies the acceptance of what is inevitably recognized as being self-determining, because it is recognized as belonging in object and subject to the fullest extent of time, place and space; and, logically, this cognition augurs a corresponding universality of intelligence in the selector, or as being unconditional of source, both internally and externally. However all that may be, the assertion of orchestral superiority or virtuosity, will some day, too, find its own finish, even though the principle of instrumentality must always hold good as a genetical means to a first source or generical end. And if we analyse Will and Agency in this state we find them to be esoteric of character, whether permanent or transient of expression.

There is no doubt but what the private study and popularity of music is directly traceable to the illustrious preachments of the virtuoso. Such purely instrumental composers, as Chopin, Liszt, Paganini, and others, have left an instrumental literature to posterity on which it can and will live for generations to come; yet it is open to serious consideration whether this esoteric idea and character of music did not do more harm than good to the integral sense of man, for it seems as if this egotising of music has almost obscured the general idea

of a first source prior to that of implementality. Virtuosity has taught the young and the old to think or feel music but vocally or instrumentally—that is, if they ever think musically at all. However, this implementally created sensation is indigenous with the natively raw and unreflecting mind—hence the immanent popularity of music in all forms and kinds. Therefore, of nothing seem these musical devotees more convinced than that the first or unconditional source of music lies in the peculiar physicality of an instrument and not primitively and solely in the universally gifted and cultivated mind. Instrumental or mechanical certainties contain only foregone, limited and predetermined conclusions, are, for this reason, but second source or minor propositions. Implementalistic thinking distinctly nurses ideas that are first of kind instead of first of source—hence a strabismic view on art by individualism. However the fascinations of self-gratification, which the possession of an instrument so abundantly suggest and encourage, are of such force and plausibility as to prove irresistible to an experientially and experimentally prepossessed mind—are, indeed, often of such intensity that they mount up to a fatal encouragement of unbalanced desires and proclivities, the raw pursuit or indulgence of which assumes phantasmal, if not fanatical dimensions, tending to a degree of self-assurance which had best be left to itself, or, rather, to time, for correction. Art is, seriously speaking, unconditional; so, if we entertain her with exploitative ideas (instead of devotional ones) we entertain also ideas which are inimical to what we artistically need to accomplish—a truth we

are most likely to recognize sooner or later. And if a native sense of integrity has not accompanied, at least abeyantly, such indirect efforts, the loss of time becomes irremediable, since there cannot have been an integral accrument on which to build anew. It should be taught and always remembered, that all individual desires or proclivities to and in music, are, when measured by the standard of a universal mind—only particular, perhaps peculiar, the cultivation or fostering of which is, more or less, anticultural; that in the light of first source worship and inspiration virtuosity is always out of time and place, therefore always going out of date; that even genius along these lines is a temporary declaration, brought about by the hidden or inner avowal of a conditional professionalism as being unconditional of truth.

The logically rationalistic step from Virtuosodom leads into the second or virilistic class of composers—composers who essay the affections, or render the internal qualities in a tonally illustrious manner.

We divide these into two classes: (1) those who tonally authenticate and accredit the affections; (2) those who tonally only collate, array, and dissipate the affections, though as one class all characterize themselves by manifesting an inner life too strong to be overwhelmed or corrupted by accidental conditions. To the first division belong such composers as Chopin, Schumann, Verdi, Brahms, Tschaikowsky, and Wagner; to the second division such composers as Mendelssohn, Berlioz, Liszt, Rubinstein, Grieg, Dvorak, Saint Saens, and Richard Strauss. To better classify these two divisions we would call the

former the generics, and the latter the genetics, meaning that the one division declares general affections, the other particular ones.

CHOPIN,

instrumental specialist as he was, nevertheless declared the hypersensitive or exotic in a poetico-lyrical and articulatively chivalrous way, from generic sources or reasons.

SCHUMANN

prevailed in the poetico-phantastically morbid, consequently his entitative meditations and mediations, musico-metaphysically abstract as they are, affirm a deeply internal state of sense and thought. He becomes delineatingly particular when he resorts to rhythmicodynamical forces, for the aural purpose of conveying the picturesque or reminiscently eventful. His dynamicorhythmical power is first of source. The romantico-aural transmission of predated subjects was always the abstract object of his contemplation and agency. Living too vividly in such a morbidly abstracted world, he eventually lost himself in its immeasurable heights, or in its bottomless depths.

VERDI.

Both a national and racial genericity are well pronounced in Verdi, for he utters the ideological characteristics of his nation and race. He is, in that sense,

erotically and dramatico-lyrically pre-eminent. Late in life Verdi sought and approached the international mode of utterance, and would have completely consummated his ambition had not his racial proclivities proved themselves ineffaceable.

BRAHMS

essays the erotico-poetical and lyrico-sensuous affections. In his music there is a lush and ingratiating plenitude of feeling and thought most grateful to aural sensibility and therefore strongly recognized and reciprocated by the affections. This declaration, though pre-eminently commanded by the mind of a great master, however, never rises into a dramatic virility of utterance, remaining overwhelmingly and cloyingly lyrico-poetical. Affectionate pathetism was Brahms' generic force.

TSCHAIKOWSKY,

as far as we are now aware, is the last of the purely generical composers. He essays the fiercely passionate and sadly pathetic, in a sincere and spontaneous manner; and though fundamentally racial and nationalistic of character, nevertheless expresses the generical patois of human nature. His arguments or musical dialectics, sometimes reach the force of triumphant certainty, yet they are ever restless and seeking, and never joyful and reassuring.

WAGNER.

Among the generics, Wagner—like Chopin and Schumann—is first and last of a kind. His ego-characteristic

and super-sensual eroticism found its text and consummation in whatever subject he selected—in fact, he summoned up all symphonic impersonations to his behests and shaped them into a virile dramaticism. He is pre-eminently the unconditional master of all tenses, moods, and actions—whatever the subject. He always found the type and exact situation necessary to his musico-generic enthusiasm, delineated it with singular mastery, whatever its particularities of character. His genius was personally and impersonally self-complete.

A few words about “uniqueness” in musicians like Chopin, Schumann, and especially Wagner, ere we continue.

An inner motive for first of a kind, is qualified—like everything else—not so much by our incoherent desires or appetites, as by the order of its time. If the motive is first of time or source, the character possessing it would necessarily be self-actively able; but if it is second of time or source, the desire or appetite simply stimulates idealism and volition. The difference here indicated declares the existence of a simple and of a complex consciousness. Now a simply conscious volition would conjecture a state of first source mastery, while complex or self-conscious volition would, on the other hand, only conjecture a state of desire or appetite for mastery; therefore, it seems likely that self-seeking or even self-realization need not necessarily imply the certainty of mastership, because it cannot arrive fully at this completion on such a second source or complicated basis. And even conscientiousness would be no better or more

effective, since that state implies a strongly reflecting accountability to self ere time proceeds—a state diametrically opposite to the quasi auto-acting presence which Art-creation needs—or what we, in other words, have designated as simple consciousness. The conscious (simple) presence of mind would mean or render all unto kind; the self-conscious presence of mind would mean or render all unto self as of kind. The world, in this respect—and especially as regards its critical portion—usually misunderstands or misinterprets the private characters of the masters, by gratuitously accrediting them with a consciousness artistically, that is self-seeking, whereas if the world realized that peculiar qualities are creatively opposed to the very products the masters do deliver, it would certainly gain both in time and quality by omitting the acrimonious part of its dialectics or delectations. Perhaps no master was more accredited with such soul and art-destroying qualities than Wagner. But whatever were his peculiarities, they were certainly of second and not of first source. The fact of the matter is that Wagner was possessed of both a spontaneous and a deliberate or selective sense of time, that is, he had an unconditional as well as a conditional option and kept his inner sources untarnished.

The genetic masters, or such as principally collate, array and disperse the affections, are characteristically more individualistic than the generical masters. They are, rationally, a step ahead of implementalism and one step back of genericism, that is: instead of being ruled by a prevailing instrumentality they rule and advance

it, being governed in their innovations by a certain sense of what may be termed "musical virtuosity." They create, musico-implementally, in a way adapted to the requirements of their affections, and manifest soaring aspirations in this direction, inspiredly consummated.

The first in this order of composers is, rationally and historically, undoubtedly

MENDELSSOHN,

because he has an aesthetic sense of cosmic as well as of generical temperamentality in combination, which never deserts him in his creative moments. The consequence is a truthful refinement of thought and form never excelled, musically speaking. He is an aesthete of the first order, whose inner needs selected music as the natal language of aesthetic sensibilities and thoughts, and as the best vehicle to subtly convey these to an outer world. He is generical to the extent of reflection, and virile to the extent of a rare sense of musical virtuosity.

BERLIOZ

is one of the first, if not the first, of the instrumental innovators, or musico-orchestral virtuosi. His implemental realism is often successfully consummated, but sometimes at the expense of realism itself—the result of a self-important imagination. Of course this naiveté found but

a tardy or a partial recognition—one which disappointed and embittered his life. The self-application and deification of this incongruous duality—native simplicity in alliance with foreign complexities—is best demonstrated in his *Damnation of Faust*—his ninth symphony, as it were. It shows that the negative element can be made to prevail affirmatively, through purely instrumental forces. The *Damnation of Faust* is his most virile utterance, even though it is but the zenith of a sardonic virtuosity.

LISZT.

The keynote to Liszt's creative or inner power was a lofty transcendentalism which directed his mind strongly to the mystical, and therein it alternated between spiritual abstraction and a symbolically corresponding realism. It is this latter quality which so pervades and characterizes his instrumentalism, giving it an epico-poetical as well as a typical-actual expression of virtuosity. As regards the possession of a truly noble and even kingly genius for instrumentation, Liszt's equal has not yet appeared, even though it is spectacular or somewhat theatrical at times.

RUBINSTEIN

is generically racial in his utterances, and in this sense is an international poet in the domain of production and reproductive music. Poetico-lyricism is the keynote of his utterances, which attain—especially in the choruses

of his operas—a deeply beautiful expression of poetical comprehension and power. Had he not sacredly held racial temperamentality to be the true genius and last word in the domain of lyrical art, he would have discovered the fourth dimension—namely himself in relation to the previous three. Reflective genericism and enacting implementality were on par with each other.

GRIEG,

a national poet of international though not of universally internal power of creation. In point of self-search and metaphysical abstraction he ranks with the more super-eminent Schumann; but in point of selection he remained purely local or national. His affections and powers for musical virtuosity indicate a deep sense of the poetico-traditional.

DVORAK

is racially temperamental with a sense of the lyrico-poetical, vividly, though not intensely, expressed, in alliance with a sound judgment of musical and implemental ways and means—the latter somewhat predominating the musico-poetical.

SAINT-SAENS

has a most facile command of ideas, technic, and virtuosity—the latter particularly striking in all of its bear-

ings. He is more inventive and constructive than generically creative. Were his utterances less sincere or more self-conscious, the native wit, indicated by their facetiousness, would predominate; as it is: an almost morbid sensibility for poetry, dynamics, and rhythm—national and racial of temperament—prevails.

RICHARD STRAUSS

is aspiringly cacophonous with a grimly humorous or almost “gargoylian” sense of musical severity and proportions. As an orchestral virtuoso he is innovatingly daring, and has illimitable resources as a harmonist. His field is imaginary realism, or soulish character-portraiture—a psychologizing, as it were, of the subjective affections which, though virilly effective, is often taken from morally feeble or inordinate sources. An erotic implementalism prevails his orchestration, and the rendering of the soulishly degenerate has in his works attained the highest possible utterance. More sincere and true to the normal affections is Strauss in his songs, wherein lovely sentiments usually prevail, set in frames or accompaniments of wrond’rous but appropriate garniture. Perhaps with Strauss the last stages of purely musical subjectivism have been entered.

If we analyze this virilistic state of musical endeavor we find Will and Agency to be temperamentally racial or national, whether its product is enduring or evanescent.

PART II.

The regress (into multiplicity) of this genetical or symptomatic state of virilism tends to the very conditional state of solecism, or pure singularity or particularity of characteristic utterance. Solecistic composers are such as unfold self-concentrically or from a self-constituted desire, in which the criterion of subject and object is the plausible. It seems to be the strikingly plausible or singular that we love to seek and find, under the impression that it constitutes identity or originality, instead of what it really is: personation;—and a plausible or patent singularity is well-nigh irresistible, though, integrally, it is the weakest side of musical art and the easiest of comprehension. Thus is music often accepted and adjudged as solecistic of constitution, and musicians as necessarily so. Nor do we deny to solecistic masters a related genericalness of utterance—that is unavoidable in music—nor a consummate mastership, but do accredit them with the pursuit of private interests. Time, however, is fatal to all such efforts, because in time there is change. But time itself is immutable back of all changes; and works created in the sense of cosmo-generic measurement are never affected by the changes which occur in time. It is thus that artistic permanency of creation is attained.

Of course from pure implementalism to virilism indicates a great unfoldment of the mind and the affections. It is individuality confessing to integrality with

a community,* or a nation, or a race, or to the possession of an integral self, auguring unfoldment to be conducted along intercommunal lines of thought. Of the virilists it may be said that all the affections are their cause; their sounds, the voices of humanity; and their argument that of all organic creation.

A further step from this virilism leads into the permanent order of cosmo-genericalness. It is these who, while rendering the affections, translate them, at the same time into ethical reflections and arguments. Of the cosmo-generical composers, it may be said that the whole universe is their cause; their sounds, the voice of the Almighty; and their meaning the argument of a super-eminent existence.

Of the virilists we have spoken as first of content, then form; of the cosmo-generics we now speak as first of form or recognized being, then content.

First of form implies and declares the recognition of an ethical existence; first of content implies and declares the recognition of the generical qualities of existence. The first is thoughtfully reflective; the second emotionally so. The first proposition is, in the order and principle of things, an immutable one; the second proposition is, in the *order*, though not in the generic principle of things, a mutable one. Which of the two propositions, as regards the higher mission of our genus,

* As merely communal confessions are only faithful to specified interest—a psychological form of mentality not broad enough of conduct to ever become of general importance, because so closely related to solecism, we do not care to pursue this especial phase of professionalism.

stands first in the order of time and source is, on ethical grounds, beyond question. Genericality is immanent of organic affections, but needs formal regulations to make it ethically admissible; spirituality is necessary to the continuity or perpetuation of things, is spontaneous worship in time and source, and being constitutive of the affections, is aesthetico-ethically regulative of them.

Of this cosmo-generic comprehension and import were the sound-messages of Bach, Haendel, Haydn, Mozart, Schubert, and Beethoven.

BACH.

Bach's mind, judging by the external and internal dimensions and qualities of his works, is one of the most potential mentalities that we know of, either in antiquity or in modernity, for they reveal such an equi-balanced Reason and Understanding as has always distinguished the master-minds of all ages. We can hear, see, feel, and know, in Bach's music, the loftiest returns to the loftiest aspirations; the most confessed worship and proclamation of divine power and thought; and the utter completion of faithful certainty and piety of Will—all qualities as none but a representative mind possesses and could express, by virtue of an equally determined inner and outer sense of harmonious unity and entirety, or of cosmo-generic dimensions in both super-eminent thought and experience. Then, too—and we prize this no less highly than his music—the simple and exemplary life of Bach fully bears out the potential connection existing between a truly complete mind and a

truly competent life, since the devotional mode of the one was the devotional mode of the other. It is not always so in the lives of super-eminent men; often there exists an inharmonious dualism in such identities, or a contradiction between personal and impersonal personations; but Bach's mind was enharmonically a truly ritualistic as well as a truly righteous mind. Its operation and conduct were integrally dual, commanding both succession or change; and an ever harmonious permanency in time. It was in music what Kant's mind was in argument, that is, fundamentally scholastic; but there the similitude ends, for the mind of Bach could realize and grasp, by means of his art, the symbolic principle and portent of universal mathematics, or the unconditional necessity of transfiguration or enharmonization, which the mind of Kant, in its ignorance of art and in the arrogance of scholastic pride and understanding, not only scorned, but completely obscured, and, eventually, eliminated from his thoughts. It is worthy of note, and, perhaps, necessary to remark in this connection, that the understanding can less react on itself in productive or reproductive music than in any other occupation—not even excluding that of professed religion. It is the constantly essential enactment in art—and without which there can be no art—that leads on to reason and faith, or a state of grace; whereas all other occupations—even that of professed religion included—are not necessarily self-balancing or self-adjusting, especially when the desire to understand is all and self-sufficient. So these two originally equally constituted and endowed minds, through the evolutions of their professions,

came to diametrically different conclusions. Bach really ended the scholastic period of musical composition, and laid the permanent foundation for all future comers. His comprehensive mind, indeed, conjectured the advent of less confined forms of utterance, and seemed fairly to presage the advent of the more homo-generic in music. The encouragement he gave to one of his sons in this direction proves his forecast; but, unfortunately, the son's products were only spasmodic, or far and few between, and serve only as mere indications of a possible period of homo-genericity to come.

HAENDEL.

Haendel was contemporaneous with Bach, and their minds agreed as to the unconditionally external and internal temperament of music; and also that its sublimeness was, at its highest and best, in the service and deification of the super-eminent.

Haendel made the first step into a distinctly national form of expression, however universal of confession, when he created the Oratorio—a musico-biblical expression of the Church of England, consummated by an equally unconditional musicality. In this field he attained the loftiest utterance extant, that of sublime majesty and exaltation—for who ever heard the elementally virile motive of the Hallelujah chorus, and felt not its unsurpassable consummation, or was not thrilled with a sense of its everlasting truth, exaltation and glorification—the ringing language, as it were, suggestive of

divine majesty itself! It sounds as if the Almighty himself had prompted the motive and joined in the chorus in honor of Man! In Haendel's oratorios the principle of vocal speech, or recitation, has never been surpassed; the inner emotions of the religiously happy and sorrowful nature of man nowhere more sincerely, tenderly, or more reverently conceived and uttered; nowhere is the militant principle of protestantism more boldly or triumphantly expressed, as the inalienable right of man; nothing more irresistibly certain in aspiration, inspiration, and worshipful proclamation, and as indicating the prescient blessing and refuge of all earthly reason and heavenly hope; nor anywhere else a musical expression more spontaneously related to this glorious idea of the existence of a Universal Father. Both Haendel and Bach possessed a cosmo-generical mind, only equalled in religious positivism by that of Milton; and no doubt, the poet here inspired the musician. No greater influences from the Almighty ever graced the minds of men, than those which came forth from the master-brains of these beings.

JOSEPH HAYDN.

We are indebted to Haydn for the extension of form and the beginning of more generic utterances than were hitherto manifested. Of the generic qualities, wit and humor were the index to his native character; sincerity, devotedness, divine and human pathos were the spiritual or serious side of it. Fortunately for Haydn, wit is an ever popular and sought-for quality, so was greatly

conducive to secure, in time, his temporal welfare, which, saving him from immediate care, enabled him to fully enunciate the highest attributes of his spiritual life. His step forward, from the more scholastic limitations of absolute musicality, resulted in the creation of the symphonic form and the orchestra; and to this good day the constitutions and regulations of both hold good and have not been, intrinsically or externally, much improved upon, though Mozart's genius gave them an exemplary perfection. The *Creation* and *The Seasons*—the oratorios of Nature—were his most ambitious forms of utterance. With these he introduced a pensive, yet happily naive contemplation and portrayal of God in Nature, indicative of more internal than external certainty. The tendency to the programmatic, in these Oratorios, is often very marked, and, at the time, may have been very effective, as first of a kind, but is now held as a rather cheap if not meretricious device. Wittiness was not applicable to the design of such works. However, we have the genericalness of Haydn at his best in his instrumental and not in his vocal utterances. The musical form of thought which he finally determined is so unconditionally logical, too, as to serve for the contents of all kinds of extensive instrumental expressions. It serves both the sonata and the concerto for musico-instrumental expressions; in the string quartet or chamber-music, for musico-intellectual or qualifiedly emotional utterances; in the symphony for musico-ethical, passion and lyrico-dramatical arguments, and later on, for musico-genetical and musico-generical revelations.

MOZART.

The quality of Mozart's early genius is never quite comprehended, even to this good day. To the observing mind there always appears to exist an unexplained difference between the genius of the Prodigy and that of the fully matured Master—and by a common experience the early Prodigy appears, later in life, never to have been possessed by a master-mind, at any time. The difference between the genius of the Prodigy and that of the Master is that existing between ingenious and genius. Ingenious implies the certain control of motions, while Genius implies the certain integration of both motion and emotion. The prodigy is prodigious, because what he really demonstrates is only a motionally predominating faculty, unfolded by strictly private reasons, either externally or internally, and these never dually complementing each other. Time is always to be gained by selecting a reduced or one-sided proposition; integral selection, on the other hand, must bide its allotted time for growth, and cannot be forced beyond the essential duration of that time—a fact that private reasons are never willing to acknowledge, or may not have it within their circumstances to grant. However, the point is this: that such immature or partial unfoldments, instead of being understood as merely ingenious—be they physical or mental—are too readily taken as evidences of an integral genius. Now Mozart's prodigious genius was at no time either partial or halved of nature, but was based on the general sum-total of both particularity and entirety. Even as a pianistic wonder, he gave no

divided manifestations of only an instinctive particularity, because in his tenderest years his father, in a succinct and disciplinary way, taught him to possess and appreciate the whole side of his art, or both its inner or ethical and outer or formal significance; otherwise he never, by virtue of his natural talent, could have attained the mastership he did. And this principle of mental integrity is essential to all demonstrations of the human mind, if the results are to continue permanently. As a consequence of his early training, Understanding and Reason were ever infallibly certain of each other; and when he created he knew no laborious self-consciousness or impedimental difference between these two faculties, since they were never present to his mind in any other form than as an indivisible whole—which accounts for the certainty, ease, and speediness of his creations.

Mozart was the creator of the absolutely musical opera—a further step in the extension of the cosmogeneric, or that of musico-lyrical dramaticism. His operatic creations were a succession of time, or a number of airs, and possessed not the integral cast of a spontaneously evolved entirety—which was only declared by Wagner. However, each of these airs is a perfectly integral gem in itself, deliberately collected, and only strung and held together by the necessity of a plot, or a dramatic order of action. He gave the musico-symphonic form, in its virtuoso, intellectually conversational and generico-universal sense, its most exemplary development; and we are still indebted to Mozart for an unrivalled perfection of musical utterance, one which must

be liberally mastered, ere reductions or extensions of it are warranted. Of generic qualities there was the same inner and outer wit as in Haydn, however, less blunt and more innately refined, because temperamental sensibility was in favor of Mozart. Wit and humor, in him, possessed an inimitable facetiousness, permeated with an angelical purity and spontaneity of pathos, whose sincerity filled the heart with love, the eye with tears, and the soul with an otherwise unutterable sense of pathetic expression. The unconscious simplicity and naivety of Mozart were more of heaven than of earth.

SCHUBERT.

In Schubert existed a strain of lyricalness, the utterance of which was so strong as to render most of his other qualities subservient to it, even when, theoretically, different treatment was perhaps better for his music. That such a character should have idiosyncrasies was in the proposition of the case. However, Schubert *sings* himself into the heart as no other composer does, and, outside of his songs, manages, in time, to convince, in defiance of the convictions—even certainties—of the understanding, for his vocalism is so mighty that all else yields to its poetical truthfulness and charm. He is, consequently, the creator of the integral song—that moment of lyricalness out of which he makes a musical history, and out of a psychological moment a poetical destiny. It is in the song that he cannot utilize that prolixity of speech to which the more extensive forms of instrumental composition readily lend

themselves, even unto exhaustion and weariness. Under the given conditions of text, consequently, his loquacious genius had to observe economy, and therewith consummated its unconditional affinity and most qualified enunciations in the song. However, this same native sense of lyricalness and poetry is what makes the length of his purely instrumental music delightful—unless, indeed, one is a precisian and economist. The tonal sonority of a vocalized instrumentation and poetry of thought is, almost invariably, compensative for the exhaustive treatment and length of his instrumental ideas. Schubert's genius is the triumph of vocalism and poetry wherever he is heard.

Perhaps we may, for once, transgress the universal and permit ourselves to grow more intimate with the personality of genius in his case—not indeed to criticise or blame, but to show how a redundancy in certain directions may create a corresponding deficiency in others, since it often happens that the richness of the artist contributes to the poverty of the man; and to show, too, how a liberally native endowment of genius—when *specifically* entitative—can yet produce, by absorption, a niggardly endowment as a social being.

Schubert is one of the most pathetic and heartbreaking examples of non-recognition and neglect in the history of musicians. His strong internalism seemed to have deprived him of speech, and, consequently, of the ready words and usages of conventional society. This strongly affected the behavior of the man, unless with boon companions, making him timid and distrustful of himself, and so, socially, impracticable if not impossible.

Nor did nature favor the exterior Schubert, for nowhere was the wondrous grace of mind indicated by the cast and manners of the body. Evidently nature here formed the spiritual at the sacrifice of the material, to the extent of constant contradiction—and society, we know, judges by appearances or at sight. The result of this temporal misfortune was, that he could make no convincing presentation of himself, nor possessed an individualism strong enough to command personal attention, secure personal respect and appreciation, except in particular cases; and so his earthly prospects seemed hopelessly committed from the start. He himself got to believe that nobody ever needed or wanted him in any capacity, and, no doubt, his experience cruelly strengthened this belief. All his faith and speech consisted of music; and the latter was of that kind which determines the seraphic form and idea of the affections—hopeless of earthly concerns from the very purity of its conception of all things. Its reasons were purely of heaven, and his understanding reckoned not, nor sang for earthly recompense, but only for its own soul and entertainment. He was possessed with the passion of an immortality grasping reason, which, in the spotlessness of its affections, completely lost sight of its mundane purpose and ends—a genius beyond the ken of temporal understanding, but simply humanly divine when viewed by the affections. It is known that he died in great poverty, and rumored, at the time, that his death was caused—at the age of 31 years—by starvation. Furthermore, it needed over half a century before justice was amply rendered to his memory, or the certainty of his musical

intelligence was as well recognized as his poetico-vocal power, and the patronizing inscription on his tombstone—promissory of better things had he only lived longer—erased, and a full acknowledgement of the remains of an immortal master recorded thereon. Ignorance had pursued him even beyond the grave; but his affection, at last, persuaded the caviling understanding of professionalism.

The great unfoldment of cosmo-generic utterance in music was brought to a conclusion, and that of a more homo-generic possibility conjectured and asserted—consequently indicated even though not fully initiated by

BEETHOVEN.

The keynote to Beethoven's character is found in an ethically disciplinary mind. He is an illustrious example of what even a brutal or inherently mistaken discipline can do for a natively capable mind. Though its appliance, in his case, was more regulative than enlightening or educational, it, nevertheless, brought about a most lofty affirmation, planting in him a lasting sense of morality with all that it muiscally entails. There is no greater or more important sense in man than that of the moral faculty. It determines equity, and in doing so seeks and may attain the basis of an unconditional freedom—a state of character that augurs able selection and equally able creation. Upon this certain character Beethoven founded an ethico-tonal scheme whose utterances were irrefutably true. While morality demands a restriction of the sensuous, it, at the same time, may

contain the power to convert sensuousness into a prayerful and worshipful super-eminence of the mind and soul. The sublimely reflective and profoundly worshipful enunciations contained in Beethoven's works show but the great character of the man in meditation and mediation. All that was morally human or generic in him was strictly and fully rendered according to cosmogeneric rules and principles, were his subject of inner or outer content or nature—mattered not—for the harmonious unity was always consummated whatever the demand. His severe code of internal ethics permitted him not to descend to the sensuousness of erotic portrayal; and it was this practical absence of an erotic or but too well governed elementality, which made his operatic attempt but the telling of a story in an ethico-musical way. For instance, nothing was ever composed which indicates a higher or a more commensurate sense of unconditional freedom than the prisoner's chorus in *Fidelio*. His summary of human happiness was apotheosized in his ninth symphony. Up to that time of his life his mind was reflective; but in and after the ninth symphony, as if tired of ethical preachments, it became more and more immanently generical of utterance, still, however, to the last, manifesting an overwhelming sense of God in Man, or Man, practically, as first of source. Beethoven was accused of being an uncultured, if not a skeptical man. That is measurably true only, or only personally so. Impersonally his mind was certainly religious, though it confessed no orthodoxy; and discipline had determined a moral cult, at the cost of

personal education and grace of manners, which made him respectlessly contemptuous of all social hypocrisy, and regardlessly furious at temporal egotism, wherever he found or touched upon it. After all, the criterion and key to a man's character and worth are only really found and cognizable in the temperamental qualities of his impersonal aspiration, and only passingly in the temporal qualities of his private character or personal professions. Dynamical reason and understanding, with its symbolical principles and laws of instrumentality, tone, and silence, held indisputable sway and argument, and filled his life completely, because he would heed nothing else but the internal behests of musical reason and understanding. His worldly comprehension, in contrast with his dynamical sense, naturally grew shocked and intolerant by the comparison of one with the other—and why not? Yet, to be just, that constituted only the strictly private opinions of the man, or that of his particular understanding. A wider education and knowledge of the world, would, no doubt, have made a more polished gentleman out of him; but this concession, to worldly thoughts and manners, would have strongly militated against the ethically uncompromising dimensions of his character in another state. It simply needed that primitively elemental and jurial sense of truth and certainty to be a Beethoven; and we would not have him otherwise if we could, for we would, undoubtedly, have been the losers in an ethico-integral sense, had there been even a breath of social hypocrisy in him. We have inherited in Beethoven's works an immortal documentation and lesson of the power and permanency of the moral faculty of expres-

sion—the universal text and preachmemnt of his existence. In a generico-jural sense, Beethoven's mind is, dynamically, on the same level with that of Shakespeare—and neither destined, in his own particular field, to be surpassed or even rivalled, so immeasurably did thought and conduct excel in the Mind of these two men. We can love Shakespeare with all our hearts for his impersonal knowledge of our characteristic strength and weakness; but the ethical preachments of Beethoven sternly command us, whether we will or no. We can only be in his company with wonder, awe, reverence, and admiration, but never so with our intimate affections, because he knows us and our needs better than we do. And our affections he never bid for, even though he yearned for them.

The classics were, in principle, rule, ethics, and formality the declarators of the universal in its all-comprising sense. They found the fourth dimension by the light of the other three.

If we analyze Will and Agency in this cosmo-generic state, we find them to be ethico-unconditionally progressive towards unity.

In dismissing these inexhaustive inner biographies of musicians, we need yet reflect upon the fact how scarce, indeed—especially in the works of virilistic masters—is the sincerely dramatical element. We, of course, always except Wagner from this accusation, because he not only reflected and felt, but actually absorbed the time of his characterizations, or lived in his characters in a dramatico-psychological way; and *living* is cosmo-generic time at first source, even

though the mind be totally oblivious of its presence. In seeking portrayal, the Virilists or homogenics delegated implements, not men, hence we have program-music, in which the sense of time is secondary; for all music devoted to the purpose of comprehending externalities is not *impersonation* but merely *personation* by aid of implemental means, is for this reason, only allusive and more or less illusive. Music in itself is purely an internal product, and finds its most lasting utterances and completeness within our sense of form, feeling, and reflection, consequently, its material application to external events and characters is not only an arbitrary but an ambiguous appliance. Wagner was the only composer who solved the truly possible alliance of the outward and inward, that is by an actual impersonation of the outward; the Virilist only contemplates, conceives, and creates reflectively the outward by an inner sense of personation—the noumena of which are not always comprehensible, even by an added text or explanation. Now when we speak of music as self-complete we speak of a fact which declares it to belong to the sphere of pure thought and feeling, cosmo-generically demonstratable—a fact which alone relieves music from the imputation of mere phenomenalism or imagery, or as needing to spring from the peculiar or the particular mind only. As unlimitedly all-pervading, it is a subtilization or sublimation of organic and inorganic forces, and it was in this broad sense that Wagner utilized it. He never made the mistake of confusing self-complete with complete music, since, categorically,

one cannot truly afford to synonymize implementality and genericity at pleasure. To Wagner the musical mind or will was either unconditional or conditional of principle, but not both in one or at the same time, therefore his able selection was pre-eminently distinguishing.

Now wherein all musicians are agreed is on the absolute necessity of mastership, whatever the subject matter, that is, whether selection has been ably, or particularly, or specially, or even meretriciously exercised. Selection is the easiest of functions; but conformation to one's selection—is another question: that of mastery. However, when carried out on unconditional lines it denotes a master-mind; when on conditional lines it denotes only a mastership; and it is well to reflect and distinguish between the two categories, for a master-mind includes mastership, but mastership does not, necessarily, include a master-mind. And the conditionally common side of geneticalness is—from a popular viewpoint—the mastership of harmonious collocation—the art of saying old things in a new way. It seems, therefore, as if this conditional unfoldment of the ethico-genericity was simply a distribution into genericity, geneticality, and professionalism—a division of the one inherently complete idea into an ever increasing multiplicity of its more or less affirmative or negative features. The expressions of this individuating process engendered specialism, peculiarism, and a “solecistic socialism”—which seems, integrally speaking, more of “a spread” than an advance, in which the ethico-genericity has been considerably diluted, if not finally lost sight of. All

this came about from the dawning desire for self-accomplishment in music—an attainment best to be consummated by a replica of orchestral possibilities, of which the piano is the most convenient device. However, the integral sense of man is naturally so ingrained that this popularization will always have to face this universal—though not common—view of things, and submit its temporary successes to more permanent judgments—those of constitutional needs and prerogatives. It is this ethico-generic sincerity in the nature of the unbiassed listener which teaches him—even without possessing a musico-critical knowledge—to feel for the integrally constitutive sense of a work or its performance; and this criterion, even when only instinctively applied to a work or performance, constitutes a permanent judgment. Its operation is quite direct: it simply looks for a positive or a negative presence of ethico-generic feeling, or, at least, some concordance with its own native sense of an ethico-generic entirety.

As an ethico- and homo-generic performer we would yet mention

I. J. PADEREWSKI,

who manifests a proximate sense of the creative in his interpretations of the masters—one almost ranking the inner and outer qualities of the masters he essays, for, like them, he draws from first sources.

We see, generally speaking, that the artist, like all men, is a generic by birth; a citizen by accident; but is likely to become a genetic by one-sided or merely

professional education. The usual stumbling block of genetics is the particularity or exclusiveness of their affections for the mere features of entirety—proclivities which obscure their intuitions and cognitions, or keep them from perceiving and seeking music in everything outside of their particular affections. The immediate result is that they usually select what is nearest to their desires, and commit themselves to this course or policy for life. The musico-genetic does not always seem to realize what an extensive or general education—not mere information—contributes to his artistic value or standing—in fact, he seems to usually entertain the notion that the more he avoids a general education the more successful he will be in his particularism. But unfortunately for him, particularism in a universal art needs all the backing or sustaining factors of a cosmo-generic education. Featured notions always turn out, upon close analysis, to contain a revocation or abjuration of timeal order. Particularism—since it must exist—attains not its best by virtue of the instrumental in its service, but by the total extension or dimensions of the mind which wields the instrument. To essay in a special or incidental way what is universal of content is, in itself, rank opportunism; but to essay what is universal of content in a particular way, is able or necessary selection. The difference in common parlance is, doing a thing you cannot help, and doing a thing because you help. A general education—the broader the better—is all-essential to the musician who desires to possess a master-mind, otherwise the strong sense of internalism is likely to mistake the genetic as the major,

and the generic as the minor proposition, thus evincing eccentricity of understanding and judgment; and the day for this kind of particularism is long past, never to return, for it was perfectly consummated by Liszt, Chopin, Berlioz, and Paganini. Again, the selfishness or egotism of an aesthetical taste may be designated as a special cult, but is, when unmasked of its pretensions, after all but a conceitedly impertinent interference with all truthfully generic education and unfoldment, which, being retroactive, time makes foolish. Yet many people consider that kind of a confession and cult as evincing a very discriminating and artistic state of mind. It is ever but good sense to place the man before his art, since Art has never profited by the particularity but by the universality of the man. Most of us—and so it is ordained—can more afford to fail professionally than entitatively. And a wholesome education, accompanied, as it should be, by physio-mental discipline—even when the latter is as bad or indirect as that given to Beethoven in his younger days—is an investment, the interest or dividend of which is lifelong and forthcoming in hourly installments.

And as to the propositions of music in particular: they are forever elementally and integrally ethico-generic; and the student or artist who considers himself superior to this democratic position, undermines, by his noumenal aspiration, the better and more worthy part of his nature. The only explanation remaining to be brought forward for this specialization of music, rests on purely personal grounds, viz., on the undeniable presence of an appetite or hunger stronger than the generic affec-

tions. But it is not safe to build and depend on this appetite, either inwardly or outwardly, because the sense of a musical or general public is generically ruling, by instinct, intuition, as well as by an unerring—even though unformulated—sense of place and time.

Within the sphere of the musical, truly lie all the realizations of our possible cognitions and recognitions. That this truth is not properly understood is educible from the fact that with most people, professional as well as unprofessional, music is only considered as a sentimental creation of concords, discords, and form, containing incidentally an ethico-generic motive, powers and purpose. But a so conceived and presented synthesis is a self-created thing, and difficult of a generic comprehension, because whatever there is in it of genericity is simply ineffaceable from any kind of music, that is: it contains its own text but not its own preachment.

The only possible danger to integrity arising from music, is its immediateness to the senses—a directness which may easily cause logical delusions as to its intelligence or significance. But musicians themselves are largely to blame for this error, since if creating what is purely noumenal they need to explain the inexplicable. In all such cases they have heeded not the unconditionally inner and outer adjustment of music, or her universal sense, but have arbitrarily persisted in following the more instantaneous experiential faculty as the proper faculty tending to an integrally successful development. Hence program-music or artificial products.

Music, in itself, enounces the unconditional necessity of an instantaneous state of generation, the truth of

which is so vitally unique as to solicit or call for an all-attentive analysis and judgment, as to the possible nature and extent of its activity and meaning. In this generating, the moment is never actually realizable, or only as past or to come; and the contents or results of that unrealizable moment are only known as anticipation or succession, as the instantaneity of the creative moment is quicker than thought, and no more ascertainable by any kind of conscious understanding than is the phenomenon of life itself. Consequently we have to reckon with music as we reckon with life, and as containing all the outer and inner factors of life, in relation to which we, as individuals, are only the more or less cognating, memorial, and mediating entities, naturally containing the inner possibility of advancing ourselves into representatives of our genus, thereby proving our true position in the scale of creation to be immeasurably above animality, or even above its most refined manifestation of artistic sensualism. To follow out our free yet enjoined course in life, we must needs remember that man and art are identic propositions.

Nothing in daily life parallels this dual proposition as does the confession of religion—that is, the sincere and humble admission of our imperfect and therefore craving nature; and blessed is the man who has harmonized his existence with the fiat which has gone forth from above, and is, therefore, free or able to work with immutable reason itself.

CRITICISM

CRITICISM

"Ten censure wrong for one who writes amiss."

Pope—Essay on Criticism.

CRITICISM," says Heinrich Heine, the eminent poet and *litterateur*, "is really all the different muses in turn, and she can be Thalia as well as Clio"—which is perfectly true, provided we accept personation for personification, or reflection for enactment.

Another and more recent authority interprets criticism as "Intellectual ability of the receptive and transmissive kind"—an interpretation which rather begs the question, as this quality is the ordained function of every mind. The same authority also states, in some other breath, that "Criticism is the sublimation of facts"—a claim which places the schemes of criticism on an equal footing with the schemes of art. Evidently the fact that the kind of criticism here referred to is a subsequent creation to art does not weigh well in his estimate of art, nor the simple fact that it is the sublimations of art he proposes to rummage among and vaporize about once more. His criticism is one of those ratiocinative schemes which is totally unable to resolve its sublimations back again into its constituent elements,

because it has none! He furthermore adds—quite logically, too, from his particular standpoint—that “literature is something by itself,” and concludes because this really can be so, when in the service of ratiocinative dialectics, that it must be also, for this reason, a greater thing than art, since it is an undeniable fact that art can be nothing “by itself.” And “Plying the oars of intellect and catching the wind of the spirit” is his advice for developing a critical mind. Literature, according to all this, must be a verbo-musical obsession, in which the verbal flow of celestial diction consummates a soulful abduction of the real—a sublimated condition of the mind, as it were, with a commendable absence of body, the ratio of which state is, at least, nine bodies to one mind, and no proportion between burden and facility. These are not historical or rational, but critical data. Dialectical criticism seems to be a euphuistic vernacular of praise or censure—an inseparable addition to art; yet to maintain this inseparability as an integral part of art is rather impossible on direct lines, since the comparative natures of art and criticism point to opposite achievements, if not to a contradictive dualism. Criticism professes a high standard of art, but has an inadequate way of enforcing or inculcating art, and the two things do not tally.

What justifies the claim that dialectical criticism is “all the muses in turn”? The claim is, undoubtedly, made on aesthetical grounds, that is, solely on the grounds of perception or feeling; and whether these grounds are comprehensive enough to justify the claim, remains to be seen. Even on the face of it, it seems an unwarranted proceeding to accredit the critic with a

better perception or a greater feeling for art, than the artist.

Are aesthetics an exact science? And if not: from whence this superiority of the critic over the objects and subjects of art? And what may constitute the necessity of his being?

There appears in dialectical criticism not even the first rudiments of a material containment, nor the possibilities of a causal demonstration, otherwise than by the self-assumption of two self-selected premises and a conclusion. Dialectical criticism is pure syllogism; consequently she is free from all vital art-participations, and so, in a great measure, free from that self-conviction which alone constitutes the true failure or success of the artist.

The syllogism of criticism—or even literature, for that matter—is not the scheme of the muses. What of art and life is in criticism is only syllogistically related—a reflection, be it of truth or fiction, practically unrelated to such executive skill or vital enactment as the muses exact. And if we find this dialectical coruscation interesting enough to believe it valuable, it will be due to the fact that we ourselves supply by imagination all invisible data. Should we call this agency or tentation?

The spirit of dialectical criticism is, superficially speaking, inimical, by nature, to the spirit of incarnating art, because it is an idle and assertive but not a working or creative spirit. Even when we grant this kind of assertion to involve labor, backed by knowledge and sterling integrity of character and purpose, we have no other proof or certainty of an incarnative truthfulness

than that of good intentions. As a fine example of musico-euphuistic verbiage, given by a dialectical genius of first magnitude, we quote Goethe's remark on what was substantially an object whose usefulness was only ornamental or decorative, "Beauty constitutes its sole duty." To appreciate this mellifluent abstraction from substance we certainly need "ply the oars of the intellect and catch the wind of the spirit," otherwise we are likely to come under the imputation that we have neither perception nor feeling. Now, it is true, that art and science do create such objects; but it must be remembered that creative sense or spirit antedates the sense or spirit of recognition, and this means quite a differentiation in the order of genealogical time, or one which shows the difference between dialectical and analytical criticism. Nor can we—even from a syllogistic point of view—accept criticism to be purely analytical of quality, especially since upon investigation it will be found that there are no two mental conditions or propositions more unlike or logically more irreconcilable in the order of time, than dialectical and analytical criticism, for, measured by the order of time, dialectical criticism appears to be that anachronistic effort of the enharmonic mind to construct while it actually analyzes—a process with the logic of appearance in its favor, because a strong doctrine of probability has been cleverly substituted for the substantial and self-convincing premises that needs must be absent—unless found in the reader or listener. Analytical criticism is a process of separation and reconstruction; dialectical criticism is a process of separation

and construction. And there is no such a thing proper as synthetic criticism.

The dual qualities of the mind are synthetic and analytic, the one quality capable of enharmonious, the other of harmonious projection; but it is an error to suppose that construction during analyzation approaches that enharmonious or harmonious frame of mind, since it is neither a sincere state of synthesis nor analysis, but only a paradoxical or inharmonious state of contention or contravention, which affirms while it negates, or negates while it affirms—the results of which are characteristically noumenal, or things “by themselves.” It is the enharmonization of mind and matter which constitutes the artistic mind; and it is the harmonization of mind and matter which constitutes the scientific mind. In the former, cause and effect are synthetically represented by the order of spontaneous time; in the latter, cause is constructively represented by the order of deliberate time, so either will render an artistic or scientific product—regardless of subject or object, since it possesses the qualities which distinguish the unbiassed mind. A temperamentally undefinable mind, or a cross between spontaneity or deliberation, can be, constitutionally, neither an enharmonious nor a harmonious, but simply an anachronistic or an anomalous mind. Writing, like speaking, is practically—though not logically—conditionless or licensed, therefore serves most freely to convey any untried internal state of perception and feeling, even though the conveyance be that of a purely arbitrary state of perception and feeling. The dialectic of criticism is never in itself a *de facto*, but only a controversial

scheme, which, though it may exist in truth, never exists in deed. Dialectical criticism is the scheme of self-personification, whose subject-matter is characteristically opportunistic.

However, there remains yet an idea that dialectical criticism, regardless of its truth or untruth, is productive of good, because it is supposed to stimulate self-criticism. We cannot do better than to clothe this idea in Richard Strauss' own words, to wit: "I know of nothing that promotes the artist more than the criticism of a deadly enemy, who listens with a preconceived intention, no matter what the grounds for it may be, of tearing to pieces wherever he can. * * * It is well known how difficult it is to discover one's own weak points, so the utility of the deadly enemy in furthering self-criticism, so far as it is exercised at all, is apparent."

The gist of this statement consists of the assertion that critics—unlike musicians—are most useful when they have prejudice or violence enough "to tear to pieces"—an assertion no less sweeping, because it is made by a musician who shows a "preconceived intention" on a certain class of critics, and not just then made by a critician who has also a "pre-conceived intention" on a certain class of musicians. "Pre-conceived intentions" are not found in one and not in any other profession; but when found are the exception and not the rule of every profession. The "tearing to pieces" in this case is done by a man whose great ability and success has enabled him to live down adverse criticism, but whose ethical viewpoint, for all that, is not a whit better than that of the supposititious enemy whom he damns

with ironical praise. Really all "tearing to pieces" is not criticism, but animadversion or abuse, no matter how able or polite its language; and the two should not be confused with each other. Such a warfare of words contains not universal but only personal propositions, since the superior claim of man—honesty and capability—is unjustly eliminated during the controversy, consequently a judgment rendered along such lines can be neither true nor final. Superficially speaking, Mr. Strauss, evidently, considers an aggressive critic more useful than a non-aggressive one—which is really saying less for the usefulness of critics, in a general sense, than we are prepared to admit.

But the artistic or scientific mind, naturally and in the first place, involves, during its labors, a more unconditional or, at least, a more searching and testing quantity and quality of self-criticism, than can be conveyed to it and promoted in it by the mere animus or violence of criticism, simply because it never can afford to overlook the relation of self to both object and subject. And whatever the force or truth of hostile criticism, it cannot, on score of its hostility (nor friendliness either), be accepted as possessing more sincerity than any other kind of criticism. Self-criticism is an integral part of creation, and predates all subsequent criticism. Subsequent criticism, integrally or artistically speaking, posits—being out of the date of actual origination and a thing "by itself"—an anticipatory frame of mind, which, when in labor, is grounded on relativity and contingency, or on such a class of principles and laws as cannot be called

creative nor compositive, but only compossible of observance and conduct. Nor matters it much whether subsequent criticism is interested or disinterested in its compossible frame of mind, for, in every event, its judgment is barren of creation, or incarnation—the objective phase or feature in the art of composition. Nor exists there a greater error about the virtues and usefulness of subsequent criticism than to infer from its disinterestedness a superior ability and impartiality of judgment. Nothing which is compossible can be an integral part of that which is composite of constitution; nor can it ever be a testable thing “by itself,” since it is non-operative in the moment of creation, or out of date, though usually it is predated, to save time.

Hence to an artistic and scientific mind the statements of critics are neither really creditable nor discreditable; it has, after its labors, complied with all the conditions of criticism and self-criticism, however, without particularization of dialectics or laying stress thereon as a thing of art “by itself.” Any dispute between critics and artists can only arise either on tentative or on technical, but not on integral grounds, for it is preposterous to criticise where tendency and technic, or inner and outer demonstration, are, self-evidently, on par with each other—as was the case with Wagner, Beethoven, etc., and is now the case with Strauss. All inner and outer combinations are first of time, even if not first of magnitude; and neither praise nor censure can alter their eventual place and destiny, though presently both can create trouble.

Subsequent or dialectical criticism, if it applies at

all, applies only analytically to novices, and but enharmoniously to masters. In the former case the teacher is in place as the dialectical critic; in the latter case the dialectical critic is out of place, because he is predated by mastership, and can only succeed in painting the lily or exposing private reasons—as history abundantly proves. Since there is no truly artistic room or utility for a permanent success between the opposites of novice-ship and mastership—a gap which only half-fledged artistry endeavors to fill, asserting time—neither can there be honor nor greatness in trying to destroy what is bent upon destroying itself. Sophistical artistry creates its own doom. Herein critic and musician meet on the same level, when both fight more for time and opinion than for immortality and art; and neither can stand the test of ultimate opinion. This is about the sum total of the contest which goes on between critic and musician or producer—a contest which has corrupted the primitive meaning of the word “criticism” into ideas of censure or praise.

The simple truth is, that a master-mind is guided by the *enharmonic* knowledge and conduct of cause and effect, and a critical mind is only guided by the *harmonic* knowledge and conduct of cause and effect; and harmonious knowledge and conduct is a magnitude not able nor calculated to encompass an enharmonic one—hence a limitation which no honesty of character nor technical ability serve to overcome. Enharmony is that elementary gift and power in the human mind which not only brushes away every obstacle it meets, but outlives the generations of man, because it is complectory

and identic with cause and effect. The completive mind compares and tests, accepts and rejects accordingly, but has no time nor self-consciousness to censure what it either accepts or rejects, since that belongs to a particular or special moment. And criticism, as a particular or special moment, is not completive of mental attitude, therefore cannot serve to create.

However be this as it may:—the danger of any kind of criticism, entitatively speaking, lies in the immoral ease with which it can be promulgated, or in the moral difficulty with which it is repressed. Even the common knowledge or daily experience of how hard or involved it is to build up, and how easy and uninvolved it is to tear down, exercises no restraint nor acts successfully as a deterrent upon the critically predisposed mind, nor fills it with qualms of shame at the advantages it takes of its uninvolved position. Opportunity is stronger than virtue, or temptation stronger than dissuasion, even though its aspirations and ambitions seek greater fields. From an entitative viewpoint criticism is internally a feeling of individual power, which externally succeeds in positing a basical self-qualification.

The difference in time between an analytical and a critical moment is also the difference in time between an unconditional and a conditional attitude of the mind, or a mind which is permanently absorbed in the first, and temporarily absorbed in the second moment; hence a particular moment is coeval, and a special moment coincidental with time. The actual difference between the two is, *that* time which elapses between a simple and a compounded consciousness. That to the analytico-syn-

thetizing mind—hereafter, for short, the critical mind—this contradictory state of mentality seems psychologically possible, is an idea based upon privately independent time, *per* necessity engendered by its voluntary or involuntary acceptance of an imposed task or time duration. It is thus handicapped by such conditions as accord it not the unconditional place of its more independent subject-matter, though during these conditions it applies an unconditional attitude of thought. And exactly this difference of place reduces even unconditional thought to the necessity of seeking a dialectical personation (and representation), instead of an entitatively artistic personification (and representation).

Now, analysis and synthesis, or disintegration and integration, are only alternating functions of the brain at will, and classifiable as completory faculties; but the two in a synthesis, as coeval with time, is not only a logical absurdity, but a psychological impossibility on any but esoteric grounds. The will here has been utilized to create a paradoxical state of thought which is most peculiar, since it chooses to assume that affirmation and negation can rule at the same time without question. When this process is measured by its products, then in the light of a complete regularity or legality of thought and conduct, it proves itself to be totally wanting in interrogative time, which means that a noumenal condition of mind has been momentarily assumed in order to meet, *per* necessity, the imposed requirements of a halved or conditional proposition of a not freely self-selected subject-matter—a position, at the outset, not calculated to do full justice to the phenomenal

intrinsicities of either the artistic or scientific output of the creative or synthetic or analytic mind. In itself it can have only one important objective: literary personation—not even literary personification—because it is only a dialectical reflection, be it capable or incapable. One cannot, therefore, call criticism analysis proper, as it lacks an all-essential condition, namely: that, though it consists of that side or part of analysis which dissects, it is not that part of analysis which consolidates what it has dissectingly affirmed or denied—having been prohibited to do so—but furnishes only a dialectical product which partakes *de facto* nothing of the original elements it has dissected. Nor matters it much whether this is a prerogative or a disqualification of time since place or substance is wanting or not at all related.

Now if the completory mind stands not for its full powers or rights in the first place, it can only be due to the existence of prior, therefore indirect interests, or to devious causes as relate to art with certain reservations. Nor is it—entitatively speaking—very brave to take a consolidating attitude for one's own interests, and only a disintegrating attitude in the interests of others, since synthesis proper is constructive and not destructive of power and aim, unless, indeed, it is devoid of the controlling factor of rationalism. But the science of rationalism in art must needs be the science of ratiocination in dialectics. Rationalism is ever an internal integer whose warranty is externally to be substantially and not dialectically demonstrated. And though dialectic may or may not—nor matters it

whether it does or not—have an internal claim to rationalism, the absence of substantiation points unerringly to the subtleties of ratiocination as its whole internal number or equipment.

The success of ratiocination depends, in the absence of place, on the amount of its own quality in the mind of others, in form of an appreciative rationale; but that, by no means, proves its figures of speech, in a general sense, as absolutely certain, but only as certainly opportune—all of which may be considered to constitute a triumphant effort to rationalize, or bring home, dialectics by such plausible measures as to attract conclusions by leaps and bounds, but not by a steady or level process of reasoning grounded on substance and place. Entitatively speaking: Criticism is illative ratiocination in literature “by itself,” *versus* a substantial or embodied spirit in art, which, though brought about by the avoidance of criticism, is, for all that, equimomentally comparative, seeking an enharmonious number in the relation of spirit with substance, and not in the relation of spirit with dialectical imagery, ending in illation and not in product.

Psychologically, criticism is an abstracted and personally peculiarized or colored state of the mind, whose illations or inferences are solely designed from and in the interests of an appreciative *rationale*. Now, as we usually view all phenomena from a critical standpoint, it is quite easy to infer that the output of the artist emanates also from the self-appreciative rationale of the critic or is governed by it—hence the uncertainty

concerning the respective places of both, for this self-appreciative rationale defies every attempt at classification, because it is so characteristically individual that it needs must attribute unto all things its own criteria. Accordingly, there is but little differentiation between the places, motives, and aims of art, and those of criticism—in fact it seems only a matter of pleasure or option which to prefer—therefore, according to the appreciative rationale, art apparently, is actuated psychologically, by the same qualities which criticism possesses. Nothing is therefore more likely to happen than that the critician finds not in art what he finds in himself, viz., an appreciative rationale—and, no doubt, but that he is quite correct, since this rationale may exist alike in artist and critic; so if critic and artist presume to make themselves official mouthpieces of their vocations, the act seems to be perfectly consistent with these vocations.

But, according to an entitative rationale, the appreciative one exists entirely outside of art. Unfortunately for the critic and fortunately for the existence, durability and advancement of art, the appreciative rationale has nothing whatsoever in common with that power, the truthfulness of which creates or constructs at first source, because creation is not a conditional but an unconditional question, in the activity of which there is no time for either critical reflection or characteristic self-appreciation, since this activity is grounded on elemental and not merely on tasteful possibilities. Artistic or scientific being and identity, if creative, demand, first of all, an immanency of spirit which, seeking

embodiment, impersonates—be impersonation dialectically, or instrumentally or organically delegated—for impersonation is the object and end-aim of art and its only criterion. Impersonation tests the truth of the rationale, be it good or bad, right or wrong, complete or incomplete—not criticism or literature as such with its indirect or disguised attempt at self-qualification and ultimate self-identification with the subject. Nor matters it, ultimately, to art, whether literaic appraisal renders a favorable or an unfavorable, a sincere or an insincere, a truthful or an untruthful judgment, since that judgment is reflective and not substantial of art. It is, simply, a personation with a mission of its own, or “by itself”—a personation which never has had, and never will have, a regulative or an authoritative voice in the vital or entitative concerns of art. An appreciative rationale is engendered by love of such facts as tend to prop or confirm one’s taste, and a hatred or fear of all such facts as would interfere with the inclination or gratification of that taste. An entitative rationale, on the other hand, is immanently in touch with object and subject; it implies unconditional agency or avoidance of self-gratification. The presence of time is, indisputably, favorable to the appreciative, the priority or futurity of time equally favorable to the entitative rationale—hence the need of both. All intelligent people will see the necessity of a rationale calculated to meet the exigency of the moment; but the exigency of the moment does not explain the priority nor the futurity of time. So, after all, it is of but little significance to the truth at large, whether personation is or is not a force

of observation (even when clothed in scientific or syllogistic garments) tending to the betterment of temporality, because it cannot be aught else than an outwardly well-veiled scheme of self-representative time as an indispensable addition or basis to its ostensible object and subject. And to give away or expose this characteristic, and, perhaps, unconscious or involuntary basis and motive of observation, is such an indecent exposure of reason as would weaken, or nullify, the ostensible object and subject of the observation, hence it is very often—except in immature or childlike minds—consciously, or unconsciously, kept out of sight to enable the observation to pass, or be accredited as an effort of sincerity and good will in regard to the truth of the subject. There is no answer to some questions—let it be well noted; and appreciative propositions are, from an unconditional point of view, quite unanswerable, except on appreciative grounds—which explains the usual silence of artists towards their critics, because they possess different ratios of observation. All conditional situations are subject to optional interpretations; all unconditional ones are subject to agential interpretations. And the difference between the two almost explains itself to the thinker—after which selection becomes a responsible and no longer an irresponsible act. Also to answer questions in anticipation of them is self-commitment to personal lines of thought and conduct—seems to be a mathematical state of being of which self is the whole number.

Selection is an act of volition and conditional or unconditional *judgment*. Necessity is a presentation of

conditional or unconditional *testimony*. Selection implies something to be embodied, or made use of; testimony is embodied selection, or something which has occurred—two time-conditions in which one condition is possible or impendent, and the other appears as accomplished or passed. Selection is discretionary or indulgent; testimony is compulsory or urgent.

Now it seems almost incredible that selective creations, or rather dialectical documentations, on a testimony-rendering subject, should be deemed to contain selection, testimony and jural sense to such a degree as to outweigh testimony itself, that is in preference and reference to such testimonial creations, or rather demonstrations, as in a self-convicting or self-convincing manner give testimony for or against themselves—such as art must imperatively render! In such a scheme of selection and documentation there is validation and invalidation at the same time, which in the scheme of testimony appears as distinction and contradistinction, but which testimony is entirely invalidated by any contradiction whatsoever existing in its scheme.

Surely inception and conclusion are not available to sit in final—consequently not temporal—judgment on conception and testimony! But since this has been accepted as proper, it is not difficult to see why a free or a compulsory selection, on the testimony of nine competent witnesses, should not, dialectically at least, be all the nine muses in turn. Selection in criticism is not a necessity, yet may be compulsory; but testimony in art compels unconditional and conditional selection. Art, not criticism, contains and delegates testimony; and

art can never finish with a judgment on a testimony not inherently its own, otherwise it destroys its own testimony, as does selective criticism. So art not only renders testimony, but in giving testimony proves or disproves the right of selection. In this light surely criticism is both a redundancy and a deficiency, and no jural summary of art—a summary which should be considered as the increase of an activity never developed or developable, which, in the nature of its limited project, stops its own achievement in the ardor of preparation or accomplishment, so absorbing the value of its activities. In such an unqualifiable judgment everything available—direct and indirect testimony—had to be drawn into the decision. The unconscious or unmerited seriousness of this thing called “Criticism” is irresistibly humorous to those—like Strauss—who are impervious to the effect of its sting. It is, undoubtedly, the wrong call to a right function.

Now, while we cannot be seriously impeached on the score of taste, or but impertinently question the predilections it may display—or even pertinently acknowledge its decisions as accordingly triumphant—it remains, nevertheless, measurably certain that, fundamentally, such taste and its decisions can only be final on the grounds of their own inherent testimony on conditionally and not unconditionally founded premises and presentations. Neither taste nor its judgment are eternal things, hence their decree has only a temporary place and value in the affairs of permanent art—a fact which undeniably shows up the advantages and disadvantages of temporal decision in

the affairs of perpetual or religious art or man. And though an ethical pretense, serves admirably the purposes of time—a pretense art or man can only be guilty of when critical or time serving—it cannot be available for the imperative purposes and intents of eternal art or man. Art is a necessity, Criticism a selection. And going down to the temperamental foundations of the phenomena of criticism, we will always find its volition to be a private intermixture of analysis and synthesis in one breath; governed, indeed, by a Will, yet in no way legally but only ethically accountable to the virile laws of enactment which distinguish art. So, unfortunately, honesty or dishonesty—no more than sincerity or insincerity or capability or incapability—have nothing to do with the question at issue, or bear upon it only in no other than a personal way; the point is this: in criticism there is exemption and impeccability from corporeal manifestation and skill, a fact which places all better or worse qualities beyond the reach of confirmatory testimony. And on broadest principles it is a faithless and thankless task to grind things to dust, or burn them to ashes—Father Time does that much for us all, be we good, bad or indifferent.

Now if by “Criticism” is understood an analysis which reconstructs, we admit the term “Criticism,” for short. We have tried simply to prove that an analysis which is unable “to resolve any object of the senses back into its proper elements” is but a last word of praise or censure—an activity of the brain which does not unconditionally dissect nor reconstruct. It needs the enharmonic and not only the harmonic premise of art,

as the indispensable condition to a final judgment. This would declare the creative faculty of the mind—as was the case with Goethe and Lessing, Aristotle and Plato, etc., who were not critics for the mere sake of earning a living by writing literature as literature “by itself.” It is safe to say that a writer who possesses not the principle of enharmonization as a religious observance is not truly a critic for short. To merely draw on dates, comparisons, experience, routine, wit, humor, gifts, etc., as data, is not sufficient. The artfulness of presentation by the light of these things but adroitly furnishes an illimitable scope to the subjectivation of the listener or reader. Such a personation is, in itself, merely curious or incurious as to an end, and not careful or enharmoniously disposed as to the constitution of its subject-matter, and much less so as to unconditional premises in relation to itself or subject; and so this chance personation is immune from any ethical criterion but that contained in the scheme or style of its own presentation inside the lines of syllogistic requirements—summed up as “he writes well.”

The timeal difference between enharmonious and dialectical criticism is very great.

Enharmonious criticism is the concurrent criticism of art; dialectical criticism is the “dis-current” criticism of art.

Now that dialectical criticism should tacitly and, as a matter of course, assume to predate itself to art, lies in the essential nature of its undefined condition and position—otherwise it could have no authority; and authority it must assume, or hold forth without the

reason of being—a predicament in which dialectical personation would appear too thick or too thin of authoritative utterance. Still dialectics are clearly an afterdate to the spirit which created its subject. But in thus arbitrarily afterdating its subject instead of itself, or what in the genealogy of time indisputably precedes it, dialectical criticism not only disowns for itself practically the generico-premisal moment of art, but entirely loses sight of the equitable quality of analysis proper which needs must accompany the moment of art, thereby attaining a psychological moment of its own, which, at the very outset, is a standardization completely at variance with the psychological moments governing either creative synthesis or analytical reconstruction. And though dialectical criticism may imperatively essay in both reason and understanding, it essays not in concurrent time, but with an ethico-aesthetically predated hypothesis based on ideas about “perfect creation”—that is, in other words, not actually employing substantial causality, it need never know absolute or self-convicting necessity, except that of its ethical conscience or characteristic honesty. Now we hold—and with due deference to Kant—that even an unconditional command of the commodity called Conscience is, artistically speaking, a hypothetic and hypothecated “thing in itself” of the most selfish nature—so egoistic in fact, that even during its creative moments in art this spirit is productive of nothing higher or better than dialectical art, or a product on the same level with dialectical criticism. Even were this pledged spirit a most devoted one it still would be a too remote or reflective spirit to

serve genericity of creation—and even though it nominally construct, the construction will be characteristically dialectical.

It is the elemental or integrally religious character of immanent mediation or agency which begets generic results in all it does; dialectical results are but declared reflexions of the genericity of art, derived from introspective intuitions. Certain it is that a dialectical or merely intuitional sense of things, never yet has been able to beget generic products, and therewith an unconditional judgment.

Now, if we consider the inherent qualities of analysis we find that, though not strictly a creative but a partialized faculty, it is, nevertheless, a reconstructive or productive one along mathematical or scientific lines, is, therefore, an activity which declares a jurally equitable product within categorical bounds, which forestalls not its ordained order of time, by aspiring to more than it can physio-mentally do, or asserting more than it can physio-mentally prove, or disinterestedly establish. This faculty, when alternately applied, renders a categorical judgment; but it is generic reason—the union proper of analytic understanding with dynamical forces—which furnishes a universal judgment; and were this not possible nothing could be Man but only *of* men. Reason, on the other hand, is not analytical nor reconstructive, but constructive—a dynamico-affirmative (not negative or assertive) or spontaneously constructive synthesis of all faculties in a state of co-efficient observation, knowledge, and discernment, first of time and source; a generic force whose immanent attributes are

not only impersonal and sexless, but coeval with time; a force of dynamic being which renders decisions according to the requirements of the instant, and can render them at no other time; anything but a "fractious, cavilling force of quibble," regardless of generic propositions. Reason is the attribute of commonality; understanding the attribute of its particularity—the former a physio-mental, the latter an immaterial or relative phenomenon; and to confuse or coestate the one with the other is the cause of all criticalness. The simple facts are: that the enharmonious qualities of facultative life present themselves as reason; the harmonious qualities of facultative life present themselves as understanding. But a volitionally synthetized state, consisting of the simple or self-conscious and the compound or sub-conscious faculty, is not calculated, in spite of its sincerest endeavors, to sift and ascertain the cause and effect of generical conceptivity or its propositions. Dualistic faculties are then no longer complemental or agential, but rivalling or competitive faculties; and duelloism is engendered by not discriminating between personal and impersonal necessities—two kinds of necessities which antagonize each other constantly. The reasonable application of mind to contra-distinctions is agential or meditative ground; the understandable application of mind to contradistinctions is speculative or debatable ground. In the uncritical course of reasonable endeavor is found Art, or the heart of nature; in the critical course of understandable endeavor is found Science, or the brains of nature; however, on the *spontaneous* mode of accentuating both the critical and uncritical endeavor is founded

neither art nor science, but only schematism, or the possibilities of human being, while on the *alternating* mode of accentuating the critical and uncritical endeavor is founded categorization, or the certainties of human being.

We can easily perceive, by this table, how or why schematism comes to be deemed as first of source, and becomes established as the rule of observation and conduct, or the indispensable criterion to progress; and also why "criticism," instead of being a condensation of analysis and synthesis, can just as well stand for the mere schematism of both.

There seem to be three kinds of perceptions in man: the unconditional or divine; the absolute or legal; and the conditional or worldly perception. Now eliminate from any one of these three perceptions the entitative spirit of symbolism or enharmonization, and put into its place the extraneous spirit of typicalism or feticism or harmonization, and you have the causal reason which produces schematic criticism in any of the three perceptions. The fact that synthesis of mind seeks virile, and analysis of mind seeks comprehensible embodiment, makes it rationally clear that schematic criticism is an opportunistic and private output, in regard to both principles of the dual mind. The cause of schematic criticism is an all-absorbing and all-controlling sense of either cosmic or temperamental time in itself, or in its own interests, irresistible enough to negate or vitiate the inherent symbolism of the entitative mind. If this sense of constructive power can create, it creates schematically and in no other way—that is to the tem-

poral detriment of such physical and spiritual qualities as constitute the data of art and science. Such qualities as these, according to its own view-point of constructive power, are not the qualities calculated to meet the requirements of the time—and very likely to this extent is the dictum rendered perfectly true; but, nevertheless, it would be the time-serving dictum of private or schematic discernments.

Schematic discernment and its standardization are the bane of entitative endeavor, for these characteristics vitiate such qualities as resist the changes of time. Their spirit is factious—if not factitious—and not co-operative. If schematism is conceived as a criterion of excellence and conduct, its products are either conditional or traditional—is a state of assurance which has nothing in common with the first source integralities of either art or religion, notwithstanding its superficial pretensions in the direction of these. It can only be a standard conceived in the interests and necessities of temporal creations.

In direct contradiction, or opposition, to this schematic spirit of criticism, stands the enharmonic spirit of art, declaring as indispensable: impersonal command of generical sources; unconditional selection; and agency coeval with time, space, and place. In a supreme capacity the three propositions are enharmonically selfsame and not divisible; in a subordinate capacity they are harmoniously different and indefinitely divisible—that is: regression into unity distinguishes the replete or pregnant mind of the artist, and progression into plurality distinguishes the strategetic or schematic mind of the

critic; hence every proposition of the three by itself may be successfully questioned—but not successfully determined—by the critical mind, along its lines of plural premising. It is inherent with the progressive spirit of plurality to destroy one supremacy or mastership with another. This fact constitutes its progress; but this progress is neither analytic nor reconstructive, but simply an indicatory or individuating synthesis, divisible by itself and ultimately favorable to itself—the spirit out of which are wrought great politicians, diplomatists, and critics, but not the spirit out of which are wrought great statesmen, humanists and artists; that spirit of individuation which is arbitrarily able to exchange the unconditional freedom of time, space, and place, for the conditional masterdom of time, space, and place.

The schematic spirit is a mode of thought which mortifies its own labors by being topically where it should be actually employed. This is tantamount to declaring understanding as first of source and time, for which there is no reason but occasion. All particularity of understanding negates the spirit of creation or origination; all impartiality of understanding consists of power to analyse and reconstruct. In both cases is the indispensable condition lacking, viz., the generic or reasonable capacity for utterance. Why, therefore, understanding, for any reason whatsoever, should arrogantly consider itself all sufficiently infallible on the strength of its mathematical rationale only, is beyond elucidation, unless we admit it as the most plausible form of noumenalism, which, however reasonably considered, looks very much like a cross between synthesis

and analysis, the product of which necessitates a many-headed understanding.

If understanding, as a general faculty, bides not the respective calls of either analytic or synthetic time, it needs must have a peculiar or particular time of its own selection; and thus it comes about that schematic mentality is a self-sought time in favor of conclusions, while entitative mentality must needs have a cosmo-generic procedure to arrive at definite conclusions. The differentiation between all minds or faculties is not that they disagree as to the prevalence or superiority of reason in the aggregate, but that they clash as to the particularities or peculiarities of its interpretations, which always happens when understanding does not obey the unconditional elemental or native principles, laws, and enactments of reason. It is due to the antinomy between reason and understanding that some of us become insane, while others have envied the animal for the direct support it receives from its unadulterated sense of comprehension; but most of us succeed pretty well in avoiding both horns of the dilemma, by resort to a satisfactory self-qualification.

Now in considering the respective time-bases of first or synthetic and of second or analytical creators, we find that the former have no selection of time but begin with the psychological moment, while the latter select time with a view to the psychological moment as eventual; and the fluxious arts are the results of the former, the plastic arts the results of the latter time-schemes of the mind. The critic has the intermediate position and

word of these two propositions of time, based on affirmative or communal, problematical or theoretical, or negative or particular understanding. He begins—it is true—his work with a given product, and closely resembles the analyst in this respect; but, unlike the analyst, his findings result in something, “whether an object of the senses or intellect,” *not* “resolvable into constituent or original elements.” Nor could it be otherwise, for neither the proposition nor the selection were his own; and nothing else could answer but to offer a proposition of his own, in lieu of what he never possessed originally and interpreted only approximately. What he really has intrinsically succeeded in doing is a characteristic supererogation of time.

Still such schematic emanations concern psychology in this respect: that by the light of analysis and synthesis proper they are parasitic or tautologous emanations lacking generality and merely its veritable partisans. The spirit of art (including that of science), being unconditionally constitutive, can only be guided by its own generical conditions of necessary enactment, since if otherwise or expediently guided it cannot endure to the end of time. And though it is undoubtedly true that all men are more or less schematically inclined, it is no less true that whenever or wherever this state has prevailed—whether chronically or sporadically—its output is perished by the spirit which conceived it. Nor can native taste or academic knowledge of a subject warrant schematism, because its character can manifest no such productive quantities as are essential to the direct presentation of the subject. Schematic truth is

devoid of the only means by which a whole truth can be proven—its quantity; it is, therefore, a direct substitution of parts for a whole, which parts, however, must serve numerically for what is omitted integrally. All schematic dialectics are designed for an appreciative rationale; and that this kind of a rationale exists almost universally makes such dialectics a plausible investment.

The schematical mind is the result of an inadequate educational system, which insists not on a requisitely disciplined physio-mentality—and may, for this reason, be as much sinned against as sinning, since with this omission there can be no educational test nor cultivation of genericalness of character. In ignoring or suppressing pre-recognition by endeavoring to control temperamental conditions by mental training and precepts alone, we weaken our innate sense of homogeneity with entirety, and put into the place of this reasonable sense an exaggerated idea of the value of understanding, which being a purely individualistic faculty, easily becomes a schematic weapon in the employ of fence, defence, and offense. By this light—it is true—we may fully conceive, comprehend, and assert our individual significance but not our homogeneity in the domain of a marvelous entirety. Our sense of reasonable prescience demands integral unfoldment—not rejection or denial and suppression, thus leaving us to no other course than one of native or experiential self-unfoldment—otherwise we are likely to be left with no other valuation of time than such particles of it as clocks ding into our brains as reminders of the swiftness of time, or become victims to our sense of temperamental self-suggestions, regardless

of time. The prerogatives and claims of man are those of humanity, not merely those of pure individuality; and it is these we plead and look for in every being.

Our innate sense of prescience is most impersonally guided into maturity by physio-mental endeavors of all kinds, which, however, find their highest or most universal degrees in the pursuit of art—particularly that of music,—because music is all-involving.

This art of generic endeavor and completeness—the best antidote to selfishness—the psychological barometer or indicator of a pulsating and homogeneous entirety—is so conspicuously teeming with vital propositions, in all of its degrees and phases, that a more thorough understanding of its relations with all the organic and inorganic powers of our native environment must, some day, become imperative for the establishment of premial truth and order, and for the conservation or direct usefulness of man's facultative endeavors in any direction. Within the sphere of this activity exists, fundamentally and psychologically, that universal plan of thought and feeling, motion and emotion, whose unconditional and eclatant results are apparent wherever it finds a serious response. It is the enharmonizing synthesis of sensorial, mental, and generic life—the synthesis of being. But as at present music is usually only defined and accepted as a propitiatory power, or a power more reasonably felt or more experientially known than generically understood, it cannot as yet be fully or unconditionally commanded and utilized for generico-educational purposes; and “propitiation,” from the viewpoint of the educational scheme at present the vogue, is

only a resort of the last instance—a fact which furnishes but one of the many examples how unerring logic can be even from a partial or self-constituted premise. We certainly seem to need musical kindergartens, too, for the older man.

But let us, ere we conclude, once more accentuate music's most salient features:

That music needs more senses and sensories than any other occupation;

That music necessitates, consciously or unconsciously, a reciprocal, a mutual, and an alternately complementary employment of the synthetic and analytic faculties of the brain, which, if engaged in this manner, prohibit its degeneration into mere schematism;

That music exercises the faculty of memory in all three tenses of time, viz., in the recollective or past; in the collective or present; and in the dispersive or future tense—which names all the possible time conditions under which human endeavor labors;

That music involves subordination of Will in favor of experientialism; co-ordination of Will in favor of intellectualism; and ordinance of Will to establish between these opposites an enharmonious and harmonious relationship—which presents all the features of Will essential to the integral—not optional—pursuit of music.

And as regards talent for music:

The consecrated desire, seconded by the unconditional Will—which results in integrity of character—constitutes fundamental ability strong enough to overcome the difficulties of reconciling all existing antagonisms

between universal and partial dispositions. As a power it will outstrip all mere passion: for music.

As regards temperament for music:

Instinctive or intuitional ebullition is the reasonable nature of all organic life, and sufficiently present in all men, for integral purposes, if they so will; that, music or no music, the government of ebullient moments is an art sense, though everywhere employed where integrity of character is in question; that the spiritual embodiment of native ebullitions is the highest generation and the distinguishing mark of the divine favor, the highest psychological achievement of man, and at the same time the sole antidote or check to the supererogation or intemperance of knowledge. And all this reduced to plain common sense means: that manual labor is of self-preservative necessity to man in every one of its forms, because it contains the declaration that time employed is both conditional and unconditional of duration.

And as to the educational question:

Music is generated by the universal integrity of body, soul and mind, and not by the private integrity of these factors. The approach to a consummation of musical success will be in exact ratio with the quantity, quality, and force of universal sentiency back of any kind of being; and the confirmation of this great truth has never yet been within reach of mere sententiousness or schematism, but is ever within reach of the humblest work well done.

PSYCHOLOGY

PSYCHOLOGY.

"The name may be new, but the study is old. It is recommended in the saying ascribed to Socrates—Know thyself."
Vocabulary of Philosophy.

THE marvelous influence of music in general is primitively due to the fact that sound—whatever its cause—is a recognitory unity of physical and generical causes, that is: while sound is cosmic in itself it is nevertheless, purely generical in relation to our observation of its effect. This unity of cause and effect, or physicality and spirituality, constitutes a dimension of universal reason and expression, which, however produced, proves to be always either spontaneously or reflectively impressed on our instincts, intuitions, and comprehensions. And the popularity of music is due to the fact that general sensibility needs not essentially the aid of a conscious understanding of her power to enjoy her expression.

Music, broadly considered as universal reason, combines the inner and outer world of organic existence; and accountingly classifying the inner and outer phenomena of musical reason, would result in placing before the mind two distinct cults of music: that which is

cosmo-generic, and that which is homo-generic—meaning that the latter is produced and governed by external plus internal, and the former by internal plus external observation and conduct.

Now were music or sound even no more than an enharmonic illustration of cause and effect, she would impose or impress upon our universally disposed mind, a further extension of thought: the idea of elementality to cause, as well as the idea of conclusion to effect; and with this extension of thought we come to the pregnant certainty, that mind and music offer self-same propositions, viz., that both are synonymous or convertible terms which offer, fundamentally, an all-pervading and all-permeating internal and external unity to cognition. To distinctly instead of instinctively understand the generic import of music, refers us to the necessity of an analyzation of our broadly or generically receptive, reflective, and executive faculties.

THE MIND.

By "mind" we do not here refer to or conceive the particular or professional mind of the musician, but the native or general mind of man, regardless of any particular occupation or employment—of which, however, the musician is the more or less, predispositioned or incidental example, which means that the distinct love of temperamentally rhythmical time and motion, or the native love of synthetically presented sensations, are ruling.

The mind is a subconscious, conscious, and self-

conscious faculty of perception, and as such entirely an internally related faculty to its particular owner—the acquisitive and distributive centre of the experiential sensorium. Divisionally it possesses two kinds of observation, which we call that of reason and that of understanding—two qualities of observation and comprehension which can either supplement, or oppose or remain entirely independent of or indifferent to each other knowingly, yet under all circumstances will remain indivisible.

Reason is the faculty of immanent intuition, comparison, and synthesis; understanding the faculty of deliberate cognition, analysis, and antithesis. Reason must, therefore, be a synthetic or enharmonic form or mode of comprehension, derived from an instantaneous unity, adaptation, and application of all factors; and Understanding an analytic or harmonious form or mode of comprehension, derived from a deliberate agreement, adoption and application of all factors. To all appearances Reason and Understanding are synonymous or interchangeable terms, until they are observed by the light of their respective time-activities; and it is these which prove them to be distinctly different, though complementary, forms or modes of comprehension. Now Instinct and Intuition come under similar speed-rules of time, *i. e.*, their differences are to be clearly perceived, otherwise it is just as impossible with these as it is with Reason and Understanding, to know at which point of time one ends and the other begins. Instinct is only a more immediate mode of intuition—in fact is the instantaneous mode of intuition; so they are but suc-

cessions of the same faculty, just as reason is an instantaneous mode of understanding. Instinct and Reason are affiliation: inception and conclusion; Intuition and Understanding are affiliations: perception and realization. Instinct is the basis of reason; intuition the basis of understanding. The power of reason is practical conduct; the power of understanding is theoretical conduct—and were not this true understanding would, long ago, have died of ossification or dry rot without the leavening power of reason. And how far reason may stand for one thing and understanding for another, is best found out in the unconditional pursuit of music, or physiology and psychology in enharmonious union and declaration. Instinct or Reason being universally inherent (intuition or understanding characteristically so), have no self-conscious timeal sense, but only the sub-conscious or unconscious sense of temperamental and rhythmical sensation and representation.

The *partial* or divided mind of man is that kind of a mind which exercises one of these two faculties predominatingly, with the other only minor or incidental to the prevailing or major one.

The *complete* mind is one in which able selection prevails, according to a timeal sense, as may be involved by the nature of the subject under consideration; is, consequently, equally interested in thesis and antithesis or diversity and specification—the one best dealt with by the mathematical Understanding; the other best dealt with by dynamical Reason. But the harmonious and enharmonious adjustments and conclusions reached by both Reason and Understanding, alone evince the utmost

extent or power of the mind, The position of man in view and consequence of this dual fact turns out to be internally meditative, and externally mediative of entity to be complete at all. It is this kind of a mind which we understand as being harmonious and enharmonious, even when not specifically given to the cultivation of music. Its oscillations of thought and deed are enharmonizations between finitude and infinitude, carried out in deliberate as well as spontaneous time. Reconciliation of extremes is its life-purpose; resolving contradictions into contradistinctions its highest consummation; and the results of these meditations and mediations are the creations of art and science.

Now to schematize the comprehension of these results, psychologically, is precisely to schematize one's own comprehension of reason and understanding. The powerful instincts of Affinity, Comparison, and Enactment are the principles of Art or Reason; the forceful logic of Accuracy, Dissimilarity, and Conclusion, those of Science or Understanding. In the order of time, reason, consequently art, is the antecedent of science—even of its own particular science—for the instinctive and intuitive operation of reason gives birth to art before a self-conscious understanding of it is available. The manifold attempts to establish a thing in itself (*a priori*), as being a perfectly pure or ideal thing, and as such first source thought or first in the order of time, is the result of academic abstraction or sheer reflection; and any *reflected* or *abstracted* creation (noumenon) is certainly last and not first of time or thought. To believe in it needs, indeed, another abstraction. To succeed in this

abstraction of mentality means the sophistic necessity to place the experiential faculty into the second order (*a posteriori*) of time. But there is still a more cogent reason (*a fortiori*) than academism commands, that this chronological error should be rectified, viz., the whole truthfulness of a practical life under all circumstances commands it, since the ideal creation of a thing in itself (noumenon), and evolving a standard therefrom for the benefit of mankind, may constitute able thinking, but seems, to common sense, a very impractical way of living. Certainly life and its propositions come first in the order of event, consequently in the order of time:

1. Art is first and science second of source, for
2. Art is vitality and science intellectuality.
3. Art is native or experiential; science reflective and dogmatic.
4. Art involves principles; science evolves them.
5. Art does; science knows.
6. Art is suggestive; science injunctive.
7. Art is constitutive; science regulative.
8. Art is eternal immanence and creation; science eternal construction and fixation.
9. Art is sensibility; science knowledge.
10. Art is a problem; science a proposition.
11. Art is precedence; science subsequence.
12. The principle of art is incarnation; that of science is dissection and construction.

BEING.

Being, corresponding to its native reason and understanding, includes three states; the external, the internal

and the arbitral or independent state of being, which may be termed the qualitative categories of Character and Tentation.

The table of these is as follows:

<i>The objective or external status:</i>	<i>The subjective or internal status:</i>	<i>The agential or independent status:</i>
1. Centralizes Being.	Decentralizes Being.	Both Centralizes and decentralizes Being.
2. Attains its aim by exactness of will.	Attains its aim by power of will.	Attains its aim by freedom of will.
3. Utilization of identity is unconditional.	Utilization of identity is speculative.	Utilization of identity is equitable.
4. Ambition is directed to exteriority.	Ambition is directed to interiority.	Ambition is directed to harmonization.
5. Work is founded on mathematical rules and principles.	Work is founded on dynamical rules and principles.	Work is founded on both dynamical and mathematical principles.
6. Thinks with Causes.	Reckons with Effects.	Reasons with both Cause and Effect.
7. Holds to predetermination or phenomenon.	Believes in determination or noumenon.	Has faith in the design of God or Supereminence.
8. Tendency of thought to mathematical command of centripetal and centrifugal motion.	Tendency of thought to dynamical command of centripetal and centrifugal motion.	Tendency of thought to both mathematical and dynamical command of centripetal and centrifugal motion.
9. Reverence for quantity.	Reverence for quality.	Reverence for both quantity and quality.
10. Love for homogeneity.	Love for variety.	Love for mediative or jural agency.
11. Impersonal intellectuality and derivative experientialism.	Individual experientialism and derivative intellectuality.	Universal intellectuality and experientialism.
12. Timeal sense is cosmical.	Timeal sense is temperamental.	Timeal sense is both cosmical and temperamental.

We see, first of all, from this table that the complete mind is a syllogistic one, that is: it first cogitates a

major proposition by means of reason; secondly, a minor proposition by means of understanding; and, thirdly, determines both cognitions according to the rules of both reason and understanding, in which event a universal judgment is recorded. However, a determination rendered according to reason alone is but a native or dynamical judgment; and one rendered according to understanding alone is only a mental or mathematical judgment. The mere contemplation of attraction and repulsion in reason or understanding by themselves, and which leads to a determination only within the sphere or category of one or the other of these two determining faculties, is an act of mediation and not conjunction. A universal judgment is only attained by the conjunction of both faculties; and the law of conjunction, be it in physical or spiritual life, contains the vital principle of existence and practical judgment, or constitutes, in cause and effect, alone a universal judgment. The basic difference between the two faculties is that of time. Reasonable time, as first of source, is an experiential intuition induced by prevalence of temperamental *emotions* or spontaneous reflection; understandable time, as first of source, is an experiential intuition induced by prevalence of temperamental *motions* or deliberate reflection. However, in the order of creation, emotions are first, and motions second of time or source; hence all judgments based on motional understanding as first of time or source, are, in extent, peculiar or particular, possibly correct in themselves, but partial or imperfect in view of entirety, because they are based upon errors in the order of time. It constitutes that kind of a comprehension

which holds time in memory or anticipation—is not vital but reflected time. Now a non-observance of this timeal order of the mental faculties, during all questions, makes all ensuing qualification categorically venturesome, and basic definition a matter of speculation, without, however, necessarily impairing the exactness or logic between premise and judgment.

It has been, notwithstanding this, philosophico-axiomatically laid down that emotional intuitions are only second of timeal significance, being purely internal or relative of quality, while motional intuitions are undoubtedly first of source, because they are externally unconditional of nature; but since without an internally temperamental possession or self-possession no intuition or realization of time is at all possible, it is hard to account for this dogmatico-noumenal acceptance of externality as first in the order of time. Our native rhythmic sense is, certainly, of first practical value, because it constitutes the first-born sense of accent or time, and without this innate sense we could observe and possess nothing which, vitally or reflectively, could be construed into either motional or emotional time. Only the inborn possession of the former can lead to the reflection and consequent estimation of the latter. And if we accept being or living as an in itself determined fact—and the majority do—and not as a relatively conjunctive process, we come, most “naturally,” to all kinds of noumenal conclusions and determinations—even in philosophy with its externally or internally noumenalistic abstractions. There simply cannot be a perception—not even excepting the academic one—which is not directly or indirectly

traceable to sensuousness. Understanding, in itself, is fully knowable in the externalism of the Aristotelian philosophy, just as reason, in itself, finds its understandable limits in the ethical internalism of Platonic thought. But the unreserved or unconditional combination of both initiates that virile and spiritual foundation and practical mode of life and thought of which Christ is the ever-living example. His vital subjectivity antedates the noumenal idea of objectivity.

It is due to our own pulsation that we are able, measurably and immeasurably, to intuit, cognize, and recognize time of any kind; and if our internal sense of time is either not unfolded or irregular, our outward or cosmic concept of time is always a particular concept. Time to us is functionally perfect—that is permanent in spite of all changes—when Reason and Understanding act interdependently and complementally. It is then that we draw our observations and conclusions from the first source, and—either consciously or in faith—actuate an unconditional freedom of mind or being. Even in the purely facultative or reflective mode of mathematical thought, it is first the inner sense, allied to self-consciousness of number and order, which demonstrates the outer time or number. Neither is everything first source or causal simply because it appears externally or is objective, for objectivity previously declares a source from which objectivation proceeds. And it is an academic delusion to resort to a supposedly external certainty—a phenomenon in itself—to make sure of an inner certainty. The delusion, or illusion, however, is bred and fostered by the inconvenience of knowing and

being accountable to one's Self; nor does the understanding of our inner value add much to self-importance, but is contributive to an enduring state of humility. *Imagination is not thought.* The fear of the internal ego—notably a premonition of its unworldly accountabilities and responsibilities, and of coming to conclusions we do not desire to arrive at—much less to activate—is the prime obstacle to impersonal self-investigation. But everything in existence is, by Reason alone—not understanding—so ordained and constituted that it is subject to the generic condition or particular state of the internal sense, regardless of all particulated ethics. Of what use would a *free* will be, were that not true? Causality is, as causality, valid everywhere, be it internal or external, and between these dual faculties the difference is not of kind, but of place and degree. We only then can fully trust—instead of rationally distrusting—the internal causality when the Ego has exerted or is able to exert its mediative functions between the dual properties of mind; and what principles and laws are affirmative or negative, temporal or permanent, good or bad, etc., will summarily come to knowledge during the conjunctive demonstration of Reason and Understanding as a fundamentally ordained whole number. Nor is it difficult to find the archetypes wherein both faculties exercise themselves enharmonically or spontaneously, and in self-testing unity. All the fluxious arts are living examples of this dual unity—notably the art of music.

MUSIC.

Music, of all the Arts, needs the immortal calculus under which internality and externality can be made to appear *enharmoniously*; is for this reason like nature, that is: spontaneous of design and purpose, and declaring premeditation as first of source or time—the only feature in her and nature, which is purely internal, therefore liable to be misapprehended, abused, and even deliberately exploited.

When we compare temperamental or innate time and an external musical demonstration, the spontaneous interconnection of internality and externality, or spirit and cosmos, becomes more and more obvious. Music offers to both an adjustment, based on the law of completion or compensation; and if the inner sense of completion or compensation be present, temperamental time and observation will be no less exact and trustworthy than cosmic time. It is an inner error to appoint the outer object as first of source or time; it is only first of sight or sense, and not otherwise. And if we, furthermore, compare the external with the internal sources of power we draw the following parallels: the motion of temperament is to the body what the motion of the sun is to the world; what the heat of the sun is to the earth, the heat of the temperament is to the organism; what the light of the sun means to form and color, the heat of the temperament means to thought and feeling. All of these are enharmonious acts in differing spheres, and temperament—like sun and mind

—is dual in its functions, viz., it is exalting and depressing.

We have now two enharmonic sources of power with similar measures of duration: that of physical and that of organic bodies—each running its succession according to its categorical constitution. Organic succession is generation, and generation is creation; cosmological succession is change, and change is number. And between the dynamics of cosmos and those of organism there is this similitude: that both are respectively self-inherent in time, and as unconditional. The one is to us an external or sensible reflexion; the other an internal and vital existence. And there is nothing unnatural about internalism unless it degenerates into egotism, since all egotism is a suspension of the unconditional, a process not essential to entirety, whatever it is to the constitution of a whole number; for impersonalism is unconditional being, or living with the inexorable powers that be. And Mind is to the body what the sun is to the earth: the focus of a system, and both enharmonic.

Now, an internal validity or reality of time is a mode of representation which is *not* successive, because it is instantaneous, and instantaneousness is the Permanent; an external validity or reality of time is a mode of representation which *is* successive, because it is deliberate, and deliberation is concatenation. Instantaneity is time *in* itself never repeated, yet *of* itself always repeated, which means that, enharmoniously considered, Instantaneity is Reason or time in itself, and Concatenation, harmoniously considered, is Understanding or time for itself—the former universal, all pervading, the latter

rational, particularly pervading. And while Reason is a generic process of comprehension, Understanding is a process of relations, both of Mind, yet differing in time, consequently in place and degree.

Music, as enharmonious with Mind, or instantaneous with it demands that its internal truth be unconditionally verified by corresponding external cognitions and enactments; because without this all-necessary principle of incarnation, or transubstantiation, or symbolism, these spiritual truths are merely indefinite, or speculative, or noumenal of worth or character. The reciprocity between the inner emotions and corresponding outer motions constitutes and posits mediation or time and selection, as the vital need of spontaneous being and creation; and though alternation is either equimomental or deliberate, therefore selective, it but means merely a change from understanding to the eternally fixed reason—the undeviating or timeless standard of all things. It is only the understanding which attempts to go beyond the pale of reason, or beyond its own criterion, though reason goes where understanding dare not tread; and Music alone, as enharmonious with Mind, can safely be made the vehicle of Reason in its highest as well as lowest flights. Reason without self-conscious understanding seems to be the law of all nature; but man's fatal gift, self-consciousness—to which all absurdities and artificial necessities or conditions which ever posed as first of source or time are traceable—seldom hesitates to apply the limitations of the understanding—always personal—to the illimitable extent of impersonal reason. However immeasurable reason is,

its own subconscious intuitions can be no less certain of an impersonally conclusive judgment than are the merely numerical certainties of the mathematical or self-realizable understanding. Reason is the basis of synthetically spontaneous judgments or acts of faith, and is only then second of source or time when it ceases to create, that is, when understanding constructs. Reason is the faculty of immediate conclusion whether high or low of degree; and Understanding the faculty of categorically mediate judgments, whether right or wrong. It is the sub-consciously or impersonally concordant grasp of reasonable existence, in harmony with a satisfied understanding, which constitutes the distinguishing glory of man, viz., his divine freedom, and which so completely surpasses the self-conscious or personal use of the understanding. There is a spontaneous logic in Reason which Understanding possesses only in a successively succinct way, and which accounts for its unemotional or merciless findings and judgments. But life is no judgment; nor consists its glory therein, but in actions; and an act is an immanent unity in the same sense that all Being is Life, and in that sense is a universal and not merely an individual conception or expression—is, in fact, the immanence of Creation. We freely admit that reason, in itself, is a nondescript, but for all that an indispensable—because a permanent—condition; and is, furthermore, a so surpassing condition as to be above sensuous as well as arithmetical dictates, universally considered. It is the creator of all types or symbols—even to our understanding—for it inherently permeates, rules, and guides all things—even inanimate matter. It

is the very author of principles; and the highest function which the faculty of understanding can attain beside it is self-conviction, or its own faithful submission to higher dictates, whether or not understanding thinks or imagines it comprehends that power—only it never does or can comprehend that power, otherwise than experientially. And to refuse submission to it is to resort to the limitations of individuality.

The more than equivalent of the arithmetical number is the reasonable or synthetic, or algebraic symbol, since everything inherently possesses vital or latent reason; and, after all, the number is but the symbol of quantity, while the symbol is the type of quality, and so Reason is not only the ground of all judgment, but is permanent judgment itself—at least as far as the human mind is concerned. Reason to man will ever remain a fundamentally inner constituent of all figures and shapes or schemes, whether of mind or of stone, therefore it can be Reason only which proves that Reason does exist. Distinct thought is merely the purely deliberate or tiresome logicity of the understanding which operates to connect numbers into a self-conscious whole or conclusion; and it is not reason but only a limited (to self-consciousness) understanding which plausibly ascertains and follows out the order and system of things posited to us by experience alone. Nor is reason subject to antinomy, because it cannot contradict itself; but understanding would not be understanding were it not antinomous. Reason, being surpassing, makes contradictions but contradistinctive symbols—more than numbers which represent only quantity—for it is above

the predicaments or categories, by including them all. Nor is Reason an End or a conclusion, but a never ceasing or eternal Origination—the unknown but self-evident quality in the problem of Being.

The divisor of Immanence or Life is Accent or pulsation, the principle of perspicuity—consciously or unconsciously—the universe over: as outlines, points, measures, weights, forces, tensions, latencies, continuities, etc., etc., in the predicaments of Time, Place, and Space; and we can, self-consciously, determine both a super-eminent as well as an experiential reality in Mind or in Matter—as we please—for the one reality is as comprehensive to the mathematician as the other reality is to the symbolical experientialist, or both dominating or ruling either the ideological or physical spheres of Being. It is exactly at this stage that both Reason and Understanding meet to interconnect, for Accent is reasonable or temperamental time, and then numbers become self-conscious superfluities. And what is quantity in the physical category of Being, is shape or schema in the ideological sphere of Existence; but if we unite both, then Quantity as well as Quality, Relations and Modality, remain ideological or the internal functions of the external appearances of substances. By dividing them into separate, that is merely incidentally interconnected things, we fix the primitive causes of both Dogmatism and Skepticism, both of which are limited truths, hedged by the Understanding. The Understanding is ever constitutionally loath to recognize the presence of the Unknown, be it of Quantity or Quality, is, therefore, easily corrupted by its intense sense of personal logic

and accomplishment, a state of self-consciousness which neither will nor can forget itself sufficiently to resort to general or symbolical logic, or any integer of reason, because it strongly desires to satisfy itself with its own particular cognitions. That it arrogates Reason as a part of its own particular schema is but an intellectual egoism, which confounds a deliberate with a spontaneous judgment. Its momenta cannot contain the immanence or instantaneity of prescient reason, for understanding must practically comprehend or be sure of itself before it ventures into the domain of reason; and this sphere it can never reach if it forgets not its own particular existence. The purely reasonable or synthetic propositions of the child are often, basically, more generically true, profound, and simple, than the acutest theorem of the learned man—a common experience which understanding alone fails to explain.

From cause to effect is a complete transition of one thing into another, and the fact proves the unconditional necessity of symbolism to be but the legal consequence of duality or multiplicity, whether within the qualities of affinity or contrariety by themselves, or whether between them both as opposing factors and principles. The transition is an instantaneous or deliberate conjunction of one class of phenomena with another class. In mind, or mentality, it is the conjunction of Reason and Understanding; in sensation, or experience, the conjunction of Emotion and Motion; in intuition, or cognition, the conjunction of Space, Place, and Time. As a cause it is a form; as an effect it is an experience; as an intuition it is a schema; and as a conscious or unconscious cognition

cause, effect, and intuition are never absent, although the particular understanding may not be aware of their interconnected presence or activity. Their acceptance, as an indivisible unity, is a pure act of reason or faith—a fact which the understanding can easily assail but never permanently controvert or overthrow, since its efforts in this direction are but a negative cognition of reason.

The organon of all schemes or transitions is implementality. Instruments, like the mind, are syllogistic, that is, they contain in suspension, the logic of every indigenous argument in agential (second source) transition between two totally different premises (cause and effect), as a foregone conclusion to be determined and verified over again by the performer. The instrument is the offspring of man's constructive thought and sensibility, and is therefore no less a possible agency than he is himself. It is a scient as well as a prescient declaration of and challenge to all that is vitally mediative in him, between a settled cause and a settled experience along certain lines of motion and emotion. As to itself it is only a second source or minor proposition or formulation of a certain cause and a possible effect—a physical form of the mind depending on the mind itself for further thought and experience to transmute it from a proposition into an argument, and from an argument into a certainty—the organon of timeal and dynamical speech—a tonal color-schema within whose characteristic limitation are conjectured a variety of exact and inexact temperamental and physical energies combined—an implement of a mediative proposition.

By its aid music may be regarded as intelligible in

reference to causality, and purely sensible in regard to effect; and while being uttered we can plainly trace the categorically dual features of the ruling mind again, viz., its distinctive functions of reason and understanding, the general deduction from which is, that there cannot possibly exist an experiential synthesis without not only a presciently causal, but also a sciently implemental presence as the indispensable condition of its comprehensible utterance. The experiential synthesis is always a harmonic unity of causal dualism or plurality, whether as amity or hostility; and that this scient or second source plurality cannot but be a mechanical synthesis made possible by the existence of a prescient or first source power, unconditionally declaring unity, goes without saying. Yet in spite of this undeniable fact the unconditional nature back of the mechanical synthesis is but seldom recognized as still and always preeminently unconditional, and this omission places instrumental results on a purely personal or idiosyncratic basis—though unity with it seems so easy of attainment if we would only be sincere—the delusion of which we seldom recognize until experience teaches us the futility of our efforts. The truth of the matter is, that all instrumentality—not even excluding the implemental mind—posits both unconditional and plausible features; and that the unconditional is first of source. With adherence to this truth—be it consciously or unconsciously—our sincerity becomes more than merely intentional; it becomes commanding and consummating. It is the necessity of inward and outward adjustment—two equals of totally different appearances—which

makes the acquisition of an unconditional skill so slow of attainment, while in effect it seems so easy, simple, and near at hand that we accept its plausibility as first of source.

Now the mind need not, necessarily, be confined to its habitual mode of thinking from Cause to Effect or *vice versa*; it can also be induced to act, as the instrument of an unconditional will, immanently or as first of source, that is: as both Cause and Effect simultaneously—an attitude of mind productive of complete results. Here then we note three distinct kinds of productive moments: one which externalizes; one which internalizes; and one which totalizes or assumes an unconditionally mediative or conjunctive attitude. The first leads to conviction; the second to persuasion; and the third alone to absolute certainty, because the latter recognizes, with its instantaneity, the moment in all of its totality and parts, or actualities, possibilities and impossibilities. The moment, however, being an instant of time, is always contingent upon the subject and object, or upon reason and understanding. A dynamical synthesis is therefore a synthesis of causality attained by means of material as well as organic instrumentality. Within this synthesis it is evident that physical causality and its parallelistic understanding *can* correspond to the *rule* of permanence; and that psychical effect and its parallelistic Reason *do* correspond to the *principle* of permanence: so cause and effect base permanence on equally exact factors and functions, because the certain or obviously visible operation of causality or understanding also serves to determine the more remote or less visible but no less certain

quality of effectualism or reason, and, consequently Certitude is as inherent in one as in the other.

Experience is a constant and never-ceasing condition of vital or temperamental being—always present—self-consciously or unconsciously—in a greater or lesser state of outer vibration and inner sensation. Its so-called “neutrality” is but an aggregation or segregation of rhythmical or existent time, which, however, cannot mean a suspension of experience, but only of its self-consciousness, while, as in sleep, the temperamental flux and reflux continues its own inherent pace. It may also mean the absorption of attention by one thing and subsequent unconsciousness of all else. It is a wakeful state of dreams.

The speculative condition of mind is nothing else than an understanding divided against itself. All speculative minds plainly demonstrate that their “*a priori*” cognitions are really only “*a posteriori*” or second source cognitions, placed ahead of their time order by self-understanding or logical abstraction, and so reasonably beyond the limits of experience; but there cannot be extensions of the mind beyond a state of experience, because, no matter what conclusions are determined by this process, they will, in the end, prove themselves to have been merely noumenal abstractions, created by the logical egotism of the understanding, from the dual mind—a denial of its own state of experiential concept, or a state of experience in which experience is denied a representation. No other than a noumenal state can be arrived at by the denial of experiential necessity as first of source, for nothing, not even excepting the

thing in itself, can be cognized from other sources than experiential ones. This is the unconditional rule of cognizant or motional and recognizant or emotional life.

To conceive, the functions of sensibility are necessary. The state of conception as determined by understanding is conscious; as determined by reason is intuitive; as determined by both is complete. Our process of unfoldment is from instinct or unconsciousness—a state of utter absorption of identity by the schema of the object—to subconsciousness or intuition—a state of identity in contact with the schema of the subject—to consciousness or realization of Being—a schema for absorbing both object and subject—to self-consciousness or apperception, that Being is both object and subject. And actions alone, indicating life are the criteria of substance. We see by this evolution or process how the substantial categories of quantity are, by degrees of existence, evolutionally promoted by transformation or symbolism from substantial into the spiritual categories of schematical or qualitative presence by the analogous though dual faculties of our mind. And so it comes about that, after all, experiential consciousness is complete and, through causality, becomes analogically exact consciousness, which, later may, by subversion, become fragmentary or abstract indeed, but cannot, unconditionally, be disunited from experiential degrees of consciousness or unconsciousness, because self-consciousness happens to have a preferred or optional part of the mind instead of its unity. For instance: an analysis and

critique of Reason can only be, in general, a futile argument, and, in particular, be but a self-investigation of the understanding. Reason, like God, is beyond the ken of understanding, and can only be *comprehended*, i. e., synthetically, by itself, is consequently, devoid and beyond the faculty of analysis. And God can only be comprehended, never understood. Understanding, according to its purely functional capacity and sense, is but the conscious faculty of deliberate dissection and composition. But when educational or moral egotism steps in with its determined love of self-consciousness, trying, by the aid of facultative understanding, to decompose and recompose itself, for its own personal satisfaction, it becomes purely speculative. Its efforts then are about as useful as trying to know why a faculty is a Faculty or a function is a Function; or why gold is Gold, or why God is God. Such efforts go beyond the province of the useful or applicable, and become unreasonable, even though recognizing the "able" as desirable. That is a state of noumenal apperception which transcends common bounds by insisting that *I* think instead of simply thinking. Apperception or self-consciousness is the product of individualism—a transcendent but by no means a supereminent act of the Ego, exceeding that sum of consciousness and conscientiousness which finds its blessing in the certainty of its relation with all, but does succeed in finding that blessing to exist only within its own bosom. Now, in Art the mind of man compels cosmic nature to yield her quantities and qualities in the interests of unity, because reason is a native experience as well as a spiritual necessity; but if understand-

ing insists in creating a noumenal state of apperception, by confusing reason to be of its own quantity and quality, it certainly sets out to undermine that native experience and spiritual necessity, and produces results that time constantly grinds to dust.

Nowhere does understanding so well and faithfully execute its functions or better fulfill its limited mission than in the practical construction of things. Therein it, at least remotely, must recognize its tentative sense of recomposition—the all-pervading principle of immanence or productivity—because it then harnesses the quantities and qualities of nature, to a certain extent, for non-speculative purposes. Now, utility is only little when it is merely expeditious, that is, when it serves not fully its own sense of quality and quantity in categorical combination with reason. Understanding can never be more—and should never be less—than the facultative schema of all-pervading Reason. A schema that saves time, yet does not try to cut down or circumvent the necessary time the accomplishment of its object unconditionally demands, is truly creative and useful, because it then is guided by a sense of the scientific, even though exercised in its humblest place by the humblest capacity. And the highest or best use a purely conjectural understanding can be put to, is to ascertain the nature and relations of contingency to the positive and negative condition of the mind; the lowest or worst use it can be put to is trying to determine the ratio of chance—an adventurous process which abrogates the very privileges and purposes of the mind itself. Nor should we ever misrate or deem equally important the

positively negative or antipathetic quality of an affection with its positively affirmative or sympathetic quality, since both cannot belong to the same degree of time, nor truth, nor intelligence; on the other hand neither should we ever cease to look out for such classic distinctions or differences as are within the same affection, since exactly in doing that consists the duteously limited conduct or vocation of the understanding. For instance: if Love is first of source and time, hatred must be second of source and time. In their degrees or changes from first to second, or from second to first source, the affections or passions go through multifarious aspects. Now the optimistic or good we cannot analytically but only relatedly determine, for the good is the very quality of indeterminable reason to which we owe being; but it is within the province of the understanding to investigate and determine not only the pathetic or optimistic, but also the antipathetic or pessimistic quality of love, viz., hatred, because actively and reactively they are the same affirmative forces of good when in sympathetic union with one another, though the sympathetic or optimistic quality of love, when self-complete, is as indeterminably bad as is the unsympathetic or pessimistic quality of hatred; therefore we cannot analytically but only relatedly or comparatively determine the affirmative quantity of one by the negative quantity of the other, since in itself Bad belongs to the very quality of indeterminable reason which negates, while Good belongs to the very quality of indeterminable reason which affirms. Either proposition by itself is absurd,

The simple truth is that all affections, or passions, or their reflections are first of source and time when optimistic or good, and but second of source when pessimistic or bad, though optimism and pessimism are as inter-related as are sympathy and antipathy. And while both are spontaneous or deliberate of action and application, they are certainly not, as far as concerns the affairs of man, born of the same moment in the order of time or creation. It is then impossible for understanding to designate permanently the true dual import of ethical utility, but only that of related, or temporal, or plausible expeditiousness, in accord with worldly lights; but when it thinks it has defined ethical utility in an unconditional way, it has but declared a schema, which, by the light of inscrutable and, to us, timeless reason, chiefly derives its merit or truthfulness from the particular purpose it hastens to consummate—a process which in itself is anything but moral, though its purpose is, ostensibly, in the interests of “temporal” morality.

The unity of the sensorium constitutes the intuition of the mind; the harmonious mind is the cause of instinctive conception; the cognition and definition of conception is the relative or regulative grasp of its understanding; and the principle of all unity or enharmony is the universal or constitutive grasp of its reason. Understanding only redetermines to self-consciousness what has, does, or will take place in time; reason determines to consciousness or subconsciousness what never ceases but continuously does take place. So the former is purely mathematical or regulative, and

the later purely synthetical or dynamical. There is a self-subsistent unity in Reason, but only a self-sufficient unity in Understanding—the source of rule and not the source of principle. As there is no realization at all without sensation both are essential to object and subject. Dynamics are gradations of united force, energy, and power—*i. e.*, can be categorized, raised or lowered into degrees, but are not integrally divisible—no more so than principle can be divided and remain a principle still. The principle of dynamics is effectual unity—manifestly derived from a substantial causality.

Understanding, as a faculty, is possessed of three conditions of memory: self-consciousness, unaffected or simple consciousness, and sub-consciousness. Self-consciousness is indicative; unaffected consciousness is cognitive; and sub-consciousness is intuitive. There is yet the purely instinctive or sentient understanding devoid of consciousness or degree of memory, which may be mentioned, because it is the antithesis of self-consciousness—the purely animalic order of understanding. However that may be, it is of vast importance as the forerunner of subconsciousness and consciousness, on account of its inherent sense of the prescient; but its involuntary volition is almost totally counteracted or negated by self-consciousness, to which its occult workings and results come in the form of a constant surprise. And self-consciousness, being but little guarded by integral consciousness or intuition, therefore in a measure unprepared for such prescient surprises, may easily become credulous or skeptical in the absence of causal

or categorical data, and revert to a state of superstition or unbelief as a consequence—either state containing even lower mental conditions than that of animalic instinct.

While understanding is a unity of experience, reason, predating it, alone constitutes the vital or practical unity of all life, no matter in what relation an understanding happens to be in regard to its reason. Sure it is that experiential or synthetic universality is a constitutive or mediative extension of validity, and experimental or analytic universality only a regulative or constructive extension of validity. Reason is Central government or principle; understanding is its facultative interpreter; and life the legal or mediative applicator and enactor of both, in an enharmonious way.

Now, music is an activity of both reason and understanding—is an instantaneous or vital co-operation of cause and effect resulting in sound, or the sublimed yet fundamental factor in purely organic and synthetic life or nature. In no other activity is that so immanently demonstrated, or the whole mind so clearly discoverable as dualistic, or its duality so distinctly divisible and, consequently, categorically ascertainable and definable. Music is not only an output of the total mind, but a complete employment and argument as well of outside and inside or cosmo-generic nature, in powerful yet measurable combination. Indeed, musicality involves time and space in co-operative instantaneity, change, and silence; nor can there be a vague abstraction of one from the other, by some eccentric twist in the mind, which insists more on originality than on completeness, or

operates in the belief, the less the divisor the greater the quotient.

The creative process, too, of music is too often either merely an outer or an inner one. In the former case the result is an exact one, while in the latter case the result is irregular or inexact. While the difference between the separated ways alters not the principle of creation, yet it begets incomplete or specific results, since the voluntary or involuntary separation of contrasting yet necessarily co-operative modes involves, in itself, a total or a partial denial of the other, which, as a proposition, is idiosyncratic, meaning, is the genetical or the generical to predominate, *i. e.*, which is to be the major and which the incidental proposition?—for all categorical minority is thereby eliminated. Now if the process is a complete or syllogistic one, or consists of both an inward and outward mode, the result is cosmo-generical of quantity and quality—like, for instance, Beethoven's or Mozart's music—due to an impersonally unconditional state of mind. It is hardly necessary to add that music, if demonstrated by modes of inception and conclusion, must be in character, either genetical or generical, broadly speaking; but its super-eminent—not meaning super-natural, but psychological—nature is irrefutably conceived and concluded by the potentially dual mind only. To unbiassed reason there can be no doubt as to the complete message it then brings us, but about the precise truth of which the more personal or limited understanding is sure to carp, when it attempts to reduce the value of music's cosmo-generical import to the level of its own particular comprehension.

In music we need never lose faith in the eternal guiding thread of pure reason; even in the midst of an overwhelming sensation, evidence and reflection can assure us that our emotions are grounded on a most practical or intelligent causality; that we can actually see, hear, and touch materiality and super-eminence in the same moment of time—a fact so irrefutably impressive as to be more contributive to the doctrine of faith, among such as dispute her necessity, than all other arguments combined—not even excluding that of professed religion itself. Music is, furthermore, the actual and vital demonstration of the indispensable principle of incarnation, or that the carnal correspondingly incarnates and renders intelligible its sublimatory transformation.

Religion teaches the same principle, only when it comes to a theological or scientific *interpretation* of religion, man is likely to be more considered as an instrument to be played with than as an unconditional copula between the finite and infinite. Musical faith, however, is not unlike that of religiosity, even though we very seldom can *exactly* get behind, or beyond, or into ourselves demonstratively, as we can in music, except we choose to obey our betters, or by a superior power of internal energy and force, not reducible by self-conscious desire or understanding, rise in oblivious faith above physical considerations. And whether the minor be deemed major, or the major be deemed the minor premise in this noumenal state, makes no difference to most people, because, lacking a sense of time, they heed no order of time; yet even in this particular case abstraction and a certain experience go hand in hand, up to a

certain point, though the principal, or sum-total, is never that of cosmo-generic unity, or physio-mental balance. Music, like religion, only truly begins when first and living sources take the, apparently illiterate, place of that noumenal abstraction which the book-learned term "*a priori*"—a merely mathematically or philosophically abstracted moment of the purely reflective mind. And when the more practical, but still scholasticized "*a posteriori*" of mathematical or philosophical scientism will be considered with less academic contempt and more brotherly humility, as first in the order of fundamental generality or being, then only will we be no longer guilty of such pedantic exclusiveness as that indicated by the noumenally scientific "*a priori*" as first of source and in the order of time.

Music, like mind, in its universal aspect, is epicene, that is it contains the qualities of both sexes, but is, in its particular aspect, a pronounced duality, if not an inimical one. So in its first aspect music appears common to both sexes; in its second aspect appears reasonable or feminine; and in its third effect appears rational or masculine.

Now, by the common aspect or scheme of music or mind, one can, surely, perceive most logically the existence of that which, as an essential unity, must lie beyond our deliberate but not beyond our immanent or vital comprehension, because music's causal declarations determine the existence of an experiential or effectual basis to be enharmonically the same as a causal basis, only under another signature, that of quality; and therefore most vitally true to our total sense of being or its

quantity. An enharmonic comprehension is the dual prerogative of the human mind the world over, and exercises this prerogative whether we see fit to deny or admit its generic quality, because it alone is able to avoid conflict with an apperceptive or literal understanding which constantly threatens our integrity, through its intuitional sense of the remorselessness of external time, which both numerically and symbolically—by the light of an enharmonious comprehension—proves itself to be but a second or particular source, even in contradiction to its own particular assertion to the contrary. A first source or an ideological ground is really the only measure or standard by which to determine the categorical validity of both a physical and ideological (psychological) causality at the same time, as the same thing, or as affirmatively and affiliatingly indivisible, complementary, and self-adjusting. And were this not true or unconditionally necessary, a noumenally self-complete state would soon be pointed out by the particular understanding—and has been pointed out unceasingly—to be the highest possible state attainable. However, that view of it will ever remain a strictly private one. Understanding, by itself, seems to be, principally, a scheme to delay universal self-adjustment as long as possible, or at least during the measure of individual time; and plenty of us talk and act as if we would live forever, and have the last word at that. The scales of Justice and Truth, as devised and contrived by the self-reflective understanding, are extremely small; and in trying to be fair to all succeed pretty well in being fair to none, or but few. What the causal self-sameness of understanding and reason

(or cause and effect) is to the mind of the musician, is the same enharmonious principle of number and symbol to the mind of the algebraist, or transmutation to the mind of the chemist; or what the fetish is to the idolatrous or superstitious mind; or what typical Gods are to the aesthetico-ethical mind of the pagan; or what transubstantiation is to the romanistic mind; or what "the word made flesh" or incarnation implies to the Christian mind, etc. These are all enharmonic conversions or changes under different aspects—the same principle from different points of view. There is really so little occultism about the whole matter that its non-adoption as a universal principle can only be explained on the grounds of a frenzied self-importance which considers itself as first in the order of being.

Music, more than anything else, practically affirms and confirms the in themselves unlike, yet systematic unity of reason and understanding as correspondingly con-substantial—a complementary opposition as it were—or as the external and internal factors or senses of the mind. It, at all events, cannot confound mere movement with progress. Music and mind, as convertible terms, constantly demand both an intelligent as well as an experiential presence; and the beginning and conclusion having reference to the unisonous employment of intellect and experientiality may be summed up as constituting the really universal character of both mind and music. These can be only then universally experiential or unconditional when they have proved themselves unisonously demonstrative—proved by an act in Music which produces an effect entirely distinct from its oper-

ation; and this operation and result is, psychologically speaking, unconditional cause and effect, or being and sensation in one—an indivisibly dual simplicity which cannot and does not possess properties which do not or did not belong fundamentally to experience. One can never cast out sensation—no matter how remote or unconscious—as long as there is life. So its denial, consciously or unconsciously—or most usually engendered by maltreating thought into a simplicity which denies the co-existence of sensibility—is as great an absurdity as cogitating a major without a minor or collateral rule or premise. Such a process does not constitute the non-existence of either, nor a necessary unity of both, even though abstracted from experience; such a complete half is never to be multiplied or added to but only continually subtracted from as its only possible proposition and solution.

Now, if we liken music unto the attributes of being: thought is her principle of silence; construction her principle of understanding; and production her principle of reason. Or time is the intellect of music; speed her color or soul; rhythm her heart; and purity of intonation her chastity. Or Music—like Mind—is the fraternal union of science and art, or of physiology and psychology; or exists because she cannot be devoid of an active or vital understanding and reason—even in her moments of silence—or harmonizes common experience with a super-eminent and vital—not abstracted—intelligence, constituting a divine freedom, free from self-contradiction, because it comprehends such a universal dimension that therein all contradictions find their place to be but

necessary contradistinctions, easily resolvable into a harmonious entirety. So it comes about that universally music can become the demonstrative certainty of all ideas, she herself being the momentum of both observance and expression, in itself constituting a schema, reared into being by super-eminent thought and a tentative or mediated and mediating experience in which all nature is joined into a unity of presentation, and which, as a schema, not only favors but actually contains and warrants the justification of the loftiest as well as humblest faith in the positive existence of God's divine reason, its inspirational qualities, and as the medium of revelations unto us, whose messages are everlastingly precursory to the time and measure of our understanding. Furthermore, music shows that a general condition of unity is not *only* possible but is actually being consummated *in extenso*, and that this wondrous harmony of oppositional forces and features can be actually commanded to appear by the mind and hand of man; and so speak and come unto him as a language full of revelation and confirmation of all that we are to know while of earth.

Sound or vibration is the active unity and principle of all quantities and qualities in nature; and that its existence, harmonious utterance and measurable control will be the cosmo-generic basis of all future experiential and super-eminent ideas, is merely a question of time. Music may yet come to be considered as the very criterion of an empirico-surpassing power, truth and understanding. And if music—like the mind—is not the sum total or evidence of an unconditional and incomparable psychico-fundamental power, what else is?

GENIUS

GENIUS

'Tis God gives skill.

But not without men's hands: He could not make
Antonio Stradivaris' violins
Without Antonio."

—George Elliot.

THE word "Genius" is used to indicate something unusual in the ordinary course of human nature; yet it is translated from the Latin language as literally meaning "inborn nature"—which seems rather tautological, since all nature is inborn, even if we understand it as the particular capability to produce. To the paganistic mind this energy to produce appeared like a spirit which seemed to indicate, to incite and guide the actions and thoughts of certain men, and was, as a distinct manifestation, mythologized by them into a tutelar deity that determined the character, conduct, etc., of both men and places. The primitive sense of this myth has deteriorated, in the less metaphysically disposed mind of modern man, down to a handy by-word to designate any appearance not easily explicable;—and when the appearance seemed not worth while explaining, the noun "Crank" seemed more appropriate than the noun "Genius." Genius and Crank have become so fatuously

synonymous as to constitute terms of evasion rather than terms of explanation—a clear gain to flippancy. And so the word “Genius” seems so relative an expression, that it is one of the synonym-breeding words, for it has attained authentically no less than nine different interpretations—such as: Abilities, Gifts, Talents, Parts, Aptitude, Faculty, Capacity, Ingenuity, and Cleverness. Of course this diffusiveness is calculated to leave any unusual appearance to idiomatic and peculiar interpretation.

The root of the word—*geno*, the old form of the verb *gigno*, to produce—leaves however no doubt but that it stood originally more for actuality than potentiality of character. No man ever expressed that sense of the word better than Henry Ward Beecher when he said that “Genius unexerted is no more genius than a bushel of acorns is a forest of oaks.” Hogarth expressed this idea more bluntly when he declared “I know no such a thing as genius—Genius is nothing but labor and diligence;” and Carlyle the same, only less bluntly, when he defined Genius as “an immense Capacity for taking trouble.” The truth seems that every definition of the word is only an epigrammatic statement of the character of its utterer. And this relativity of definition goes on until from that of the mere opinionist we arrive at that of the psychologist, who renders a more impersonal explanation.

Coleridge decides that “Genius of the *highest* kind implies an unusual intensity of modifying power.”

Johnson determines that “The true genius is a mind

of larger general powers accidentally determined to some particular direction."

Sir Walter Scott concluded that genius was "The peculiar structure of mind with which each individual is endowed by nature." What Sir Walter however suggests, between the lines is, that the more we know man the better will we understand the centralized one-ness of man at the hub of his nature and the infinite differences in men at the circumference of their nature—the outer boundary, as it were, of the figurative wheel.

Now, as a matter of general fact there exists nothing in man but what is "inborn of nature"; and being "in-born" is productive of a corresponding result. In this light "all men are geniuses" is the ready inference—which, though not so very far from the truth, in comparison with the rest of creation, leaves us precisely where we started from, after considerable rumination. So let us begin once more with the primitive root of the word: *gigno*, to produce.

To produce involves labor; labor conjectures motion; motion suggests speed; speed a quality of motion; and quality a certain degree of slowness or speed. Again, speed suggests space; space a direction; direction an aim; aim an end; end a place; place a purpose; purpose an object and subject; and these both indicate a class or category to which they belong.

Nature in man stands for the initiative power to produce; and as this goes without saying—as many things do for the thinker—it becomes evident that first we must investigate kinds and directions of motion.

Motionally there are but two kinds of speed, quick

and slow. Thus quick (or centrifugal) movement is that which goes from us, therefore possesses the attribute which de-centers our senses and thoughts; and slow (or centripetal) movement is that which comes toward us, and for this cause possesses the attribute which centres our senses and thoughts. The latter we term *impress*, the former *express* motion, or simply divide them into motion and emotion. Impress movement conveys a sense of mathematical force; express movement a sense of dynamical force. According to this: all movement is, ordinarily speaking, genius, because motion is produced and producing. To one or the other of these schemes of motion we have to entrust for conveyance our thoughts and enactments; and the mode characterizes the principles and laws through which any of our thoughts, sayings, and doings are transmitted either to our own or to the consciousness of others. Furthermore: these two motions, in themselves, are two opposites, which under unconditional predicaments present a complementary contrast, and under conditional predicaments an uncomplementary one. Now, the consciousness of these two differing motions posits a third state, viz., that of quiescence, with the power of suscitation. The power of suscitation declares being and identity, and the exercise of this being and identity is the possibility of mediation or agency. Identity is, in every state of motion or quiescence, the basis of causality and eventuality, and for this reason identity must be premised as the starting point, or centre of all motional and emotional conceptions, determining whether they are radial, convergent, or remain in a state of rest.

Identic activity has two inceptive qualities, viz., the one which suscitates, and the other which resuscitates, consequently suscitation is first and resuscitation second of source. Identicalness stands for internal or external consciousness to some degree of observation within its temperamental category. So the characteristic of radial identity is the category of subconsciousness; that of convergent identity is the category of self-consciousness; while that of mediation or agency is the category of simple consciousness. Accordingly subconsciousness and selfconsciousness are declared by the inherent quantity and quality of temperament, that is, by its centrifugal or centripetal speed; and that of simple consciousness is declared in the name of the unconditional or universal will, regardless of the predispositions of identity. This again brings into notice and consideration the characteristic foundation of Will power, which when declared by radial temperamentality is subjective; when declared by a converging temperamentality is objective; and when declared by universal temperamentality is unconditionally free.

The mathematical aspect of centrifugal, centripetal, and abeyant temperamentality, shows (1) that centrifugality retrogresses into multiplicity; (2) centripetality progresses into singularity; and (3) agency into unitotalism or congregationalism. And the dynamic aspect of these procedures shows the principle of centrifugality to be that of expansion; of centripetality to be that of contraction; and agency to be that of unconditional freedom of command.

The sensual and mental duality in us is what constitutes to our consciousness both a Cause and Effect. That we would term conditional mediation. In unconditional mediation Cause and Effect are only one to the mind either simultaneously or eventually. However, the time essential to all deliberation separates the two propositions until a judgment is arrived at; and so the act of thought is not a spontaneous one but consists first of a psychological and then of a physical cognition and recognition. Now, a constructed conclusion is always a restricted or an individual, and not an unrestricted or universal product. The former is a particular unity; the latter a general unity. The difference is due to time, or is the difference between instantaneity and deliberation of mind.

Centripetality and centrifugality, as separate motions, show on the convergent side a physio-mechanical mode of thought towards conclusions; on the divergent side a psychico-dynamical mode of thought towards conclusions; so in either mode are only capable of reaching a categorical but not a universal unity of thought—which only takes place when Cause and Effect have not been separated or when the psychological moment of thought and enactment is self-same. In each and every event of the three orders of productive capacity or genius, the scheme of motion or emotion is one or two, or all three of these conditions in one, under which concept takes place, unfolding itself either self-radially, or self-convergently, or instantaneously, that is, when concept and enactment are the same thing.

When man sees, thinks, feels and acts impulsively or

radially, or from himself, he appears characteristically altruistic or devoted subjectively;

When he sees, thinks, feels and acts deliberately or convergently, or to himself, he appears characteristically egoistic or devoted objectively;

When he sees, thinks, feels and acts neither impulsively nor deliberately, but remains entitatively self-commanding, he appears characteristically agential or pendent.

These various aspects of genius posit three different qualities of Will: (1st) that which is impersonal or radial, is subjective and governed by its object; (2d) that which is personal or convergent, is objective and is governed by its subject; and (3d) that will which is strictly free or is governed by both object and subject.* None of these states of thought, feeling, and conduct excludes the constitutional attributes of mind, viz., Thesis, Antithesis, and Question and Unity. So Genius is a unit, either within a category, or within all categories. Unity is either conceived identically (individually), or plurally (entitatively); and to live and not attain a unity or totality of some kind, means the complete derangement of will or interest.

Now, as to convergent motion and emergent emotion in thought, feeling, or conduct: these two qualities are, in one sense or the other, the vital or forceful attributes of all organism, and attain their greatest dimensions and culminating point in the advent of man. This

* In explanation of this apparent paradox it should be remembered that there is always the *inter-connection* between subject and object or object and subject to be reckoned with. There is absolutely no such thing as a thing "in itself."

By the rational standard of motion all emotion is something intangible, unexplainable, phenomenal, visional, eccentric, if not irrational or apparently devoid of any ratio. Education aspires chiefly to the motional ratio; civilization is based and built upon its exactness. But the relative importance of the mathematical or mechanical ratioism of self-conscious, understanding has not yet been conclusively proven—indeed, it is disputed daily by the reason of man, since it is not all there is to man:—there are yet the dynamical qualities to be reckoned with or raised to the dignity of a universal proposition.

Now, what we continually mean by “understanding” needs qualification, because it has a common gender consisting of two kinds in one: mechanical and dynamical understanding. The mechanical side of the understanding is its analytical or self-conscious side; the dynamical its sub-conscious or synthetical side, which, for short, we term Reason. Mechanical understanding consists of three *distinct* relations: Cause, Effect, and Agency; dynamical reason, on the other hand, consists of these three relations in unity, *i. e.*, *indistinct* as far as analysis is concerned. The difference between them is that mechanical understanding is measurably timeful and spaceful; and dynamical understanding or reason immeasurably timeless and spaceless. Upon the former is based all comprehension of Cosmos; upon the latter all comprehension of God.

Between Reason and Understanding is a first or primitive degree of interconnection tentative of their unity, which is recognized as native understanding or

common sense, the scheme of which is a trust in the evidence or testimony of one's senses. We enter upon this particular subject because the great antagonist of all genius is common sense.

The senses are but elemental in their fundamental forms or functions, and are usually applied in common sense judgments without a further inquiry into their developed conditions. An advanced stage of common sense would consist in knowing the testimony of our senses to be rather confined to the degree of their educated perception than to the state of their native capacities. How very casual, for instance, is the sense of sight, as usually employed, is only fully realized by the painter, sculptor, or geometrician; how casual indeed is the usage of the ear or of the touch, is best realized by the trained musician. Every sense or thing has enharmonic presentations. Common sense sensibilities do not, for this reason, mean a correct discrimination, certainly not a tested one, consequently even a self-evident usage of such senses cannot be accepted as unquestionably true or final. The fact is, that the more receptive or keen untutored or casually tutored sensibilities or faculties are by nature, the more likely they are to lead their owner's mind astray with either too much or too little facultativeness or sentiency. As to common sense ever rendering an unconditional judgment:—that is impossible with the two uninvestigated relations of time and space, or the three conditions of subject, object, and premises. Only a commanding summation of all senses can render an unconditional judgment.

The exercise of three faculties or senses, at least, is

indispensable to the proper unfoldment of any one of these senses in particular—in which event all of the three may reasonably be considered as trustworthy or adequately tested. Man generally uses but one sense at a time; less so two at a time; still less so three at a time. He seems satisfied to get along with one. Only a jury of three senses can render an able verdict, after they have agreed. Neither common sense, nor work directed by a “common sense” state of the faculties, can ever be considered as final or as the work of genius. Genius means a categorical finality or unity. Only from a sensory co-education is derivable the eventual possibility to understand and demonstrate the duality of the enharmonic mind; and without the knowledge of a coequal state of mechanical and dynamical mentality, no education, or naturalism, can be final. Since our being must be *ratio-nal*, let rationalism be found in both qualities of the mind, and not only in either one of its branches only.

The other representation, or the enharmonic side of common understanding or motion, is common reason or emotion. If common sense or understanding is naturalistic, common being or reason is nativistic. The scheme of nativism is the spontaneity or infallibility of reason; the scheme of naturalism is the deliberate infallibility of understanding. Reason is perpetual, Understanding periodic; and the *dynamic* force of reason transcends the *mechanical* force of understanding. The ratio of nativism, or reason, or emotion, is found in its attunement with the infinite; the ratio of naturalism, or understanding, or motion is found in its attunement with the

finite. The former is the vital, the latter the lethal principle of man. And if this is true, it follows that there can be only one mortal or deadly sin: the selfishness of the affections, the backbone of all mortal sins, whatsoever their names. Reason is dilection; understanding predilection. One is unconditional, the other absolute; and both possess the quality of a common or enharmonic basis—experience—though they vary in aim and end.

As order is "the law under which we recognize things," we can no more eliminate order from genius than we can eliminate it from common sense. But that the ratio is only found in mechanical and not in dynamical force, is the distinct shortcoming or imperfection—not only of the age in which we live but of all known civilizations. As separated beliefs they are inimical opposites, for either force in itself is strongly inclined to ignore or dispute the legal principle, law and order of the other—so that nothing is likely to be recognized which is not immediately affiliated with a particular premise of the other's views. And the symbolistic idea of completeness is, mechanically, the circle; and dynamically the sphere. Seldom can the eye of common sense add to the circle a globe or reduce or simplify the globe to a circle; it knows not in either class of ratio the principle of symbolism, or the necessity of enharmonic transformation or places.

Phenomena are easily produced in a reflective or self-conscious mind by radial motion. This motion, sending expressions into space with a centrifugal temperamentality, naturally exceeds the centripetal speed of

temperamental reflection or understanding, which then, with an approximate sense of truth, classifies that appearance as phenomenal, and can logically interpret it as visionary—or aught else, for that matter. By centripetal standards radial motion has often been declared to be a state of madness or degeneration—no less a purely subjective declaration than the antithetic reply to the accusation of madness, from a centrifugal point of view, viz., that the nature of such a reply is perfectly in keeping with the monomial or singular condition of a purely reflective state of the mind. We see by this that the thetic reproach of one state is the antithetic reproach of the other.

Radial genius is that kind which, apparently, exceeds the laws governing convergent genius, which, in contrast or opposition, apparently never exceeds the self-evident laws of rationality.

Now, the real difficulty, however, is to distinguish radial from eccentric or irregular genius. The difference between these two is really this: radial or decentralizing genius is *equality* of expression and subject-matter; eccentric or irregular genius is *inequality* of expression and subject-matter. Psychologically speaking, there exists no greater error than to hold that a declared expression must be, for this declaration alone, also a self-expressive one. It may be an illusive intention only.

On the other hand radial and convergent genius agree, comparatively, in equitable expression, but not in the category of expression. The cause for this is found

in timeal variations of each: convergent genius avows priority or ancestry of time; and radial genius avows posteriority or futurity of time; or—in other words—convergent genius avows an internal conscience; and radial genius avows an external conscience. But in entitative genius all states and conditions are optional and unconditional, both in grade and space. It avows the presence of all time, or the unconditional conscience.

Radial motion, in preponderance or projection, we would define to be intuitionial or psychological genius or agency; convergent motion, in preponderance or projection, we would designate as instinctive or physiological genius or agency; optional motion, in preponderance and projection, we would hold to be impersonal or entitative genius or agency. The latter alone is completely based upon all qualities and for this cause possesses unconditional freedom of will. Any one of these temperamental speed-schemes—or all in one—distinguish and classify the feelings, thoughts, and productions of men. Of course, it is understood, that these categories of motion approximate each other contrastingly, or comparatively, or spontaneously—that is: contrast and comparison in one. So their respective demonstration is, in psychological agency, primeval or autochthonous; in physiological agency, regulative or autonomous; and in entitative agency, generic or final—that is: the first avows emotion as agency; the second motion as agency; and the third avows motion and emotion as agency.

Now, either psychological or physiological agency, as predominating, manifests not the fullest potentialities

of man; it seems, in most of these cases, as if these agencies were conditioned, or fashioned, by an inherent naturalism of temperament, or by particular environments. The simple fact that an individual is averse to certain kinds of work, or is averse to any kind of manual labor is enough to change the course of entitative unfoldment and direct it into some particular channel of production. On the surface it does seem often wiser—principally because easier—for men to evade entitative prerogatives and responsibilities, than to live up to them, at all costs.

Psychological, Physiological, and Entitative agencies are only then "genius" when they have been unfolded—or have unfolded themselves—to the ability to create, conditionally or unconditionally, whole numbers. We see from this that genius is an acquired ability—not only an inborn unit. Natural tendency may be inborn, but the acquisition of a unit declares effort, or a process of unfoldment or growth. Unity, being an achievement which makes Being and Identity not only possible but positive—be it achieved by nature or by man—declares the unconditional necessity of work, be it of degree, kind, or universal. Now, when the subject-matter is of entitative dimensions, unconditional selection alone furnishes the whole number. This freedom of selection derives its commission from the divinely elemental power with which man is—above all nature—so graciously endowed, and which declares the unconditional Will to be immeasurably above the fortuitous or incidental inheritances of egoistic inclinations. This power, though always tentative or suggestive of unity, is two-

fold of aspect: when silent it is mathematical or of time; when resonating or resounding it is dynamical of both space and time. We see by this that dynamics are a potentiality of mathematics as they include both time and space. And goes it too far to say that substance or matter is but a concretion or solidification of dynamic powers? Is therefore the certain finitude of substance and form, or physiological genius, more rational than is the uncertain infinitude of psychological genius?

The egotism of selfhood, which distinguishes psychological and physiological genius alike, is in the former case emotional and vibrant, and in the latter case motionless and silent—the one a sublimation-seeking, the other a gravitation-seeking power, or, enharmonically speaking the powers of sound and silence. However the non-egotism of manhood, characteristic of entitative genius, declares these powers to be unconditional of self and identity.

Especially difficult is it to measure or approximate the egotism of psychological genius; but whatever its measure: it is inseparable from self, therefore refers to individualism no less so than does physiological genius, however with this difference: that the one refers *backward* and the other *forward* to self-hood—that is: one is a concealed, the other an open declaration of the ego as first of time, because of Being; but the infinitude of one, and the finitude of the other are extremes that meet in self nevertheless, even though it is patent that the proper position of man in all nature is pre-eminently unconditional. Any egotism, be it radial or convergent,

is, as "inborn nature" or genius, incontestably a personal proposition; and its uninvestigated acceptance, as "inborn," is likely to prove vitiating to indicative nature.

The course of psychological genius is plural in its dissipation. The pleasures of dissipation are its own; the reflections of its dissipation are for the benefit of others. It loves aesthetical creation; and the more it dissipates the more liberal-minded or broad grows the tenor of its discourse—a whole basis, as it were, for the guidance of others.

The course of physiological genius is singular in its convergency. The pleasures of singularity are its own; the results of it are also intended for the good of others. It loves ethical creation; and the more it gathers the more narrow-minded or pointed grows the tenor of its discourse—a whole culmination, as it were, for the guidance of others.

These two figures are extremes which meet in self-hood, *i. e.*, both segregate and declare egotism. Both may be likened unto conic sections, which, when put together, form a hyperbole. Their pointed ends only meet; they stand vertex to vertex, inverted, but never enharmonic. But the unfoldment of self-hood involves the placing of cones not vertex to vertex, but to the placing of them side by side, so that the two constitute a quadrature. That is the figure symbolic of manhood, of entitative genius. The weakness of truth is in all judgments, in all adjudications; the strength of truth is in all considerations, in all pronunciations. The one is partial and only mathematically correct, in view of many

things; the other is impartial and dynamically correct, in view of all things. The numerical ratio of being is identity; the dynamical ratio of being is genus, the principle of which is enharmonization, and not merely harmonization, as is the case with identity. The capacity to enharmonize is the isolated privilege of manhood, but is, nevertheless, its native state of grace. Enharmonization is a sexless attribute, the inner power of which is universal love, not in category or degree, but in all categories and degrees. And what is committed in its name is permanent—immortal—even though it never reaches the light of self-hood.

Now, what are the affections but the basic, culminating, and all-pervading and cohering power of all existence, of which the obverse is Love, or the principle of enharmonization, and Hatred,* the reverse or the principle of harmonization? Both of these powers belong to the harmonic scheme of the mind, or are the same quantity of the affections in corroborative contradistinction with each other.

The state of Love and Hatred is the entitative state of man—a state of grace distinguished by the enharmoniousness of all senses and faculties.

The three states of human existence are the states of Grace, Affirmation, and Negation.

*We must not deem Hatred, universally speaking, a negative power, because in this sense Hatred of Evil is still an affirmation of good. Only hatred of good is negation proper—a power whose scheme is to alter identity: a vacuum-seeking power of cosmic and temperamental time, which, in space, causes change of place and subject, to which it is strictly limited. We see then that Hatred is dualistic or both an active and a retroactive power, while Love is monistic in its thetic and antithetic aspects,

Grace begins with Creation or enharmony—is a condition of generic Being, or entitative genius.

Affirmation begins with reconstruction or harmony—is a condition of genetic Being, or radial genius.

Negation begins with analysis or isolation—is a condition of critical being, or convergent genius.

All these are inner or emotional quantities and qualities that *produce* outwardly.

The principle of enharmonic qualities is found in the attunement with the Creator; the principle of harmonic qualities is found in the attunement with Nature; the principle of isolated or particular qualities is found in the attunement with Self.

All inner forces are of aspect, vital, reflective, and self-acting; and production is the result of these organic and inorganic forces in combination with matter, the degreeal, categorical, and universal *rationale* which is found in What and How they combine, and in the intent of that production.

The first aspect of inner force advances the portent of the Creator; the second aspect the purport of organic and inorganic Nature; and the third aspect the purpose of self-adjustment or gravitation.

In the order of time and space the first aspect is spontaneous; the second aspect is deliberate or meditative; and the third aspect is contingent or conditional.

Ratio is the principle of usefulness or utility; and the *rationale* of motion and emotion is production; that of emotion is found in generation, that of motion is found in what is generated; one is infinite, the other finite,

The emotions are, affirmatively,
Passion, Worship, and Will;
negatively,

Wantonness, Blasphemy, and Necessity.

Passion argues vital, Worship moral, and Will regulative or mediative power.

The classification of genius is derived from timeal order—as we have indicated before—that is: if the emotions are enharmonious it is integral or entitative genius; if harmonious, it is, in expansion or contraction, genetically internal or external genius. In the constituent or entitative state identity is permutative; in the regulative or tentative state identity is impersonative in a synthetico-dynamical (subjective), or personative in an analytico-mathematical (objective) way. Will, naturally, partakes of the timeal character of its genius; that is, it is alone constituent in the unconditional state and only regulative in the two conditional states—which in the one case declares an unconditional Will, and in the other two cases either an independent, or a contingent Will.

Passion, the first quality in the order of time, is the elemental attribute of organic being, or the physiological scheme of creation.

The constituents of passion are:

Impulse, Tentation, and Enactment.

The impulses of passion are, positively or comparatively:

Rashness, Cowardice, Enmity, Hatred, Blasphemy,
Folly, and Carnality;

and superlatively:

Fear, Courage, Friendship, Love, Reverence, Wisdom, and Spirituality.

The tentatives of passion are, positively and comparatively:

Gluttony, Lust, Sloth, Covetousness, Envy, Pride, and Violence;

and superlatively:

Abstemiousness, Purity, Diligence, Content, Unselfishness, Humility, and Gentleness.

The enactments of passion are, positively and comparatively:

Animality, Slavishness, Dereliction, Ingratitude, Vanity, Malevolence, and Revenge;

and superlatively:

Physicality, Morality, Duty, Gratitude, Modesty, Benevolence, and Forgiveness.

Worship, the second quality in the order of time, is the spiritual attribute of organic being, or the psychological scheme of creation.

Worship is the sublime state of being, and though second in the order of time (reflection) is a return to, or identity with, first causes or cause—more or less a state of grace, the principle of which is consecration, or psychologically, the state in which man is enabled to approach origination and to identify himself with the name of his Maker or first cause, as the origin of power, the partaking of which makes him a prevailing agential or secondary cause.

The worship of man is dualistic, since it consists not only of a cogent passion for rehabilitation, but also of a cogent supplication for eternal life. The psychological unity of worship is internal; the physiological unity of worship is external. The former is unconditional or

entitative of universality, and in keeping with the idea we have of God, viz., that God is permutative and of no class or degree; the latter is conditional or tentative of category and degree, and in keeping with the idea we have of nature, viz., that nature is impersonate and personate. The state of entitative worship is therefore the absorption and enharmonization of entire being towards an infinite consummation; the state of tentative worship is the absorption and harmonization of entire identity towards a definite consummation.

The idea of permutation, impersonation, and personation, is the principle of worship. Personation is the lowest form of worship, on account of its egotism, and contains the principle of negation—usually a vitiating love of Self in some form or other, and may lead to the acknowledgement of necessity as a principle. Under such circumstances the unconditional manifestations of genius seem the exceptions to the rule, or rather idiosyncratic than indicative of entitative nature. And worship in any form or scheme, be it universal, categorical, or degreeal, is a dirigible power, through presence of either a permutative, or an impersonal, or a personal quality of Will.

In matters which are superlative or vital, the principle of worship is immanence; in matters which are comparative or reflective, its principle is recurrence; in concerns which are positive or necessitous, its principle is constancy.

The unconditional necessity of worship is the eternal obligation of generical being.

The quantity and quality of worship is superlative

when Question and Will are internally and externally selfsame with existence; comparative when internally in touch with being; and positive when externally concurrent with identity.

The soulish (dynamical) qualities of Worship are passionate, beatifical, and mediative; the formal (mathematical) qualities of Worship are synthetical, analytical and constructive.

In time Worship is involuntary when superlative; approximate when comparative; and voluntary when positive.

Will, the third factor in the order of time, is the mental scheme of being.

Will is indebted to Passion for the quantity of its energy; to Worship for the quality of its character; and to Reflection for the correctness of its enactments.

The affirmative nature of Will is certainty; the negative nature of Will is conviction; and the questionable nature of Will is opinion.

Will is the psychological child of original necessity, for the need and extent of redetermination only becomes known to us through the apodictic or unquestionable plan, activity, and tendency of physical nature, or of a power super-dating that of individual being. And the first lesson physical nature conveys is: that there can exist no such a thing as an unlimited, but only an unconditional freedom, and, consequently, if we are to unfold a proper Will the process will be contingent upon our recognition of—and conformation to—such powers as prove themselves to be externally stronger or internally more truthful than we are—which narrows down

the proposition of Will to the fact: that there can exist no other kind of a Will for us than a conformative one, either in a constituent or in a regulative sense. The timeal (physical), and spacial (spiritual), preservation of identity depends upon the worship of that truth; and whatever is deemed or accepted as Will in contrariety to this canon is a degeneration of Will proper, the scheme of which consists of simple conformation without constitutive and but a self-acting modicum of regulative power.

The affirmative quantity and quality of the regulative Will is moral; of the constitutional will is religious. Both are self-active in man and contain three schemes of power, Compulsion, Law, and Principle or Freedom. Man, as insensate, is subject to compulsion; as an identity comes within labor of the law; as an organum comes within reach of self-government.

Any exception to these affirmative aspects of Will constitutes uncertainty—the antithesis to Religion and Morality alike.

Uncertainty is the militant principle of latitudinarianism, or repeating succession; Certainty is the enduring principle of religion.

The active powers of Providence and Nature, which in the schemes of materiality and chemicality offer themselves to our notice as Cause, Effect, and Consequence *in one conception*, are:

Order, Chaos, and Neverness;
Affinity, Repulsion, and Neutrality;
Solidity, Fluidity, and Gasseity;
Gravity, Suspension, and Imparity;

Specific gravity, Equilibrium, and Volitation;
Light, Color, and Darkness;

Heat, Temperateness, and Cold.

How elementally Providential and Natural powers are interwoven to the universally agential sense of the mind, can be deducted or inducted from this table. These contents are but Categories and Degrees of the One mind, because the conceiving and recognizing mind must separate and differentiate as the faculty of agency, judgment and enactment. But it should always be remembered that all distinctions—even those of categories—are conditional unto Itself, and so not arrive at that pass of noumenal thought wherein all contradictions end in unity, instead of a unisonously essential contradistinction, enharmonious in space, time, and place. When the mind is at that pass of conception and recognition it imagines, vainly, what God, or Self, must be or consist of; and by so doing creates either a heaven or a hell within its own bosom. Pride of knowledge tends to these private and parallel ends or conclusions of mediation, while Humility, begotten by realizing the limitations of knowledge, keeps an open mind and abides in constitutional or unqualified agency, well knowing, above all things, its temporality. Self-qualification is the besetting sin of man.

Both the schemes of Providence and Nature contain the principles of production in affirmation and negation. The constructive passions of organism are the arrangements of nature; the destructive passions of organism are the convulsions of nature. Providence seeks expression, Nature, apportionment.

This agential position of the mind declares the necessity of selection.

Man's selective privilege, or option, offers two propositions, viz.,

Liberty to do as we please, and

Freedom to do what is appointed or should be done—two vastly differing offers, which present three ways of possible demonstration:

as License, which is personal;

as Liberty, which is communal; and

as Freedom, which is divine.

In *quality*, License is particular or personal; Liberty, social, national, racial or impersonal; Freedom, integral of all human nature.

In *force*, License is obstruction; Liberty, construction; and Freedom, creation.

In selection the better part of option is to vindicate the prerogatives of manhood. This possibility is given unto all men as "a divine gift and heavenly instinct not to be gotten by labor and learning alone," but by that kind of worship which seeks to be identic or timely with the primitive gift.

Man's selective privilege is only then commensurately warranted and fully met when he exercises it in unconditional view of God. Freedom refers positively to his spiritual being and only questionably to his animality or materiality. To seek what is within reach—genius—is waste of time to consummate personal or ambitious ends. The self-respecting recognition and acceptance of grace, as a divine offer, declare that kind of worship and work which ends in gracious redemption.

We need constantly to earn the gift to prove and continue worthy of it.

The native force of organic being is physical warmth or activity, known as "temperament."

By "temperament" we understand the inherent quantities of energy and force in ardent or organic life, regulatable by individual will or strength of purpose, or which—when energies and forces are at par—is self-regulating or instinctive.

A general temperament would be the union of the four well-known classes of animal heat activity. But there exists no kind of a personal temperament which, in a greater or lesser degree, does not share all the propositions involved in the general temperament—a fact which, more than any other, is the cause of man's unquestionable superiority over simple animal life. Temperament is the passionate and characteristic energy, or potential or spiritual force which courses through man's body; and whether or not this energy and force is powerful enough to bring forth great or small results, alters not one iota of the elemental intrinsicity of his creative and productive character, since in any event man cannot be otherwise than a giver and taker of the common inheritance of his kind.

The differences in his genius are not—and cannot be—integrally those of an amplified or manifold elemental nature in one man more than in another, but are only those of a certain temperament declaring a dominating character or scheme, or trend in the interest of appetite and desire; and this—not his spiritual or entitative nature—creates distinctions in men.

Now, recurrence is not a beginning but a succession to the spiritual part or sense of man's nature, or the result of an occurrence. To imagine every succession to be an occurrence is really dating the beginning of existence to the day of individual birth, in which thought there is nothing universally entitative of character present but the physical law of animal production and succession, an idea, which, taken as a principle, militates strongly against the integrality of its own genius. And if to this worship of the generative principle in nature is added a personal instead of an impersonal interest or enactment, then, indeed, belief must, logically, arrive at the conclusion that the universe is made for the especial edification of man and that creation is opportunistic. By this light man's genius can be nothing else than a particular and not a gracious endowment;—and that we are deeply steeped or saturated in or with opportunism, is evinced by the variable or temporal character of our civilization.

Most important to the understanding of our particular drift or predisposition are the inherent temperamental degrees of speed and duration, since either our mathematical or our dynamical incline is declared thereby to be either prevaillingly external or internal.

External or visible or motional time, space, place, and change, is established by planetary appearances, or regularity of cosmic recurrence and duration; internal or invisible or emotional time, etc., is established by organic vibrations, or regularity of physiological recurrence and duration. A third, or unconditional, or interrogative order of time, is established by the self-

evident necessity of reducing the previous two to a par or ratio, since the speed and duration of temperamental time is constantly subject to variations or changes. By interrogative time we harmonize or enharmonize quality and quantity, or the different aspects of the same thing, and obtain, by doing so, a standard for both appearance and phenomenon, or a ratio for the external and internal features of the same thing; and the obtaining of this ratio is the highest consummation of meditation.

Now, is it not for this very thing that Christ preached the necessity of a second birth—symbolized by baptism? Had He not actively understood the most essential and most fundamental and spontaneous of all human truth and requirements—virile mediation—He would have been, long ago, placed into that class of ethico-religious originators who succeeded only in establishing the ethical side or a certain cult of worship or religion instead of its spontaneously universal and ardent enactment. And as to the temperament of man, by what we have just now seen, it can hardly be said to come unqualifiedly under the environing and protective rules of organic nature, or limitation of enactment. It stands to reason that if man's subliminal or expansive power can end with products above the canons of physiological nature, then the opposite or contractive course of this power must end in products below the canons of physiological nature. And the doctrine of the two principles of good and evil—a proposition left by divine decree to interrogative time—simply declares man to be the sole agent of good and evil.

Cosmic and temperamental time tally dynamically but not mathematically, which proves that time is not duration nor speed, but simply the principle of change. Thus, for instance, the duration of a solar year agrees dynamically with the temperamental year of all organic being: as to birth or spring; youth or summer; ripeness or autumn; senescence or winter.* The confusion of standards always follows purely mathematical results;—and this mathematical monism, as the best standard of observation and conduct, clearly explains why and wherefore we harness our highest qualities to the pulling of secondary subjects and objects, and only casually consider the dynamical aspect of things—if we choose to consider them at all. The consequence is that we are, in a dynamical sense, not quite satisfied, nor modestly contented with our labors—something is missing continually. From a dynamical viewpoint mathematics are

*Dividing again these four seasons into twelve months or phases of the solar year and comparing the human with the solar cycle of time we obtain the following similitude:

Birth or Spring.

March—Infancy, or first incipency. Unconsciousness.

April—Babyhood, or relative concept of external things.

May—Childhood, or intuitive comparison of things.

Youth or Summer.

June—Early juvenility. Sub-consciousness.

July—Juvenility, or instinctive concept of inner and outer nature.

August—Late juvenility, or intuitive concept of inner and outer nature.

Ripeness or Autumn.

September—Early manhood. Consciousness.

October—Manhood, or physical and spiritual harmony.

November—Late manhood. Fruition.

Senescence or Winter.

December—Early senescence. Super or Self-consciousness. En-harmonic return to unconsciousness.

January—Senescence, or incipency of second infancy.

February—Late senescence. Sleep. Death.

the principle of all self-righteousness, in both religion and civilization. From one side we continually proclaim insufficiency, and from the other side incontinently proclaim self-sufficiency—which simply implies that we are dynamicians or Christians at heart, and mathematicians or pagans at head. Now, while a few combine or entertain both propositions and are true Christians, many more of us are professed or accidentally titular Christians; but the majority of us are neither Christian nor pagan, and only nondescript or mathematically civilized heathens—that is: a possible and feeble, or a fortuitous and strong representation of raw manhood.

Every temperament is mathematically conditional, but dynamically unconditional, that means its dynamic state serves or fulfills the enharmonious purposes of both God and nature, while its mathematical state only serves the harmonious purposes of Self and nature. And the mathematical state when deemed to be absolute or infallible ends in qualitative vitiation and quantitative substantiation.

The difference between the dynamically and mathematically grounded mind is, that the former realizes the enharmonic or spontaneous, and the latter the successive harmony of things; but only interrogative time, declared by the contra-distinctive or dual mind, can solve both propositions, by adding Place to time and space. Place is the principle of enharmony, or the same thing under different aspects, and is declared by the necessity of keeping place within space, due to the circularized limitations of the senses. Enharmony is to space, in a spiritual sense, what substance is in a ma-

terial sense, viz., Place. It is not a succession but an exchange. In our psychological and physiological unity, enharmony appears as the genius of place; harmony as the genius of space; and time as the genius of succession. It is solely due to the enharmonious faculty within us that the mind outranges our senses.

The principle of harmony is compound concordance, that of melody is simple concordance. The time of harmony is self-same, of melody deliberate; and one appears to the senses as vertically, the other as horizontally inclined. Harmony is known in music as Keynote, Mediant, and Dominant; in Psychology as God, Man, and Nature; in Theology, as Father, Son, and Spirit, etc., etc.

The progression or movement of triadic unities declares or contains both an outer and inner melody or tunefulness, consequently melody is singularized or specialized harmony and but second of source.

We unfold integratively only dynamically, and dis-integratively only mathematically. So, for instance, the mathematical trend of civilization—comprising theology, commercialism, and society—is constantly interrupted by the dynamical powers in man himself, seeking re-adjustment and equity; and to such a civilization the unexpected always happens—must happen—because the indispensable condition is not mathematical but dynamical. The difference between a mathematical and a dynamical mind occasions two, or, involvingly, diverse certainties regarding the same subject and object, for dynamical time is vital with the moment and mathematical time reflective of the moment. Yet these diverse

certainities are based upon the enharmonic truth that an accent is to dynamics what an integer is to mathematics, with this constitutional difference, that the former is experientially and the latter computatively or reflectively correct. And the accent and not the integer will, in the long run, always carry the day, since we cannot deny the priority of the inner over the outer power—not even in regard to outer interests or necessities, for the mere certainties of reflection reduce life to mechanism and its products to dust or ashes.

Preponderatingly or unequally preferred by disposition these experiential and reflective energies serve but time—on the one hand as divergently, on the other hand as convergently producing results; but complementally or mediatively applied they constitute the entitative genius of man which produces beyond change or time, because it agentially enharmonizes the inner and outer energies and forces of being, the results of which accord or correspond with the urgency of infinity.

The entitative genius of man is due to the enharmonious quality of the mind; divergent or convergent genius is due to the harmonious quality of the mind. Enharmonic thought, for instance, takes place when Cause *and* Effect are reducible to the same thing under two aspects; harmonious thought when Cause *or* Effect is reducible to its own scheme and contradistinctions. Particular genius is a conditional necessity, that is, it must be either centrifugal or centripetal of motion, while entitative genius is an unconditional necessity, *i. e.*, it is selectively centrifugal or centripetal. The former is governed by a predilective, the latter by an ordained

will. The ordained or unconditional will is the principle of entitative or impersonal, the individual or conditional will is the principle of centrifugal or centripetal genius; therefore under conditional aspects genius may possibly be fairly defined as "inborn nature," provided we are prepared to admit individual nature to be unalterably egotistic or only directable along its predilective course—a theorem we are not prepared to admit as unconditional. However be that as it may: the unfolding of entitative genius, in contradistinction or enlargement to divergent or convergent genius, is grounded on the instinctive, intuitive and tuitive comprehension of our being, the whole number of which is furnished by the unity of time's genealogical order—spontaneity, immediateness and proximity—as constituting the indispensable condition of mind for the entitative teaching of man. The indispensable condition furnishes the psychological moment, or the moment wherein all three time-conditions are one, and succession is no longer in the scheme of thought. The psychological moment, or entitative activity, is purely dynamical and not mathematical, because dynamicism is based upon the ordained and not on the speculative or ethical will which seeks the harmonic integer but not its enharmonic accent. The force of instinct is that of immediate want; the force of intuition is that of mediate want; and the force of tuition is that of proximate want—three propositions predating all entitative conclusions or enactments.

In view of this, predilective nature is not an elemental but an individual or reflected declaration, which, being particular or topical, seldom unfolds to entitative

dimensions, but usually ends in a self-radiating or self-centred individualism, to the presence of which all else is required subserviently. Its singularity is less a gift of Providence than a monism of inherent desire or appetite—a fact which invites the superficial belief that its logical pugnacity, persistence, and endurance, constitute the principle of “inborn nature” as essential genius. What is both Providential and Natural in man is the gift of enharmonization—the principle of which is the incontrovertible spirit of his being, or the keynote to his being.

Passion, first in the order of temperamental time, is dynamical existence and the principle of ardent dualism.

Worship, second in the order of temperamental time, is enharmonic existence, and the principle of ardent permutation.

Will, third in the order of temperamental time (but first in the order of visible time) is the unconditional accent of Passion and Worship, and the director of the generating forces of conditions into events.

The fluxious nature or interchangeable attributes of the Will—from third, in the order of temperamental, to first, in the order of cosmic time—is the cause of option, which, in effect, imposes upon man the necessity of selection. If this changeable, or constitutionally unstable, or assorting quality of the Will, is not considered as an enharmonious but only as a harmony seeking force, its third or entitatively conclusive place, in the vital concerns of human being is accidental, and it determines itself as an absolute factor in the mathematical interests of being, which—however conducive it may be to indi-

vidual intellection—is too categorical to admit or perceive the dynamic constituents and ramifications of indicative life; and being unable with this integer to solve or qualify the perplexities of dynamico-human nature, except in a private way, concludes self-qualification to be the highest attainment of man. This, after all, is but an admission how little nature has spoken for man, and, therefore, how much man is called upon to speak for himself—after which he usually concludes that he is Providence himself, or truth itself.

And, finally, Genius, as the unconditional phenomenon of Passion, Worship, and Will, is the convertibility of physical into spiritual principles, laws, and enactments; but any preference or non-recognition, as to the genealogical order of these three indivisible constituents of human nature, simply leads to particular affirmation or denial—a state of implied recognition instead of an ardently involved cognition. And Will is to genius—in its triune sense—what the ear is to the senses: a last tribunal of resort or adjudication.

Our native genius is, unfortunately, constantly particularized by the singularized infusion into us of that superciliously dogmatic and oracularly self-seeking genius of ancient pagandom—self-qualification—which really is the last thing in the world that entitative nature, or christendom, can truly advocate or unqualifiedly approve of. To the sincerely or dynamically Christianized mind, self-qualification is that private quality and caviling force of pagan genius that cannot distinguish the difference between a venial and a mortal sin, and glories in the fact that it is incapable of committing

either, perfectly oblivious that there are three classes of sin: the venial, advertising mental weakness; the self-godly, proclaiming moral lordliness; and the mortal, declaring spiritual mortification. However, there exists no sin in the decalogue which can so outrage the entitative sense as can this lordly spirit of self-certainty, for its technical stress upon the divine principle—enharmony—is ever the spiritual distress of our common nature. And the cardinal sin of entitative genius is neutralism; its cardinal error is succession. But when radial genius devotes itself to phenomania, and convergent genius dedicates itself to scientism, then there exist no steadier or more implacable controversialists on the globe than these two philosophized and philosophizing classes of self-qualifying geniuses. To this paganistic attitude of the self-qualifying mind is also to be ascribed *why*, of all arts, music could only exist theoretically in pagan times, though it was reduced to rules by Jubal 1800 years B. C., and had to remain so until the dynamical power of the Christianized mind gradually found its keynote. The spirit of music is perfectly consonant with the spontaneously militant and worshipful mind of Christianity or principle of life, and unfolded itself eventually after the coming of Christianity into the world.

The burden of entitative responsibility is an infinite blessing if man accepts what invariably accompanies the imposition, viz., that compensating grace which points to self-control and immolation as the sublimable consummation of his indicative being, and as the mode of transferring himself from the tyranny of self-evident

nature into the more satisfactory state of forensic thought with its deathless conclusions. While we are not only of nature yet never can entirely circumscribe or circumvent her dictum, there still remains, by the assumption of entitative responsibilities, a graciously accorded second birth, the force of which is powerful enough to command her quantities and qualities in the interests of our spiritual or prenatal welfare.

To resume:

Man's entitative or providential genius is the enharmonious qualification of his mind, the truth of which places him presciently above the rest of organic creation.

This genius is the indicative spirit of three relations in one, viz., Passion, Worship, and Will, but Passion is the vital principle of both motion and emotion, or action and reaction.

The prescient synthesis of this nature was first non-superstitiously revealed and taught to us by Christ.

The unfoldment, maintenance, and fruition of this prescient nature is decided by the worshipful supremacy of the individually unconditional Will over particular nature and passion, and until worshipfully decided remains either secular, incidental or vitiated of kind.

If any one of the three component factors of this prescient nature predominates, the other two are, entitatively speaking, in degree, contributive as dual and subdual quantities and qualities; but only when any of these factors as predominant is so supported by the other two do its products indicate an entity in relation with entirety, and that only then are such products infinite or immortal.

The human progression to divine consummation is
passional and serious, its recession mental and
humorous.

And this visible and invisible beginning and end of
our ordained nature is the incarnation of spiritual Love,
since only from its representative embodiment became
we fully aware what wondrous Truth, Salvation, and
Everlastingness are contained :


In a *Faith* not devoid of analysis and summation,
but of criticism ;

In a *Hope* not lacking in prayer, but in self-seeking ;
and, finally,

In a *Charity* whose end is not on earth, but in
Heaven.

Amen.

Amerika 5
Herrn
Herrn Carl Feininger
Componist
85. East 8th Street
Cor. 1st Avenue
New York City
U. S. of North America



The image contains four postmarks. Three are circular: the first on the left has 'AMERIKA' and '5' with some numbers; the middle one has 'JUN 12' and '1907'; the right one has '5'. A rectangular postmark is located over the address, with 'NEW YORK' and 'JUN 12' visible.

Sehr geehrter Herr,

Th: „Symphonischer Misch Gedicht
„Vom Anfang zum End“:
bezeugt eine außerordentlich
geistige Kraft und Gedanken Fühl.
Nicht minder erheblich ist
daran das musikalische Wissen
und Können, in der logischen
Anordnung der Sätze, und
der Instrumentation, Wirkungen
Ob das poetisch-metaphysische
Element nicht zu überwiegen,
wird sich beim Hören des Werkes
erweisen. Möge Ihnen baldig
die Aufführung und Veröfentlichung

Dieser ^{höchst} merkwürdigen Musik endlich
befriedigenden Lohn bringen.

Empfangen Sie, sehr geehrter
Herr, den geraden Ausdruck
meiner drutlichen Anerkennung
und Hochschätzung.

Sehr ergebent
J. Schübe

22 Mai 71 Weimar

Ich beauftrage J. Schübeuth/Leipzig,
Ihnen das Manuscript zurück
zu senden.

(TRANSLATION.)

“Mr. Karl Feininger, New York.

“Very Honored Sir:—Your symphonic poem, ‘From Beginning to End,’ shows an extraordinary power of mind and richness of thought. Not less elevating therein is the musical knowledge and ability to do (Wissen und Können) in the logical order of entirety and instrumental effects.

Whether the poetic-metaphysical element be not too preponderating will be shown on hearing of the work.

“May the early production and publication of this highly remarkable music-poem bring you satisfactory reward.

“Receive herewith, very honored sir, the straightforward expression of my earnest recognition and esteem.

“Very sincerely yours,

“F. LISZT.

“22 May, 1871, Weimar.”

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